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ABSTRACT 
A central question in the field of global studies is how does the development planning of 
emerging economies address social inequality? The emerging economies have achieved 
remarkable economic success in recent years; however, this success has also accompanied new 
challenges of mega-urbanization, new rural and urban poverty and inequality. This has prompted 
a reexamination of the growth strategies in countries such as India and China who have made 
“inclusive growth” as their central goal of development planning. 
In the context of inclusive growth, urban development has emerged as a key problematic 
that seeks to balance high growth and reduction in poverty and inequality. Growth has fueled 
national ambitions for increasing power in world politics and the global market and cities are 
viewed as key actors in sustaining this growth. In this context, growth gets normalized, masking 
its inequities, unevenness, and contestations. Therefore, any serious discussion about inclusive 
growth in emerging economies has to take into account the complex urban realities within these 
societies and the challenges involved in making growth inclusive. 
Taking Mumbai—India’s “global city”—as a case, this dissertation explores competing 
claims of urban development among diverse stakeholders in the city (including planners, 
business associations, civic organizations, activists, and poor peoples’ movements) in the context 
of the recent national growth strategy in India that gives primacy to cities. I analyze the 
genealogies of emerging local (urban) development imaginaries, modeled after “successful” 
Asian cities, particularly Shanghai. In doing so, I focus on the processes, actors, visions, and 
practices that constitute and contest these urbanization strategies. The study was based on twelve 
months of field work (archival research, interviews, and ethnographic observation) in Mumbai. 
The study contributes in problematizing taken-for-granted assumptions of growth in the 
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emerging economies and calls for broad-based inclusive development that focuses on the quality 
and welfare implications of growth.  
Some of the key findings of the study are: 
~Shanghaization as an urban growth strategy was produced and sustained by a constellation of 
actors operating at multiple scales involving the corporate sector, the national and subnational 
state, and the urban middle classes. 
~As a model of development, Shanghaization is narrowly focused on growth rather than broad-
based development. As an entrepreneurial model, it privileges the urban middle-classes and does 
not address structural poverty and inequality in the city. 
~Shanghaization is not merely a metropolitan imaginary, but has emerged as a national urban-
centric model of development in India that is premised on uneven development. 
~By challenging the narrow economic assumptions in development thinking, the poor people’s 
movements in the city open up possibilities for ground-up, broad-based developmental 
alternatives that are equitable and sustainable.  
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INTRODUCTION 
~“Indian cities will be the locus and engine of economic growth over the next two decades, and 
the realization of an ambitious goal of 9—10 per cent growth in GDP depends fundamentally on 
making Indian cities much more livable, inclusive, bankable, and competitive.” (Eleventh Five 
Year Plan (2007-2012), Planning Commission, Government of India 2008:394). 
 
A central question in the field of global studies is how does the development planning of 
emerging economies address social inequality?
1
 Emerging economies, particularly in Asia, have 
achieved spectacular economic success in the last few decades (Harris 2005; Nederveen Pieterse 
2008b; Prestowitz 2005).
2
 For years now, growth rates in the global South (particularly in India 
and China) have far exceeded those of the North (Nederveen Pieterse 2008b). There is a 
widespread optimism that in this “Global-Asian Era,” the new economic dynamism in Asia, led 
by India and China, would alter the international political economy dominated by the 
“transatlantic West,” thereby reshaping the world (Kaplinsky and Dessner 2006:197). Sustained 
growth in the past few decades has led to significant improvements in living conditions and a 
decline in extreme poverty in the world.
3
 However, this growth has also brought with it 
numerous challenges—mega-urbanization, new rural and urban poverty, and inequality—that 
threaten to derail the progress of growth and poverty reduction (Commission on Growth and 
Development 2008; Davis 2004; 2006; Dicken 2003; Mittleman 2006; Nederveen Pieterse 
2008b; 2009; Sassen 1999). For example, in India although there has been a decline in urban 
poverty (largely attributed to the increasing rate of urbanization), the absolute number of the 
urban poor has increased in recent years. Moreover, the incidence of decline in urban poverty has 
                                                          
1
 Some scholars prefer to use the term “emerging societies” to emphasize a sociologically rich understanding of the 
internal debates within the emerging economies that focus not only on the economic dynamism, but also the social 
and political processes that shape it and are shaped by it (Nederveen Pieterse and Boike Rehbin, 2009b). This study 
supports this endeavor.  
2
 Investment bankers have coined the term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) to refer to a special category of 
countries which have sustained high growth rates. See Harris (2005) and Prestowitz (2005). 
3
 However, some scholars are critical of these dominant claims on poverty reduction. For example, see Wade (2004).  
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not accelerated with the GDP growth (Government of India 2009). Therefore, it is imperative to 
understand the developmental trajectory of emerging economies. As Nederveen Pieterse (2009b) 
puts it:  
How the development path of emerging economies relates to social inequality; what is the 
relationship between economic vitality in emerging economies and social inequality? Are social 
inequality and multi-speed economies built into the pattern of accumulation such that if inequality 
recedes accumulation declines, or is the development path geared towards reducing inequality? 
Where do the emerging economies lay their growing weight—with growth without equity or 
growth with equity? (P. 4) 
However, the uneven and unequal nature of growth in emerging economies has not unnoticed 
and has recently prompted a reexamination of existing growth policies. As a result of this, 
“inclusive growth” has emerged as a new development paradigm in many countries that seeks to 
focus not only on the pace, but also on the quality and pattern of growth.
4
 Recently, countries 
such as India and China have made inclusive growth as the center piece of their development 
planning (Fewsmith 2004; Planning Commission, Government of India 2006; 2011; State 
Council of China 2006).  
In planning for inclusive growth, urban development has emerged as a key problematic 
that seeks to balance high growth and reduction in poverty and inequality. Cities are extremely 
important for growth. As highlighted by the urban studies literature in the West, due to the 
agglomerative nature of global capitalism, cities (“world/global cities”) are assuming a more 
central role in the world economy (Abu-Lughod 1989; Arrighi 1994; Braudel 1986; Friedmann 
[1986] 1995; King 1990; Renntich 2006; Sassen 1991; 2001).
5
 Moreover, the shift of global 
trade toward Asia has led to the spectacular rise of cities in the Asian world and with that a 
                                                          
4
 At this point, it is worth mentioning that there is more to development than growth and poverty. Questions of 
equality, dignity, and justice are vital for development. In this context, refer to Nederveen Pieterse (2002) for a 
critique of the contemporary poverty-centric approach of development. 
5
 In 2009, cities accounted for 70 per cent of the world’s GDP (World Bank 2009). In India, 62 per cent of the GDP 
is generated in towns and cities (Government of India, 2009: xv). 
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renewed interest in urban development in this region (Amin and Thrift 2002; Roy 2009). While 
the recent financial crisis has somewhat dented the reputation of New York, London, and Tokyo, 
cities such as Singapore and Dubai have emerged as new centers of global finance (Roy and Ong 
2011). Increasing importance of cities in the Asian world has reconfigured national growth 
strategies, thereby altering the dynamics between national growth and urban development. To 
seek global prominence, Asian states are systematically orchestrating growth by “reinventing” 
their cities through extensive centralized political and economic investment.
6
 The role models for 
these Asian cities are no longer cities in the West, but other “successful” cities in Asia. In this 
context, Ong (2011:5) highlights that there has emerged an “inter-Asian horizon of metropolitan 
and global aspirations” based on distinctive practices of urban modeling and inter-referencing 
within Asian cities.  
In the above contest, the “urban” has emerged as a key subject of development planning. 
Driven by “urbanization for growth” strategies promoted by dominant multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, predominantly rural countries such as 
India and China are introducing ambitious urban renewal programs that focus on improving 
urban infrastructure, quality of life, and governance, primarily aimed to facilitate fast growth 
(World Bank 2009b).
7
 In this excessively growth-centered environment, growth discourses 
inundate the popular media and the elite boardrooms of planners and business groups. These 
discourses tend to normalize growth, masking its inequities, unevenness, and contestations. 
Given this context, there is a need to strengthen the inclusive growth debate through a critical 
                                                          
6
 In the Indian context, see Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s quote on p. 75. 
7
 In India, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) represents one such ambitious urban 
renewal scheme launched in December, 2005 for the integrated development of urban infrastructure and services in 
63 cities across India. Around Rs. 50,000 crore of reform-linked central assistance is to be provided under this 
scheme over a period of seven years. For additional details on JNNURM refer to its website (http://jnnurm.nic.in/). 
A recent New York Times article mentioned an ambitious Chinese plan to move 250 million rural residents into 
newly constructed towns and cities over the next decade or so. For further details, refer to Ian Johnson, “China’s 
Great Uprooting: Moving 250 million into Cities,” New York Times, June 15, 2013. 
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examination of the (rephrasing Ong) “emerging horizon of metropolitan growth aspirations” in 
the emerging economies. This is further supported by a shift in the emphasis of development 
policy toward the territorial dynamics, rather than national averages in understanding growth and 
development (CMEPSP 2009; UNCDF 2012). In this regard, a place-specific analysis of growth 
would be extremely productive to shift the focus away from a static, value-neutral, numerically-
driven, and taken-for-granted understanding of growth, to a more dynamic, context-specific, and 
contested understanding of what constitutes growth and how growth discourses are produced in 
specific contexts.     
The Research Agenda 
In light of recent development economics that emphasizes the importance of shared, inclusive 
growth (Ali and Zhuang 2007; Commission on Growth and Development 2008; MGI 2010; 
Planning Commission 2006; 2011; Rodrik 2006; 2008; Stiglitz 1998; State Council of China 
2006; UNCDF 2013; World Bank 2009a), this study seeks to analyze:  
 Contemporary growth strategies in emerging economies and how they relate to poverty 
and inequality. 
 Do they reflect a narrow development approach that privileges middle class interests or 
are they broad-based and inclusive? 
 The study tries to do this through the case study of Mumbai (India’s “global city”) by 
examining the developmental visions and contestations of what is popularly referred to as 
“Shanghaization” of Mumbai (a recent growth strategy modeled after “successful” Asian 
cities, particularly Shanghai), within the dominant city-centric growth strategy in India.
8
  
                                                          
8
 Bombay was officially renamed as Mumbai in 1995 by the right-wing Hindu fundamentalist Shiv Sena-led state 
government. Henceforth in the dissertation, while referring to the city, I will alternate between Bombay and 
Mumbai, depending on the historical period that is being discussed. 
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Bombay/Mumbai has been India’s premier city and has been characterized as India’s most 
modern city (Patel 2004). This view of Bombay/Mumbai has not only been based on its 
economic vitality, but also its cultural appeal as India’s most cosmopolitan city based on the 
diversity of people, arts, theater, literature, music, and films that it has nurtured over the years.
9
 
However, the city is also notorious for its seamy underbelly of crime and the underworld as well 
as its right-wing anti-migrant and anti-Muslim urban movement since the 1960s in the form of 
Shiv Sena. However, since the early 1990s, there is one imaginary that has taken center stage and 
captured the hearts and minds of people (particularly of the elite in the city)—that of 
transforming Mumbai into a “world class city.”          
In the post-reform context, the national political and business elite have reinforced 
Mumbai’s role as the driving force of India’s economic integration in the world economy. 
Simultaneously, since the mid 1990s, urban planning in Mumbai is guided by entrepreneurial 
and technocratic visions of transforming the city into a “world class city,” emulating the model 
of Shanghai. Recently, the Prime Minister of India expressed a desire to “reinvent” Mumbai as 
the “new financial capital of Asia” to strategically integrate the Indian economy with the finance-
driven world economy. This vision draws its inspiration from Shanghai and its success in 
complete transforming itself within a short period of time. For example, during 1992 to 2007, 
Shanghai experienced the fastest economic growth by any megacity in the world, averaging 12 
percent annually! 
As a development model, “Shanghaization” symbolizes “fast-growth” based on real-
estate revitalization to make the city internationally competitive. In Mumbai this has take the 
                                                          
9
 For example, the cosmopolitan ideal is reflected in a variety of cultural spheres. Bombay/Mumbai has been the 
birthplace of modern Indian painting and progressive modern theater in both English and native languages. It is also 
the home of the radical Dalit literature, produced primarily by the historically most oppressed castes. It also houses, 
Bollywood, India’s premier film industry.  
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form of gentrifying former industrial districts, redeveloping slums, and regulating public space in 
an effort to spur foreign investment. These redevelopment practices have resulted in the 
displacement of the low-income residents (mainly industrial workers, slum dwellers, and street 
vendors) from the central parts of the city to the urban periphery. However, these transformations 
have also engendered various poor people’s movements in Mumbai that have made demands for 
housing, livelihood, and good governance.  
There is substantial literature on Mumbai documenting certain aspects of contemporary 
transformation in Mumbai: deindustrialization, informalization of work, and economic and 
spatial restructuring (Banerjee-Guha 2002; Bhowmik and More 2001; Deshpande and 
Deshpande 2003; D’monte 2002; Ghorpade 2005); poverty and declining living standards for the 
poor (Swaminathan 2003); the growing middle classes (Fernandes 2000; Nijman 2006); and the 
privatization of basic services, especially in the area of health and housing (Mohan 2005). There 
are also studies that have analyzed contemporary transformation in Mumbai in relation to 
globalization (Banerjee-Guha 2002; Patel 2003; 2004). There are also studies that provide a 
descriptive account of Shanghaization and its immediate politics (Mahadevia 2008b; Mahadevia 
and Narayan 2005).  
However, this study differs from the above studies in several ways: 
~None of the above studies have systematically analyzed Shanghaization as an urban strategy of 
growth and development in a broader context of inclusive growth in India.  
~Further, even those that focus on Shanghaization have not analyzed the contextual specificities 
within which the Shanghai model emerged as a dominant discourse of development in China and 
India.  
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~In addition to this, these studies ignore the agential and contested aspects of urban development 
in Mumbai.
10
  
This study tries to fill the above gaps by analyzing the deeper contingencies of urban 
development in Mumbai by focusing on the processes, actors, visions, and practices that 
constitute and contest urban growth strategies such as Shanghaization. In doing this, the study 
problematizes the taken-for-granted assumptions of growth in India and calls for broad-based 
inclusive development that goes beyond economic growth to focus on the quality and welfare 
implications of this growth. Finally, it critiques the prevalent economic hegemony in 
development thinking by incorporating ground-up, broad-based alternatives of development that 
are equitable and sustainable. 
Cities and Globalization 
There is a large literature available on the theme of cities and globalization. The study is guided 
by a deeper, historically informed understanding of globalization as a longue durée process 
based on cross border exchange of capital, goods, and people (Arrighi 1994; Hobson 2004; 
Hopkins 2002; Nederveen Pieterse 2006). Based on this approach, it is found that cities have 
historically constituted as key nodes that sustained wider networks of production, exchange, and 
culture (Abu-Lughod 1989; Arrighi 1994; Braudel 1986; King 1976; 1990; Rennstich 2006). 
Historically, much of these exchanges took place either in the context of empires or in an inter-
state system (Sassen 2001). However, since 1960s, the increased mobility of capital and the 
financialization of the world economy based on advances in global communication technologies 
have further accentuated the strategic role of cities in the world economy beyond the boundaries 
of the nation state (Sassen 1991; 2001). Moreover, since 1980s, we have witnessed a increasing 
influence of neoliberal policies that have added onto this “globalization package” certain other 
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 A few notable exceptions include Anjaria (2009) and Harris (2008). 
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features, namely, deregulation, marketization, financialization and securitization, and the lean 
government (Nederveen Pieterse 2004:1). As a result of these changes, there has been a 
structural transformation in governance, policy making, and accumulation, leading to a rescaling 
of the state and devolution of power to the subnational levels (Brenner 1999). The rescaling of 
the state has also accompanied an increasing role of global institutions and private actors in 
urban development. As a result of these changes, there is a growing interest in theorizing the link 
between contemporary globalization and urbanization, especially in terms of how global and 
local forces interact in shaping the city. In the following section, I discuss four such 
perspectives/approaches that inform this study, namely, the capitalist city, the global city, the 
neoliberal city, and the contested city. 
The capitalist city and the “created” environment 
In the 1970s and the early 1980s, there was a “paradigm shift” in urban studies in the US led by 
new critical approaches that questioned the dominant functionalist paradigm of the ecological 
approach of the Chicago School (Gottdiener and Feagin 1988; Walton 1993).
11
 This “new urban 
sociology” (Zukin 1980) or urban political economy viewed urbanism as a “particular 
geographical form of spatial patterning of relationships taken by a particular mode of production 
and the process of capitalist accumulation” (King 1990:72). Rather than seeing urbanism as an 
inevitable or natural process, it was understood as a “created” environment influenced by the 
processes of capitalist accumulation.  
 Harvey (1989b) uses the term “space time compression” and “spatial fix” to describe the 
apparent contradictory logic of capitalist accumulation. On the one hand, contemporary 
globalization has led to the elimination of geographical barriers to capitalist accumulation, while 
                                                          
11
 For example, see Castells (1983) and Harvey (1973). Even though this new critical approach was labeled as “new 
urban sociology,” most of the researchers were from diverse disciplines such as urban planning, political science, 
and geography (Gottdiener and Feagin 1988). 
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on the other hand, this geographical expansion of capitalism is itself premised on the production 
of relatively stable and immobile geographical landscapes such as the built environments, 
transportation infrastructure, production and business complexes, and communication networks.  
 However, the new urban sociological research had an intra-national focus and there was 
not much cross-national analysis or a broader discussion at the level of the world economy. 
Moreover, most of this research was grounded in cities of Europe and North America and there 
was less focus on cities in Asia and Africa. Nonetheless, the key contribution of new urban 
sociology was that it provided the critical tools to understand the conflictual nature of urbanism. 
Later, influenced by the world systems theory (Wallerstein 1984), scholars began to connect 
localized processes of urbanization to structural economic changes in the world economy. It was 
increasingly recognized that urbanization could not be understood solely through the political 
economy of regions or within the boundaries of nation states and that there was a need for an 
“analytic disarticulation of cities and nations” (Davis 2005: 97). Inspired by the dependency 
school’s approach of exploring the “global context of national development,” urban sociologists 
began to understand cities on the basis of capitalist development on the global scale (Davis 
2005). Thus, urbanism in the “periphery” was understood in relation to the capitalist processes in 
the “core.” The “development” of cities in the South and their function, organization, and form 
was understood in terms of their incorporation into the world-economy (King 1990).     
 The capitalist city approach sensitizes us to the role of power and ideology in shaping the 
urban environment and therefore, it promotes a critical understanding of urban development. 
However, as critics have argued, new urban sociology tends to be too economistic and simplistic 
in its analysis (Walton 1993). By privileging economic perspectives, new urban sociology often 
ignored history and culture as critical variables in explaining urbanism (King 1990). 
10 
 
 
The global city and the geography of centrality and marginality 
Building upon the “world city theory” popularized mainly through the writings of Friedmann 
([1986] 1995), Saskia Sassen (1991; 2001) proposed a “global city” model based on an empirical 
analysis of New York, London, and Tokyo. The “global city” model argues that along with the 
geographical spread of economic activities, there is a need for an amalgamation or centralization 
of these dispersed activities. This has resulted in the emergence of a centralized corporate 
structure in order to coordinate the operations of a firm (Sassen 1991; 2000a). Due to their 
relative densities, cities enable such agglomeration of activities and, therefore, acquire a new 
strategic role in the functioning of the world economy (Sassen 1991).  
 A “global city” is “a place where certain kinds of work can get done” and the “things” it 
makes are highly specialized services and financial goods (Sassen 2001: 5). By defining the role 
of global cities in such a manner, Sassen helps us to rethink the dichotomy of manufacturing and 
services by focusing on the “practice of global control” (emphasis added) where global cities 
“produce” high-level business services. However, this global control is not possible through a 
single city, but based on coordinated network of cities that produce a “geography of centrality,” 
bringing together major international financial and business centers such as New York, London, 
Tokyo, Paris, and Frankfurt. But on the other hand, dominant manufacturing centers and port 
cities become peripheral in this process, leading to a simultaneous “geography of marginality” 
(Sassen 2000a). This geography of centrality and marginality is also reflected within cities in 
form of increasing informalization that accompanies the growth of a specialized service sector.                       
 Over the years, the “global city” has become a hegemonic analytic in the academia that 
articulates the dynamics between cities and globalization. Even outside the academic realm, the 
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“world/global city” talk has become influential in urban policy circles. In cities of the global 
South, the “world/global city” is increasingly used as a frame of reference for growth and 
development. The “global city” approach has also generated a lot of criticism from scholars from 
the South. These scholars have been particularly critical of the universal claims of such theories 
and their unwitting perpetuation of power hierarchies. Robinson (2002) argues that in urban 
studies cities outside the West are assessed with a “pre-given standard of (world) city-ness” (p. 
531). Further, it is argued that the urban hierarchies constructed by most world/global city 
theorists are not merely analytical tools, but also “status yardsticks” that “measure cities in terms 
of their global economic linkages, to locate their place in a hierarchy of nested cities, and to 
assess their potential to join the super league” (Yeoh 1999:608). Smith (2002) argues that the 
concept of “world/global city” provide a static picture of the urban world and does not 
sufficiently explain the dynamism of place construction. The world/global city literature is also 
criticized on grounds that it ignores local historical contexts and “overstates the power of actors 
and institutions operating on a global level and underestimates local agency and contingency” 
(Shatkin 2007:1). Thus, the “world/global city” approach ends up reifying cities as abstract 
economic spaces. 
The neoliberal city: “urbanization of neoliberalism” 
It has been argued that the development of neoliberalism has been highly uneven across different 
social-spatial scales (global, regional, national, or urban), rendering it polycentric and multiscalar 
in character (Leitner et al. 2007). However, it is most manifest, visible, and open to contestation 
at the urban scale (Brenner and Theodore 2002:367). Thus, cities are at the forefront of 
neoliberalization (Brenner and Theodore 2002).  
12 
 
 The emerging “neoliberal city” is characterized by the following features. First, an 
entrepreneurial city that focuses on competition with other cities for investments, innovations, 
and “creative classes.” Second, a city in which municipal governance dedicated for social 
development is replaced by professional quasi-public agencies promoting economic 
development, privatization of urban services, and competition among public agencies. Finally, a 
city whose residents are expected to behave responsibly, entrepreneurially, and prudently and 
who are responsible for their own successes and failures (Leitner et al. 2007:4) 
 Neoliberal urbanism is also characterized by a change in the nature of urban governance 
from managerialism of the 1960s to entrepreneurialism in the 1970s and 1980s (Harvey 1989a). 
Led by powerful business interests, cities are increasingly taking an entrepreneurial approach to 
economic development prioritizing innovations and public-private partnerships to attract 
investments and jobs. In this context, cities resort to several neoliberal strategies such as place-
marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development 
corporations, public-private partnerships, local boosterism, property redevelopment among 
several others (Brenner and Theodore 2002:368).  
 Thus the primary goal of neoliberal policy experiments is to “mobilize city space as an 
arena for both market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices” (Brenner 
and Theodore: 368). However, it is important to understand the agency that drives this 
entrepreneurial activity. In this regard, it is argued that the power to organize space is conflict-
ridden and involves a wide variety of social actors coming together to form broader coalitions 
facilitated by the government. These coalitions usually consists of local chambers of commerce, 
local financers, industrialists, business leaders, real estate and property developers, educational 
13 
 
and religious institutions, local labor organizations, political parties, social movements, and local 
state agencies (Harvey 1989a; Molotch 1976).  
 In a democratic environment, emerging growth strategies need to be perceived as serving 
the greater common good. Therefore, the task for these growth coalitions is not merely to create 
the material conditions for growth, but also discursively generate a consensus for growth. In 
order to do this, pro-growth lobbies engage in civic boosterism through their business journals 
and daily newspapers. Therefore, it is through the “power of machine language” that shapes 
everyday life that emerging growth is normalized (Jonas and Wilson 1999:8).  
The contested city: embeddedness and alternatives  
It is argued that the manner in which global economic forces localize and get realized in various 
national and urban contexts depend on the specific economic and socio-spatial contexts. Thus, 
there is a distinction between the neoliberal ideology (market forces operate as immutable laws) 
and “actually existing neoliberalism” because neoliberal projects are contextually embedded 
(nationally, regionally, and locally) within “inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, 
regulatory practices, and political struggles” (Brenner and Theodore 2002:350). Therefore, the 
process of incorporation of global forces is always contested, generating possibilities of 
alternative claim-making and citizenship (Sassen 2000b). As Leitner et al. (2007) argue, 
“contestation is integral to the emergence of neoliberal regimes and remains closely articulated 
with neoliberalism.”  
 Leitner et al. (2007) conceptualize contestation in a broad manner. Contestation is not 
merely conceived as imaginaries and practices that resist or respond to neoliberalism, but also 
involves those that existed prior to the embedding of neoliberalization and which lie outside the 
14 
 
scope of the neoliberal framework. As a result of this, they are resilient to neoliberalism and can 
potentially rework it (Leitner et al. 2007:5). As Leitner et al. argue: 
[T]here exist non-neoliberal social and spatial imaginaries, alternative forms of subject 
formulation, and newly emerging practices of contestation that include alternative economic and 
social practices and innovative alliances across multiple axes of social difference” (Leitner et al. 
2007:22). 
Therefore, the emerging urban politics is much more complex than the binary opposition of an 
“urban glamour zone” and an “urban war zone” (Hamel et al. 2000:8). It is a result of 
contradicting visions of “whose city is it.” The day to day urban struggles constantly involve 
both negotiation and conflict and very specific demands and victories, but nonetheless they do 
contribute to the overall nature of development of the city. The emergent urban politics may not 
always take the form of contestation, but can also be collaborative in nature (for example, public-
private partnership). In this context, it is observed that there are three different kinds of struggles 
emerging in global cities: first, are less institutionalized and spontaneous movements dealing 
with the costs (poverty, income inequality) of gentrification, displacement, and pollution; 
second, those that are based on institutionalized cooperation with the state in the form of public-
private partnerships in dealing with urban repair in the context of urban decay and marginality 
(community-based organizations); third, are the episodic, spontaneous, and disruptive new poor 
people’s movements that deal with the erosion of the welfare state that challenge the legitimacy 
of local policies of exclusion (Hamel et al. 2000:9-14).  
 However, urban politics may not always take the form of organized social movements 
striving for “social transformation” or “emancipation” (Bayat 1997:57). But as Bayat (1997) 
argues, the everyday informal politics of diverse groups of “floating” population such as 
migrants, refugees, unemployed, squatters, street vendors, and other marginalized groups may 
take the form of the “encroachment of the ordinary.” This kind of politics is not long-lasting or 
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collectively organized, but mostly spontaneous and individualistic, driven primarily by the 
necessity to survive and live a dignified life.  
 Based on this broader view of contestation, we need to explore contextually specific 
interactions between the emerging market-oriented restructuring projects (within the inherited 
historical and institutional landscape of the city) and their contestations at multiple socio-
political scales. It is not only important to understand top-down neoliberal urban restructuring, 
but also the “bottom-up” and “sideways” contestation and accommodation between neoliberal 
and non-neoliberal imaginaries and practices that collectively shape the future of the city.  
Methodology 
The city and the text: critical urban discourse analysis  
This study uses discourse analysis as a tool to critique dominant urban growth discourses in 
Mumbai. Discourse analysis has been an important theme in international development studies 
(Apthorpe and Gasper 1996; Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Nederveen Pieterse 2011) and in critical 
development studies (Munck & O’Hearn 1999).12 As a tool of criticism, discourse analysis is 
particularly useful in “critiquing hegemonic discourses and exposing its silences, omissions and 
double talk” based on its critical appraisal of development policy, official texts, and development 
thinking (Nederveen Pieterse 2011: 239).
13
 In the field of international development studies, 
discourse analysis has remained an influential component of the post-development approach 
(Escobar 1995; Sachs 1992). Although its merits as an interpretive methodology have been 
widely recognized, as an ideology, post-development has been criticized for its “development 
                                                          
12
 Given the constraint of space, I do not provide a comprehensive review of discourse analysis, but only restrict 
myself to discourse analysis in the interdisciplinary fields of development and urban studies. However, it should be 
noted that discourse analysis informs multiple disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, linguistics, psychology, 
geography among other, and the use of discourse analysis differs in each of them in terms of their assumptions, 
analysis, and methodologies.  
13
 For example, see Rew (1997) and Tucker (1999). 
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agnosticism” (Nederveen Pieterse 2011:238) and its inability to alternative policy perspectives 
(Corbridge 1998; Nederveen Pieterse 2010).  
Recently, discourse analysis has gained widespread acceptance in the field of urban 
policy research (Hajer 1993; Hastings 1999; Fairclough 1985; 1992; 1995; Jacobs 1999; 2006; 
Lees 2004).
14
 It is acknowledged that along with actual planning decisions, it is equally 
important to analyze the power and ideological conflicts that shape the deliberation of policy 
implementation and to recognize the important role of language in the policy arena (Jacobs 
2006). A closer examination of language in the form of utterances and texts in the policy context 
provides a more nuanced understanding of the policy process.  
Social reality is mediated through discourse and there is an ongoing struggle over its 
meaning (See Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In this discursive struggle, there is a broad array of 
discourses competing to establish their version of the social world. When discourses become 
hegemonic, the social practices they embody become “common sense” masking their political 
contingency (Gramsci 1971; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Therefore, discursive and non-discursive 
worlds are not antithetical to each other, but dialectically constitute each other (Fairclough 
1992). As shown ably by Michael de Certeau (1984: 125), language is not merely expressive, but 
also productive as discourses “open a field” for social practices. In the same context, Fairclough 
et al. (2004) explain, “people not only act and organize in particular ways, they also represent 
their ways of acting and organizing, and produce imaginary projections of new or alternative 
ways, in particular discourses” (p. 2).15 Therefore, the manner in which actions are represented in 
language is also important. 
                                                          
14
 For a critical appraisal of different approaches as well as studies using discourse analysis in urban policy research, 
see Jacobs (2006). Also, see Urban Studies (1999) for an initial discussion on discourse analysis. 
15
 Cited in Jacobs (2006:40). 
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However, discourse analysis is not free from criticisms. One particularly important 
criticism leveled against discourse analysis is worth noting here. Discourse analysis is criticized 
for privileging individual agency and subjectivity over structural factors (Jessop 1991; Badcock). 
In a similar vein, Nederveen Pieterse (2011) argues that in order for discourse analysis to be 
more effective and avoid the trap of “discursivism,” it needs to go beyond the discourse and link 
the discourse to political economy and take into account the wider political and economic 
context. Guided by these criticisms, this study is influenced by Norman Fairclough’s “critical 
discourse analysis” (CDA) (1989; 1992; 1995) which is sensitive to the context of power and 
political economy and connects discourses to broader political and economic contexts.  Unlike 
the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe which contends that the social world is wholly 
constituted by the discourse, the CDA distinguishes between the discursive and non-discursive 
worlds, which mutually constitute each other through a dialectical relationship. Therefore, 
according to CDA, discourse is a “way of talking about and acting upon the world which both 
constructs and is constructed by a set of social practices” (Candlin and Maley 1997:202, cited in 
Rear N.d). As Fairclough puts it, “discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but 
of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning (Fairclough 
1992:64).  
However, this process of representing and constructing the world is a contested one, 
where different groups compete to establish a particular version of social “reality” in order to 
pursue their objectives. And the methodological assumption that guides CDA is that is that 
“these conflicts are revealed in texts and speech as well as in the actions of individuals, interest-
groups and government agencies” (Fairclough 1999:203). 
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According to Lee (2004), methodologically, discourse analysis generally involves 
highlighting of two things: “first, the interpretive context, that is the social setting within which 
discourse is located; second, the rhetorical organization of the discourse, that is the 
argumentative schema that organize a text and establish its authority” (p. 104). Based on the 
analysis of spoken or written texts, Fairclough (1992) proposed a three-dimensional framework 
of discourse analysis involving the text analysis, discursive practice, and social practice which 
connects the individual discursive event (“language use”) to wider aspects of social practice.16 
Jacobs (2006:42) summarizes the three dimensions as follows: 
1. Text analysis—the actual analysis of the text, its structure, vocabulary and grammar. 
2. Discursive practice—the analysis of the processes in which texts are produced and the 
context in which policy statements are made and how they relate to other debates and 
literature. 
3. Social practice—a study of discourse in relation to wider structures and ideology. 
Personal research narrative 
Having lived in Mumbai for several years as a child and intermittently as an adult, I am familiar 
with the changing ethos of the city. My initial interest in the city was in studying the postcolonial 
transformation of the textile mill-district in Mumbai, Girangaon (the village of the mills). The 
textile industry was the sweat and blood of Mumbai for more than a hundred years. As a child, I 
was enamored by the stories narrated by people who worked in the mills. Bombay for me then 
symbolized a city of the working classes. Even though I was too young to understand some of 
the dramatic struggles waged by the mill workers in the turbulent 1980s, I do have visual 
memories of how the social and physical landscape of the city was shaped by the mills: be it the 
                                                          
16
 Although, there are competing definitions of discourse and discourse, Van Dijk (1997:3) provides an interesting 
way to understand the difference between “discourse” and “discourse analysis” where he defines “discourse” simply 
as “language use” and “discourse analysis” as “the study of talk and text in context” (Cited in Jacobs 2006).  
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towering mills that dotted the skylines of Mumbai, the series of wholesale cloth stores in the 
mill-district, or the cultural festivities of the mill-workers and their families (especially the most 
popular Ganesh festival). However, over a period of time, I realized that the mill-district was one 
(arguably one of the most important) among several important elements of transformation taking 
place in Mumbai. Moreover, as I studied existing urban studies literature, I came to realize that 
there was merit in understanding the transformations in Mumbai at a much broader level. 
Mumbai of the 1990s and 2000s had become noticeably different than the one in the 1980s and 
earlier. In the post-reform period, the city was introduced to foreign products, cable network, 
malls, and “world class city” desires. A section of the city-elite were now talking about a 
complete “make-over” of the city, of transforming it into a “world class city” to the likes of 
Shanghai. It is in this context that I reformulated my research idea. I was now more interested in 
understanding the key processes and actors involved in producing this discourse of urban growth 
and transformation and how this discourse was gaining legitimacy in the policy circles. I thought 
this was a fundamental question for analysis as language is power and is a critical tool in 
transforming the social world.  
 My first systematic attempt of research was a preliminary study of two months in the 
summer of 2008. During this period, I collected newspapers articles and reports from various 
documentation centers and libraries in Mumbai. Along with this, I also conducted interviews 
with a few activists and academics in the city. As a result of this preliminary fieldwork, as well 
as my earlier visits to the city, I established contacts with representatives of several organizations 
in the city. I was also able to identify key stakeholders that shaped urban development in 
Mumbai. On returning to the US after my preliminary fieldwork, I wrote and defended my 
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dissertation proposal and later spent a year in Mumbai (December 2008 to December 2009) 
conducting extensive qualitative research. 
Research methods  
At the operational level, the study was guided by three specific questions:  
1. To analyze the genealogy of the discourse of Shanghaization as an urban growth strategy 
in Mumbai by focusing on the processes, actors, visions, and practices that shaped it and 
were shaped by it.
17
 
2. To assess how diverse stakeholders in Mumbai (representing the state, the market, and 
the civil society), mediate, make sense of, and contest the dominant discourses and 
practices of growth and development.  
3. To explore if these contestations enable alternative visions of growth and development in 
Mumbai. 
In order to gather data to answer the above questions, I employed multiple research 
methods that involved archival research, in-depth interviews, and ethnographic observation. I 
drew on multiple secondary sources including academic literature, government reports, 
newspaper articles, and newsletters of various organizations in the city. I also visited several 
governmental and non-governmental organizations and documentation centers in Mumbai.  
I conducted about 40 in-depth interviews with representatives of diverse stakeholders in 
Mumbai that included poor peoples’ movements, trade unions, civic groups, government 
                                                          
17 My understanding of the term “discourse” is influenced by the political economy tradition of discourse analysis 
(discussed in detail later) which views discourse analysis as “a tool for uncovering certain hegemonic thinking and 
talking about how things should be done that serve certain vested interests” (Lees 2004:102). Methodologically, this 
involves a close scrutiny of rhetoric and the narrative structure of texts and to understand how issues are framed. In 
terms of its definition, I find Candlin and Maley’s (1997) definition of discourse particularly useful. They define 
discourse as a “way of talking about and acting upon the world which both constructs and is constructed by a set of 
social practices” (cited in Rear N.d). Therefore, it is important to see how action is represented in language. 
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agencies, non-government organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), 
business think-tanks, as well as several social activists, social workers, urban planners, municipal 
officials, politicians, and developers. I narrowed down the list of people to interview on the basis 
of my reading of available literature on Mumbai as well as the theoretical leads guiding the 
study. An important criterion of choosing the respondents was their “perceived” influence in 
shaping the affairs of the city. This was based on my subjective judgment based on my reading 
of contemporary literature on Mumbai and the frequency with which these people were quoted in 
newspapers, reports, and during informal conversations with people. I also relied on the “snow-
ball” method to find potential respondents. During my preliminary research in summer, I made 
contacts with people, who directed me to other prospective respondents. The questions were 
tailor-made for each organization, but also involved a few common questions that aimed to 
gather information about the objectives and activities of the organization, as well as the 
particular challenges it faced in the context of contemporary urban development.  
Finally, I selectively engaged in ethnographic observation by “immersing” myself in 
multiple sites including talks, workshops, and meetings organized by several organizations and 
social movements. I also visited sites that have been at the forefront of urban redevelopment such 
as the mill district, slums communities displace by the 2003-04 evictions, recycling grounds, and 
resettlement sites of the displaced urban poor, to visually document the ongoing spatial 
transformations and displacements and to gain a richer understanding into poor peoples’ daily 
struggles against inequality, dispossession, and resistance.  
In chapter 1, I situate my study in the wider context of the emerging discourse of 
“inclusive growth.” I argue that in the context of inclusive growth, the urban has emerged as a 
critical development problematic that seeks to balance high growth and reduction of poverty and 
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inequality and, therefore, justifies attention. Chapter 2 provides a historical context to Mumbai’s 
contemporary transformation. Using a longue durée historical perspective, I trace the 
development of Bombay/Mumbai as a “colonial port city.” In doing this, I try to explain how 
particular historical circumstances of Bombay/Mumbai bear heavily on its contemporary 
transformation. The discussion specifically centers on the historically produced inequalities. In 
chapter 3, I critically discuss the Shanghai model of development as it emerged in China. I argue 
that although the Shanghai model was a remarkable economic success, it was premised on 
unequal and anti-poor growth. Given this fact and the different socio-political realities of the two 
cities, I argue that it is not a good model for Mumbai. Thus, this chapter provides a critical 
comparative context to the discussion of Shanghaization of Mumbai. In chapter 4, I focus on the 
contingencies that produce Shanghaization as the discourse of growth and transformation in 
Mumbai. I also critically analyze this discourse itself and how explain how it emerged as a 
dominant city-centric growth strategy in India. In chapter 5, I highlight some contemporary 
“development” projects in Mumbai and the displacements engendered by them. In chapter 6, I 
analyze competing discourses of urban development emerging from the struggles of the urban 
poor, particularly the slum dwellers, street vendors, and former textile mill-workers. I discuss 
how these contestations enable alternative visions of development of Mumbai. I also highlight a 
few competing claims on Mumbai and the particular challenges they pose to the grand visions of 
transformation in Mumbai. Finally, in the conclusion section, I draw some general conclusions 
based on the study in the context of inclusive growth.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND THE URBAN QUESTION 
~On July 11, 2006 Mumbai a series of seven bombs in a span of 11 minutes ripped through the Western 
line of the Suburban Railway that left more than 200 people dead and 700 injured. While the front pages 
of local newspapers carried stories about the terrible tragedy, the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan 
Singh, commented, “No one can come in the path of our progress…[t]he wheels of our economy will 
move on.” Defying all predictions, India’s stock market rose by three percentage points on the morning 
after the bombings.
18
  
 
~Just a few months before the bomb blasts, on December 3, 2005, the Prime Minister had launched one of 
the most ambitious urban renewal programs in the country aimed at changing the face of infrastructure 
and quality of life in Indian cities.
19
 Months later, the Prime Minister flagged-off the construction of a 
mega-infrastructure project in Mumbai—the Mumbai Metro Rail Project—the first metro project financed 
through public-private partnership in India. On that occasion, the Prime Minister remarked, “I have often 
said that Mumbai is not an ordinary city, its contribution to the creation of wealth in our country, the 
symbol of hopes and aspirations of a resurgent India… it is an embodiment of the spirit of India that India 
is out to embrace globalization…Mumbai symbolizes India to the external world.”20  
 
~Four years later in 2009, at the fourth anniversary of the launch of the mega urban renewal scheme 
(JNNURM), the Prime Minister (who was now in his second stint as the Prime Minister) said, “I wish to 
reiterate our government’s commitment to the development of the urban sector. This commitment stems 
from the recognition that the balanced development of the urban sector is an integral part of our strategy 
of inclusive growth…We will also work to widen and deepen urban renewal policies and reforms…we 
need to concentrate on the need for rural-urban integration.”21 
 
The above quotes by the Prime Minister of India point to two key trends in contemporary 
globalization—first, the rise of emerging economies in Asia and the emergence of “inclusive 
                                                          
18
 Mumbai bombers “will never win,” BBC News, July 12, 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/south_asia/5173646.stm 
19
 This program is referred to as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). 
20
 PM lays foundation stone of phase-I of Mumbai Metro, June 21, 2006,  
http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content4print.asp?id=342 
21
 PM’s address at the National Conference of the JNNURM, December 3, 2009 
http://pmindia.nic.in/lspeech.asp?id=859. Emphasis added. 
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growth” as a hegemonic discourse in development policy (Harris 2005; Nayyar 2006; Nederveen 
Pieterse 2008; Prestowitz 2005; Kaplinsky and Dessner 2006; Rodrik and Subramanian 2004); 
second, the emergence of the urban as a critical development problematic within the emerging 
economies that seeks to balance high growth and reduction of poverty and inequality. This 
statement from the Eleventh Five Year Plan of India (2007-2012) bears testimony to the above 
fact: “Indian cities will be the locus and engine of economic growth over the next two decades, 
and the realization of an ambitious goal of 9—10 per cent growth in GDP depends 
fundamentally on making Indian cities much more livable, inclusive, bankable, and competitive” 
(Planning Commission, Government of India 2008:394). Further, it is prescribed that there 
should be a massive investment for infrastructure development in “prosperous cities,” if India 
desires to “continue on its current path” (MGI 2010).  
Although, there is substantial literature in global and development studies that has 
addressed the dynamics of growth and inequality, there is insufficient attention paid to the urban 
question as an important mechanism mediating growth and inequality. My key argument is that 
the urban question lies at the heart of the emerging economies and their vision of inclusive 
growth and therefore, we need to pay sufficient attention to the emerging urban growth 
discourses and how they relate to inequality. In what follows, I trace the emergence of the 
inclusive growth discourse in a wider context of reconfiguration of development thinking in 
terms of what is called a “post/new Washington consensus.” Based primarily on the experience 
of the South, this new development paradigm focuses on broad based growth that balances high 
growth with inclusiveness. I later discuss the different articulations of the concept of “inclusive 
growth” and how cities are emerging as key actors in this inclusive growth framework. In the 
final section, I discuss the Indian case and show how urban development has emerged as a key 
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vector in the larger dynamic of growth and inequality in India. I thereby lay the foundation for 
the subsequent critique of India’s city-centric growth strategy in the next few chapters based on 
the case of Mumbai.  
A “Post-Washington Consensus”: Reimagining Growth and Development 
It is argued that the “twenty-first century globalization” is markedly different on two accounts: a 
relative decline of American hegemony and neoliberalism and the emergence of new forces 
constituted by the emerging economies in the global South. The experience of neoliberal reforms 
of privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization subsumed under what is famously called 
by Williamson (1990) as the “Washington consensus,” has not yielded desired results. Despite 
some recovery in the 1990s, growth in Latin America has remained limited and unequal; most of 
Africa, barring a few exceptions such as Botswana, experienced negative growth rates; even after 
decades of reform, former communist countries in Eastern Europe have not seen improvement in 
their economic situation since 1990s; moreover, there have been frequent crises in several 
regions of the world including Latin America, East Asia, Russia, Turkey and recently, the United 
States (Rodrik 2006; Commission on Growth and Development 2008).  
The locus of new trade and finance has shifted to the emerging economies in the South 
(particularly in Asia) which are growing faster than the advanced economies of the North (Harris 
2005; Nederveen Pieterse 2008; Palat 2009; Prestowitz 2005). If we consider Asia, in 2006 total 
exports from Developing Asia alone constituted 34.1 per cent of the world’s exports.22 In 2005, 
Developing Asia received 21.8 per cent of the total FDI of the world, up from 1.2 per cent in 
1980. The percentage share of global GDP of Developing Asia increased from 9 per cent in 1980 
to 10.5 per cent in 2005. In terms of the growth rate, Developing Asia has maintained a steady 
                                                          
22 According to the Asian Development Bank, “Developing Asia” refers to its 44 developing member countries and 
Brunei Darussalam, an unclassified regional member (ADB 2012). 
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GDP growth rate of 5-6 per cent during 1980-2005. Much of this growth is driven by China and 
India. China maintained growth rates of a little more than 10 per cent during 1980-2000, 
decreasing slightly to 9.6 per cent in 2000-2005, while India maintained a steady growth rate of 
more than 6 per cent during 1980-2005 (Mahadevia 2008a). Although, the recent global 
recession has dented their growth slightly, it is still impressive in comparison to the advanced 
economies of the world (see Table 1 below). 
Source: Compiled from ADB (2012). 
Not only has rapid growth in Asia stabilized the world economy, but it has resulted in 
dramatic improvements in the living standards in the region and an absolute reduction in the 
number of people living in poverty. During 1990−2010, average per capita GDP in Asia and the 
Pacific increased from $1,633 to $5,133. In the same period, around 716 million were lifted out 
of poverty as the proportion of the population living on or below the $1.25-a-day poverty line 
fell from 53.9 per cent in 1990 to 21.5 per cent in 2008. Moreover, seventeen countries reduced 
poverty by more than 15 percentage points in the period (ADB 2012:38).  
Table 1. Trends in GDP growth (%) 
 
Developing 
Asia 
China India Major Industrial Economies 
    
US Eurozone Japan 
2007 10.1 
     
2008 6.7 
     
2009 6.0 9.2 8.4 
   
2010 9.1 10.4 8.4 3.0 1.9 4.4 
2011 7.2 9.2 6.0 1.7 1.4 -0.7 
2012 (projected) 6.9 8.5 7.0 2.0 -0.5 1.9 
2013 (projected) 7.3 8.7 7.5 2.3 1 1.5 
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Based on the East Asian “miracle” in the early 1990s, there were calls for a “post 
Washington consensus” in development studies (Stiglitz 1998). According to Gore (2002:789), 
there was a “paradigmatic shift” in development thinking due to the challenge posed to 
Washington consensus by a new “Southern consensus” that converged around Latin American 
structuralism and East Asian developmentalism and which was largely at variance with the 
Washington consensus ideology. Unlike the Washington consensus which was based on a 
narrow goal of economic growth based on standardized prescriptions of macroeconomic 
stability, trade liberalization, and privatization, proponents of the post-Washington Consensus go 
beyond economic growth to include broader goals of sustainable and equitable development. In 
Stiglitz’s (1998) words:  
We seek increases in living standards-including improved health and education-not just increases 
in measured GDP. We seek sustainable development, which includes preserving natural resources 
and maintaining a healthy environment. We seek equitable development, which ensures that all 
groups in society, not just those at the top, enjoy the fruits of development. And we seek 
democratic development, in which citizens participate in a variety of ways in making the 
decisions that affect their lives. (P. 31) 
In recent times, the success of emerging economies in Asia has led to even bolder claims about 
the end of the Washington consensus. As Rodrik (2006) puts it, “the debate now is not over 
whether the Washington consensus is dead or alive, but over what will replace it” (p. 973). 
Guided by the insights of the report of the Commission on Growth and Development (2008), 
considered as a watershed in contemporary development thinking, Rodrik (2008) proclaimed the 
emergence of a “new Washington consensus” that is less prescriptive and more diagnostic and 
experimental in its approach toward growth. The report also goes beyond growth strategies to 
include health, education, and other social policies. Based on Rodrik’s (2008) assessment of the 
28 
 
Commission on Growth and Development report, Table 2 summarizes the differences between 
the old and the new Washington Consensus models. 
 Table 2. Washington Consensus Models: The Old and the New 
Old Washington consensus New Washington consensus 
Presumptive: strong preconceptions about the 
nature of the problem (government 
regulation, poor governance, too little public 
spending) 
Diagnostic: relative agnosticism about what 
works 
Laundry list of reforms. Simultaneous, rather 
than sequencing of reforms 
Focuses on the most significant economic 
bottlenecks and “binding constraints”  
Comprehensive reforms:  liberalize trade, 
privatize public enterprises, deregulate 
prices, bring down inflation through 
monetary and fiscal retrenchment 
Policy experimentation: relatively narrowly 
targeted initiatives in order to discover local 
solutions  
Universal recipes—“model” institutional 
arrangements, “best practices,” rules of 
thumb  
Suspicious of universal fixes. Influenced by 
China’s experimental gradualism since 1978 
(spectacular episode of economic growth and 
poverty reduction) 
Failed to generate much growth in those 
countries in Latin America and Africa 
Each country must devise its own mix of 
remedies 
 Source: Compiled from Rodrik (2008). 
Even in theorizing of growth and development, there is a shift toward non-neoclassical 
frameworks that are historically informed and institutionally specific and which take into account 
diverse social processes, incorporating insights from multiple disciplines. One such recent 
example is De Paula and Dymski’s Reimagining Growth (2005: 4), which states: “democratizing 
theory means, at a minimum, developing approaches to conceptual thinking about growth and 
development that are ‘open’ – that can respond interactively and inclusively to the concerns and 
perspectives of multiple interests, social constituencies, and perspectives.”  
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It is within this context that the discourse of inclusive growth needs to be understood. 
Along with this academic shift, the emergence of inclusive growth as a central development 
planning goal in countries such as China, India, and Vietnam is largely influenced by a not-so-
widely discussed aspect of growth in emerging economies—increasing inequality.     
Growth and Inequality 
Why does inequality matter? 
There are several reasons why inequality matters and should, therefore, be an important focus of 
development policy along with poverty reduction. First, inequality is important for growth. 
Studies have unanimously shown that, unlike poverty, growth has no impact on income 
distribution and that there is no virtuous circle between higher growth and lowering of inequality 
levels (Dollar and Kay 2002; Easterly 1999; Chen and Ravallion 1997; Deninger and Squire 
1996). However, there is a deep connection between inequality and growth. It is observed that 
redistribution positively impacts growth (Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Perotti 1996) and that asset 
inequality (particularly land distribution) can undermine growth and pro-poor policies (Birdsall 
and Londono 1997; Deininger and Squire 1998). Policies that cater to better education, 
macroeconomic stability, and infrastructure are not only good not for growth but also for 
inequality. Therefore, as highlighted by the human development approach way back in the early 
1990s, what matters is not growth, but the quality of growth (Haq 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 
2010). Second, inequality also impacts poverty. High initial conditions of inequality slow down 
the pace of poverty reduction (Birdsall 2004). This is especially important for developing 
countries that are overwhelmed by inequalities produced historically through colonialism and 
consistent policy and market failures. Therefore, the context in which inequality rise also matters. 
Third, inequality can also undermine the political process, leading to political instability, 
particularly in countries with a weak and unrepresentative democratic politics (Birdsall 2004; 
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Nederveen Pieterse 2002).
23
 Therefore, although growth is crucial for poverty reduction and in 
expanding the social sector, in order for it to be sustainable it has to be premised on equity and 
equality of opportunity.
24
   
The extent of inequality 
There is another sub-plot to the story of the “new Asian dynamism.” While high-growth is 
celebrated by the popular media and the government, it has uneven and has accompanied 
deepening of rural and urban poverty and inequality in the emerging economies (Davis 2006; 
Dicken 2003; Nederveen Pieterse 2008a, 2008b; Sassen 2000a). The biggest challenge faced by 
these rapidly growing economies is to ensure that economic growth is sustainable and equitable. 
However, the recent experience has shown that inequality has increased globally, nationally, and 
regionally between the rural and urban areas.   
Global inequality—Inequality is on the global map today, for obvious reasons. Although 
there is no historical data to measure the direction of change of global inequality (inequality 
between people, regardless of their nationality and where they live) it is found to be extremely 
high (Gini coefficient of 62-66) is suspected to be unparalleled in human history (Milanovic 
2007).
25
 If the data is broken down further we find that the top 5 per cent of the highest earners 
in the world receive almost one-third (33 per cent) of the world income, whereas, the bottom 5 
                                                          
23
 Spurred by increasing “mass incidents” of unrest in China (from 8700 in 1993 to 90,000 in 2010), China now 
spends more on its internal security than on its external defense. According to a 2010 report of the Chinese Finance 
Ministry, China spent 548.6 billion yuan ($83.5 billion) on internal security, while it spent 533.5 billion yuan ($81.2 
billion) on national defense. Further, for 2012, the government plans to spend 624.4 billion yuan on public security, 
a 13.8 percent increase from 2010, and 601.2 billion yuan on defense, a 12.7 percent increase (See Jeremy Page, 
“Internal Security Tops Military in China Spending,” China Real Time Report, March 5, 2011).  
24
 In the development literature, equity refers to outcome or results either based on historical circumstances or 
through market conditions, whereas equality of opportunity refers to access based on starting points. Addressing the 
former is more controversial in policy and is achieved through redistributive mechanisms, while the latter is more 
widely accepted and involves creating a merit-based opportunity structure through a provision of universal access to 
public services such as education and health.   
25 The Gini coefficient is a standard matrix used to measure inequality. It ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 
(perfect inequality). However, for convenience it is shown as a percentage by multiplying by 100. Gini coefficient at 
or greater than 40 is considered as the threshold for “high inequality.” 
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per cent receive only 0.2 per cent, a ratio of 165:1. Moreover, the top 10 per cent of the people in 
the world get half of the world income, while the rest of the 90 per cent receive the remaining 50 
per cent (Milanovic 2007:39).  Even in the Asian context, as shown below, remarkable success in 
growth and poverty reduction has accompanied an increase in inequality since early 1990s.  
Inequality in Developing Asia—since the early 1990s to late 2000s, the overall Gini 
coefficient of Developing Asia increased from 39 to 46. Although it is lower in comparison to 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, if we take into account the trends in inequality, 
Developing Asia does not do too well. We find that during the last decade, most Sub-Saharan 
African countries and more than half of Latin American experienced a decline in inequality. 
However, in Developing Asia, 11 out of the 28 economies, covering 82 per cent of the region’s 
population, experienced increases in inequality. The Gini coefficient for China went up from 
32.4 to 43.4 and for India it increased from 32.5 to 37.5 from early 1990s to late 2000s. 
Moreover, inequality in China and India has steadily increased during 1990-2000. If we compare 
inequality between top 20 per cent quintile and the bottom 20 per cent quintile we find that that 
ratio almost doubled in China, while in India it has increased moderately (see Table 3 below). 
Table 3. Inequality Trends in China and India 
 
Gini coefficients
26
 
Annualized 
growth rate
27
 
Quintile income
28
 
Annualized 
growth rate 
 
1990s 2000s  1990s 2000s  
China (1990-2008) 32.4 43.4 1.6 5.1 9.6 3.6 
India (1993-2010) 32.5 37.5 0.7 4.8 5.7 1.1 
 Source: Compiled from ADB (2012). 
 
                                                          
26
 Based here on per capita expenditures, the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect 
inequality). For convenience, here and in following tables, it is multiplied by 100. Gini coefficient at or greater than 
40 is considered as the threshold for “high inequality.” 
27
 The annualized growth of the Gini coefficient refers to growth between the earliest available figure in the 1990s 
and the latest available figure in the 2000s. 
28
 The quintile income (or expenditure) ratio is the ratio of the total income (or expenditure) of the top (richest) 20% 
of the population to that of the bottom (poorest) 20%. 
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Regional inequality—In terms of regional inequality, we find that the gap between urban 
and rural incomes in Developing Asia has increased. In China, the gap has increased remarkably 
since 1990s to late 2000s, whereas in India too there has been a moderate, but a steady increase 
(see Table 4 below). 
Table 4. Urban-rural income gap 1990-2010
29
 
 
1990s Mid-1990s 2000s Mid-2000s 2010 
China 1.74 1.80 2.08 2.27 2.37 
India 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.33 
Source: Compiled from ADB (2012). 
When we look at the pattern of urban and rural inequality in China and India since early 
1990s to late 2000s, we find that there has been a similar increase in urban and rural inequality 
(about 10 percentage points). However, inequality in rural areas is higher than urban areas. In the 
case of India, we find that since early 1990s inequality has been higher and increased faster in 
urban areas than rural areas. This is a clear indicator that the recent rapid growth has not been 
shared (see table 5). This alarming increase in inequality amidst unprecedented growth and 
poverty reduction in Asia point to two important facts: first, rapid growth in itself does not 
guarantee equity; second, as we shall see in the next section, inequality has direct implications 
for broad based growth.  
  
                                                          
29 Although inequality is usually discussed in terms of inequality of incomes, the ADB estimates on India are based 
on the distribution of consumption as there are no official data on the distribution of household incomes in India.  
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Table 5. Pattern of inequality in China and India (Gini coefficient) 
  
Urban Rural 
China 1990 25.59 30.57 
 
1993 28.47 32.13 
 
1996 29.09 33.62 
 
1999 31.55 35.39 
 
2002 33.46 38.02 
 
2005 34.8 35.85 
 
2008 35.15 39.4 
 
India 1993 34.37 28.56 
 
2004 37.59 30.46 
 
2009/10 39.35 29.95 
 Source: Compiled from ADB (2012). 
The Inclusive Growth Discourse 
In the context of increasing inequality inclusive growth has emerged as the new mantra of 
development policy. The term has become popular among diverse actors that include 
government leaders, economists, planners, academic scholars, and in business circles. Unlike 
earlier development thinking, the consensus in development thinking is that trade-offs between 
growth and inequality are not inevitable. This fact is highlighted by a recent survey of Asian 
policy makers revealed that over 65 per cent of respondents agreed that inequality in their 
countries were very high and a majority believed that success in poverty reduction does not 
justify increase in inequality (ADB 2012).On the contrary, it is now believed that inequality is a 
serious impediment for inclusive and sustained growth (UNCDF 2012).  Therefore, it is now 
believed that inequality warrants equal attention as poverty. This new change in thinking in 
policy is reflected in recent development policies across Asia, where countries have explicitly 
made goals to make growth more inclusive. In India, the guiding objective of the Eleventh Five 
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Year Plan (2007-2012) is “faster and more inclusive growth” and prioritizes “a growth process 
which yields broad-based benefits and ensures equality of opportunity for all” (Planning 
Commission, Government of India 2008a:2). The current Twelfth Five Year Plan of India (2012-
2017) which is currently being drafted continues to focus on “faster, sustainable, and more 
inclusive growth” (Planning Commission, Government of India 2011).  
Similarly, in China, the new leadership in 2002 underwent a rethinking in development 
thinking that focuses on balanced development and building a “harmonious society.” The new 
approach of “scientific development” (kexue fazhanguan) or “comprehensive, coordinated, and 
sustainable development” that was outlined by President Hu Jintao in 2003, sought to correct the 
earlier uneven economic growth that overly emphasized a GDP-centric economic growth that 
neglected social welfare (Fewsmith 2004). This new approach has been further crystallized in 
China’s Eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-10) (State Council of China 2006).  
 Although the discourse of inclusive growth has gained greater traction in recent years, 
scholars argue that it is in fact a revisionist Keynesian version of “redistribution with growth” 
that was popular in the 1970s and which fell out of favor with the onset of neoliberalism 
(Nederveen Pieterse 2010). It became evident in the 1960s that economic development did not 
necessarily lead to employment generation, reduction of poverty and inequality, and provision of 
basic needs. This led to alternative redistributive and basic needs framework of development that 
moved away from simple economic growth to broader questions of human development and 
social equity (Haq 1995). It was in this context that the World Bank adopted the approach of 
“redistribution with growth” and rather than arguing that there are trade-offs between growth and 
equity, they were seen as complementing each other. More specifically, the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) basic needs approach in the 1970s gave equal importance to growth and 
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redistribution and argued for a more balanced approach to development that catered to basic 
needs, participation, and employment generation (Brohman 1996:205). However, with the rise of 
neoliberalism in the early 1980s support for this approach gradually eroded.  
 The recent inclusive growth discourse marks a return of the “redistribution with growth” 
approach, however, albeit in a different context. In the following section, I discuss three 
contemporary approaches of the concept that have significantly informed development policy: 
the Commission on Growth and Development (2008), the Asian Development Bank, and the 
World Bank. 
Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development (henceforth 
the GR) (Commission on Growth and Development 2008)—Chaired by Nobel Laureate Michael 
Spence, the task of this independent commission was to understand how developing countries 
can achieve fast, sustained, and equitable growth. The GR specifically targets policy makers in 
the developing world and is a particularly important starting point for the discussion of inclusive 
growth.  
The GR begins with a notion that growth is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
broader development. According to the GR inclusiveness is an essential ingredient of any 
successful and sustainable growth strategy. As a concept, inclusiveness “encompasses equity, 
equality of opportunity, and protection in market and employment transitions.”  By “equity,” the 
GR refers to outcomes created by the market. In this context, policy plays a critical role in 
constraining these outcomes through appropriate redistributive mechanisms, spending programs, 
and funding of service provision as markets do not play an equalizing role. By “equality of 
opportunity,” the GR refers to access to various opportunities. Thus, systematic inequality of 
opportunity can prove to be detrimental to the growth process as it can lead to political conflicts 
36 
 
and therefore should not involve any trade-offs. Equality of opportunity can be addressed 
through universal access to public services such as education and health and a meritorious 
selection system in both the government and private sector. 
Based on the above notion of inclusiveness, the GR makes particular recommendations that 
can bring about an inclusive growth: 
~Maintaining high rates of public investment in infrastructure, education, and health, achieved 
through national savings (20–25 percent or higher) rather than borrowings. 
~A balanced approach during the rural to urban transition that involves increased investments in the 
agriculture sector in a predominantly rural workforce such as Indian and China. 
~Protections and safety nets for people during job transitions and protecting rights of labor. 
~Not to resist urbanization, but to make it more orderly and manageable 
~Addressing the upper end of income distribution through taxation and appropriate spending 
programs  
The Asian Development Bank—the second approach of inclusive growth that has 
emerged within the Asian context is that of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). ADB’s 
strategy of inclusive growth is explained in a key paper, “Inclusive Growth: Toward a 
Prosperous Asia: Policy Implications” (Ali and Zhuang 2007). ADB’s strategy of inclusive 
growth is somewhat narrow compared to Commission on Growth and Development as it more 
market-focused and business friendly. Further it gives more importance to opportunity, rather 
than outcomes of inequality. In ADB’s strategy, inclusive growth is more about creating “growth 
with equal opportunities” (Ali and Zhuang 2007:10). The two main pillars of ADB’s inclusive 
growth strategy are: a) sustainable growth that creates and enlarges opportunities and (b) 
broadening access to these opportunities to ensure that members of society can participate in and 
benefit from growth. However, the ADB strategy is less redistributive in its approach and steers 
away from targeting poverty directly to focus on identifying market and government failures that 
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constrain inclusive growth. Further, this strategy there is a far lesser role of the government, 
whose responsibility is to develop and maintain an enabling environment for business.  
The World Bank—the third approach of inclusive growth is that of the World Bank 
(2009a). The World Bank approach of inclusive growth focuses on the pace and pattern of 
growth. Along with sustaining rapid pace of growth which is crucial for poverty reduction, it also 
focuses on its sustainability in the long run based on broad-based sectors and including large part 
of the country’s labor force. Similar to ADB, the World Bank approach too is more market-
heavy and emphasizes that government’s role was to remove constraints to growth and creating a 
level playing field for investment. Even the idea of equality of opportunity is discussed in terms 
of access to markets, resources, and unbiased regulatory environment for businesses and 
individuals. Further, discouraging income distributive schemes, it proposes that inclusive growth 
should focus on long-term productive employment. 
To sum up, one can summarize the main features of inclusive growth based on the three 
approaches discussed above:  
1. Growth is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for human development. 
2. Growth premised on inequality is unsustainable. 
3. Growth is vital for poverty reduction. However, sustainable growth reduces poverty more 
effectively. For growth to be sustainable it must be pro-poor.  
4. Therefore, inclusive growth is not just about the pace but also the pattern of growth. 
5. Increasing public investments in infrastructure, education, and health is crucial for 
creating an inclusive growth. 
6. Governments are key actors in facilitating sustained and inclusive growth and can ensure 
that benefits of growth are widely shared. 
38 
 
7. There is a need for providing safety nets to counter market imbalances. 
8. There is a need for a long-term growth perspective that is focused on generating 
productive employment rather than direct redistribution of income. 
Making Urbanization Work 
As discussed earlier, the urban has become a key problematic in inclusive growth with regard to 
balancing growth and poverty reduction. There is a growing sense of urgency with regard to 
urbanization in the developing world as highlighted by this quote from Urbanization and 
Growth, a report published by the Commission on Growth and Development (2009:xvi) 
Rapid and sustained growth entails rapid and sustained urbanization. But, if mishandled, the 
growth of cities poses problems that can derail growth. Developing countries must accomplish in 
a few decades what today’s industrialized countries achieved over a century or more” (p:xvi).  
Driven by this sense of urgency, the writing on the wall is that we should “make urbanization 
work” for growth and poverty reduction by, first, harnessing its potential for economic growth; 
second, by managing the negative effects of economic success of cities—congestion, regional 
inequality, and high prices of land and housing (Commission on Growth and Development 2009; 
World Bank 2009a). The second challenge is particularly important for inclusive growth in terms 
of ensuring that the benefits of growth are widely shared. 
 In light of the above thinking the new approach in development policy recognizes that 
urbanization is not only inevitable, but is a necessary condition for economic growth and poverty 
reduction (World Bank 2009a). Therefore, the idea is not to resist urbanization, but to make it 
more orderly and manageable (Commission on Growth and Development 2008). This approach 
is largely influenced by the fact that in the last 25 years countries that have registered a sustained 
high growth of seven per cent or more have all done so through manufacturing and services 
based in urban areas (Commission on Growth and Development 2008). Therefore, given the past 
39 
 
record, there can be no growth without urbanization and industrialization. Growth occurs due to 
a structural shift in the economy from agriculture to urban activities. Urbanization is therefore a 
“geographical corollary of industrialization” characterized by a shift of workers from their rural 
farms to factories in cities (Committee on Growth and Development 2008:58). The reason why 
growth gravitates in cities is because of what economists call “agglomeration economics.” 
Clustering of activities together provides economies of scale and scope and easy flow of 
information which are crucial for capital accumulation. Therefore, with advancement in 
technology and globalization and financialization of markets, “global cities” have become 
centers of this agglomerative growth (Sassen 1991; 2001). For example, in 2005, the largest 100 
cities in the world accounted for 25 per cent of global GDP, while the top 30 cities together 
accounted for around 16 per cent of world GDP (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007). 
However, the process of urbanization is rarely smooth, as infrastructure and public 
services often fail to meet the needs of an increasing urban population. Further, economic 
success of cities in predominantly rural societies such as India and China has led to glaring 
income and regional disparities, which in the long-run is detrimental to growth. Therefore, along 
with growth, it is imperative to manage the extent of inequality.    
Urbanization is a particularly important challenge for the developing world. In 2008, for 
the first time in human history, the urban population of the world surpassed the rural. In the next 
two decades, it is projected that another two billion people would move to the cities and 90 per 
cent of this urban population growth is expected to occur in the developing world. Due to the 
emergence of the new geography of trade the locus of urban restructuring has shifted to the large 
and expanding metropolises of Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa; which are becoming the 
“production hearths of the new globalism” (Smith 2002: 436). In this context, multilateral aid 
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agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have increasingly 
focused their attention on cities as “engines of growth” and have channeled their efforts into 
improving the infrastructure in cities in order to facilitate growth (World Bank 1994).  
In 2010, the World Bank announced a “new global urban strategy” for cities in the 
developing world that focuses on “harnessing urbanization for growth and poverty reduction 
(World Bank 2009a). At the launch of this new urban strategy, the then President of the World 
Bank Robert Zoellick announced that “urbanization is a vital phase of development, and if 
managed well, it can be a key driver of long-term economic growth in a country. Climate 
change, jobs, poverty, education, health, infrastructure—these are all development challenges 
closely intertwined with cities.” The new World Bank approach of “managed urbanization” 
involves the following features: more intervention from the national state in cities in critical 
policy areas such as land and housing markets; updating planning regulations to absorb new 
residents; fostering agglomeration benefits to enhance growth and poverty reduction; and a focus 
on secondary cities which are urbanizing very rapidly. Specifically in terms of urban economic 
growth the Bank recommends increasing focus on city management, finance, and governance; 
pro-poor policies to target urban poverty and slum upgradation; a progressive urban land and 
housing market; and a safe and sustainable environment (World Bank 2009a).    
Growth and Urbanization in India 
India has witnessed a remarkable growth in the last few decades making it one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world. For the first three decades following independence in 1947, 
India’s growth rate remained rather sluggish at around 3-4 per cent per annum (Kohli 2006; 
Government of India 2009) which came to be referred to as the “Hindu rate of growth.” 
However, there was a marked acceleration in India’s growth rate which increased to 5.6 per cent 
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per annum during the period 1980-2004 (Nayyar 2006). The growth rate further accelerated in 
the 2000s. During the Tenth Plan period (2002-03 to 2006-07), India achieved an average growth 
rate of 7.8 per cent per annum. The financial crisis dented India’s growth in the next plan period 
(2007-08 to 2011-12), declining to 6.8 per cent for the year 2008-09. The economy recovered to 
register 8 and 8.6 per cent in the next two years (Ahluwalia 2011). However, in last two years the 
growth has slowed down the cause of which is attributed to strong inflationary trends and a 
slowdown in the global economy. In 2011-12 it decline to 6.2 per cent and even further to 5.0 in 
2012-13. Nonetheless, if you look at the combined annual growth rate for the decade ending in 
2012-13 it remained an impressive 7.9 per cent (Government of India 2013:1).  
There is a debate about the timing of India’s high growth “take-off.” On the one hand, 
some scholars emphasize that the widespread economic reforms introduced in 1991 contributed 
to India’s subsequent high growth (Ahluwalia 2002; Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003; Panagriya 
2004). On the other hand, there are other scholars who argue that there a “surge” in India’s 
growth actually occurred a decade prior to the formal inauguration of reforms in 1991, where the 
growth rate actually doubled (De Long 2002; Kohli 2006; Rodrik and Subramanian 2004; 
Virmani 2004). According to these scholars, the real structural break from the “Hindu rate of 
growth” actually occurred in 1980 and India’s growth rate in the decade 1980-81 to 1990-91 
increased to 5.5 per cent per annum from 3.5 per cent per annum during the earlier three decades 
(1950-51 to 1979-80) (Nayyar 2006).  Some even argue that the India’s growth performance 
cannot be attributed to economic liberalization at all. Nayyar (2006), using a long-term historical 
perspective that takes into account the “long-twentieth century,” argues that the turning point in 
India’s economic growth actually took place in 1951, when India’s growth improved 
significantly from the past and it was respectable compared to the performance of other countries 
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at that time. Nayyar (2006) attributes this turn around in performance in the 1950s to the birth of 
political democracy and the mediating role played by the state between economic and social 
development. Therefore, changes introduced in the 1950s were far more significant in 
comparison to changes in the 1990s as 1950s marked a change in both the economic and political 
landscape of the country. Nayyar (2006) does admit that the changes introduced in 1990s were 
also significant as it marked a shift in the development approach of the country from 
redistribution and concerns of equity to pursuit of growth. However, according to him the initial 
conditions for growth were laid in the three decades preceding reforms due to the importance 
given to higher education, science and technology, other institutional capacities. 
However, as pointed out earlier, some scholars argue that the momentum of India’s 
growth was created a decade prior to 1991 (De Long 2002; Kohli 2006; Rodrik and Subramanian 
2004; Virmani 2004). In this context, it is argued that it was at that time that a nascent “growth 
first” strategy was created in India by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi which marked a 
shift from the earlier Nehruvian socialist model of distributive justice to growth (Kohli 2006; 
Rodrik and Subramanian 2004).  According to Rodrik and Subramanian (2004:4), growth first 
“unleashed the animal spirits of the Indian private sector in the early 1980s due to an attitudinal 
shift in the national government that favored private business marking a shift in the rhetoric of 
Garibi Hatao (eradicate poverty) to growth. There are several factors cited for this shift toward a 
pro-growth alliance of state and business. According to Kohli (2006:1255), the combined effect 
of failure of anti-poverty programs; ineffective socialism that prevented growth; success of the 
green revolution in the 1960s led by private producers; and a poorly performing public sector, 
created an atmosphere in which the private sector seemed like a natural ally for growth. 
However, the nature of these reforms did not confirm to the path prescribed by the “Washington 
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consensus.” Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) make a distinction between a “pro-market” and a 
“pro-business” model. Unlike, the pro-market reforms which was premised on the free market 
and competition that supported new entrants and consumers, the pro-business reforms introduced 
in India were closer to the East Asian model of development that involved a highly 
interventionist state that relied on indigenous businesses in promoting economic growth and 
which selectively linking their economies to the world (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004; Kohli 
2006). This new growth strategy provided several benefits to big businesses such as tax benefits, 
removing earlier licensing restrictions by diluting the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (MRTP), introducing a special legislation that discouraged strikes (Kohli 2006).  
As a result of the new growth strategy by Indira Gandhi (and later her son Rajiv Gandhi), 
the 1980s saw a substantial improvement in rates of investment and growth rate (especially in 
Industry) as well as growth of private sector in the Indian economy.
30
 India adopted a wider set 
of reforms in 1991 that included further delicensing of the private sector, removal of MRTP 
restrictions, tax concessions to big business, and labor reforms (Kohli 2006:1363).
31
 Due to 
external factors such as the second petroleum price hike in 1981 that increased India’s import 
costs significantly, India entered into a loan agreement with the IMF for almost $ 5 billion in 
1981 to avoid a foreign exchange crunch. As a result of this, India also had to obey certain IMF 
structural adjustment prescriptions such as reducing social and public spending to cut the 
budgetary deficit. However, India’s opening up of economy remains fairly modest, compared to 
this the internal deregulation has been faster (Kohli 2006).  
The Indian growth story has been one of high GDP growth, but primarily driven by the 
growth in the service sector. Not all sectors of the economy have grown at the same pace as is 
                                                          
30
 Along with the established big business such as Tata and Birla, the pro-business strategy also enabled newer 
companies such as Reliance to grow powerful. 
31
 For more details on the 1991 reforms see Jenkins (1999). 
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reflected in the relatively low agricultural growth rate, low-quality employment, poor education, 
inadequate healthcare services, rural-urban divide, social inequalities, and regional disparities 
(Kumar 2009). The Indian government too has officially recognized that growth has not been 
equitable and has left out certain states, regions, and people (Government of India 2009). The 
percentage of the population below the official poverty line has come down from 36 per cent in 
1993–94 to 28 per cent in 2004–05. However, it is still high and its rate of decline has not 
accelerated along with the growth in GDP. Poverty among certain marginalized groups, for 
example the Scheduled Tribes (STs) has remained unaffected. Illiteracy still is still a big 
problem, with almost 304 million people, making India the country with the highest number of 
illiterate people in the world. Further, growth rate in agriculture has slowed down since the late 
1990s, leading to growing rural-urban divide and severe distress in rural areas in some regions 
(Planning Commission, Government of India 2008a:1). The most glaring proof of increasing 
inequality in India is the alarming increase in farmers’ suicides in India (Vaidyanathan 2006). 
According to national statistics, there were 270,940 farm suicides in India since 1995 is 
270,940.
32
 Inequality in urban areas too has increased since mid-2000s and remained higher than 
rural areas during 1950-2000 (Weisskopf 2011). Growth has benefitted city-dwellers more than 
their rural counterparts. Further, studies have also found that the pro-reform growth has had a 
pro-rich bias which is more striking in the urban areas than the rural areas (Sarkar and Mehta 
2010). The post-reform growth has also been anti-poor, as highlighted by a study which found 
that the per capita consumption by the urban poor increased only half as much as the per capita 
national average rate of growth of consumer expenditure (Sen and Himanshu 2004). After taking 
stock of India’s growth experience, I will now focus on its urban component, which is becoming 
increasingly important to sustain the growth momentum 
                                                          
32 P. Sainath, “Farm suicides rise in Maharashtra, State still leads the list,” The Hindu, July 3, 2012. 
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The urban context of growth in India 
It is argued that cities are going to be extremely crucial for India’s future growth. Although, 
India’s share of urban population remains small due to the relatively slow pace of urbanization 
(28 per cent of the total population), the urban share of India’s growth has steadily increased. For 
example, the contribution of the urban sector to India’s GDP has increased from 29 per cent in 
1950–51 to 47 per cent in 1980–81. Currently, the urban sector contributes to 62–63 per cent of 
India’s GDP and this is expected to increase to 75 per cent by 2021 (Planning Commission, 
Government of India 2008b:394). With the increasing share of urban growth, India’s pace of 
urbanization is also set to increase. It is projected that India’s urban population will increase 
from 340 million in 2008 to 590 million in 2030 (40 per cent of India’s total population). Most 
urban population is concentrated in India’s large cities. Cities with population over 100,000 
account for 68.9 per cent of the urban population and this share has been growing (Planning 
Commission, Government of India 2008b:394). 
 However, this urban-led growth has not been inclusive. Urban poverty remains high in 
India. Although the share of the urban poor in the urban population has fallen, there has been an 
increase in the absolute number of urban poor. India-Urban Poverty Report 2009—a report 
brought out by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation of India, supported by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the first of its kind in India—highlights 
some interesting findings which are worth looking at length:  
~25 per cent of the people in urban areas (over 80 million people) live in poverty and about 61.80 
million people were living in slums.  
~There is an “urbanization of poverty” in India reflected by the fact that most States in India 
reported higher incidence of poverty in urban areas than rural areas, although at the national level 
rural poverty is higher.  
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~The incidence of decline of urban poverty has not accelerated with GDP growth. The report 
explicitly states that “a substantial portion of the benefits provided by public agencies are 
cornered by middle and upper income households” while 54.71 per cent of urban slums do not 
even have access to toilets. 
~Therefore, the report warns that “urban poverty will become a major challenge for policymakers 
in our country as the urban population in the country is growing, so is urban poverty.” The report 
points out that urban poverty is related to several other problems such as housing and shelter, 
water, sanitation, health, education, social security and livelihoods, and also to the special needs 
of vulnerable groups like women, children, and the aged.  
~There has been an increase in migration in India and that poverty incidence was higher among 
rural to urban migrants. This shows that economic reforms in India have not been able to create 
much employment opportunities in small and medium towns and in rural areas. 
Despite these pressing urban problems, the policy focus on urban areas has been relatively 
modest. Urban development remains a state subject, but is heavily determined by central 
intervention. Planning in India has always centered on the rural sector due to political 
considerations, and in the initial three decades after independence the approach toward the urban 
sector remained ad-hoc and piecemeal (Government of India 2009; Sharma and Shaban 2006). 
This has mainly contributed to the haphazard growth of Indian cities. It was only during the 
Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90) that for the first time the process of urbanization was viewed 
as part of larger economic development. To strengthen this view, the First National Commission 
on Urbanization was set up in 1986, which recognized the role played by cities in economic 
development. According to the Commission, cities such as Mumbai, “have been generators of 
national wealth and, if they were to collapse, the economy would receive a grievous body 
blow…the Commission feels that it is a matter of top most national priority to not only save the 
national cities but to help them revive their economies.”  
It is not a matter of coincidence that increasing attention on urban development happened 
at around the same time when the “growth first” strategy was adopted by the Indian government 
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in the early 1980s. This view of “cities in economic development” was further reiterated in the 
economic reforms in the 1990s. In 1992, India introduced political reforms of decentralized 
planning and devolution of power under the 74
th
 Constitutional Amendment Act. These reforms 
were initiated to create a more participative and decentralized planning process in which cities 
would have the necessary autonomy for planning and governance. As part of political 
decentralization, ward committees were to be established in municipalities with a population of 
more than 300,000. It was also recommended to set up Metropolitan Planning Committees and 
District Planning Committees. However, only a few large municipal bodies benefited with this as 
most local bodies lacked the necessary capabilities to generate own funds (Sengupta 2006).  
 As pointed out earlier, the introduction of economic reforms in the 1990s and increasing 
role of market-driven development reinforced the role of large cities where most of the economic 
activity has concentrated, leading to the neglect of small and medium cities. For example, eight 
largest million-plus cities in India account for over one-third of total bank deposits, over 50 per 
cent of bank credit, and one-third of the FDI (Sharma and Shaban 2006). To illustrate this 
imbalanced urban development further, let us take the example of Mumbai, the subject of this 
study. Over one-third of the total urban population of Maharashtra State is concentrated in the 
Mumbai region alone. Further, half of the “net share in domestic product” of the state comes 
from two industrial belts of which Mumbai is one (Sharma and Shabhan 2006).  
In recent times, development planning in India has given importance to inclusive urban 
development. The Eleventh Five Year plan recognizes that rapid economic growth will 
inevitably lead to an increase in urbanization based on large economies of agglomeration 
provided by cities. In this context, the biggest obstacle for rapid growth is inadequate urban 
infrastructure. However, in creating new urban infrastructure, the plan puts emphasis on equity 
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and inclusiveness. The plan talks about creating a distributive model of urbanization that would 
ensure that migration flows do not concentrate in any particular city or cities  (Planning 
Commission, Government of India 2011b:400).  
To improve urban infrastructure and the quality of life the Indian government launched 
one of the most ambitious urban renewal programs in the country in 2005 called the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) for the integrated development of urban 
infrastructure and services in 63 cities across India. Around Rs. 50,000 crore of reform-linked 
central assistance was to be provided under this scheme over a period of seven years. However, 
Kundu (2011:12) criticizes this mission for perpetuating “exclusionary urbanization” which he 
describes as “the indecision or purposive ambiguity in the Plan and policy linked documents 
concerning urban development [that] has deprived the small and medium towns of the resources 
badly required for providing critical infrastructure and services” and expresses a need for a more 
spatially distributed model of urban development (Kundu 2011). The finance generation for 
funding infrastructure is based on generating revenue through external borrowing, public-private 
partnerships, and through financial instruments such as bonds. However, small and medium 
towns face a severe handicap in this regard. Kundu and Samanta (2011:62-63) highlight that only 
58 per cent of the urban population has been covered under the JNNURM and that too within 
more developed states and metropolitan cities. Further, within the JNNURM “there is greater 
bias on improving the efficiency in the functioning of the overall city economy and meeting the 
infrastructural deficiencies at the macro-level rather than addressing the issues of distributional 
inadequacy and improving the access of the poor to these (Cited in Mahadevia 2011:57). 
Recently the approach of inclusive growth in India has been questioned on grounds of 
lacking a clear vision and strategy (Oommen 2011; Suryanarayana 2008). The draft Twelfth Five 
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Year Plan acknowledges that “to achieve inclusiveness…requires multiple interventions, and 
success depends not only on introducing new policies and government programs, but on 
institutional and attitudinal changes” (Planning Commission, Government of India 2011:5, 
emphasis added). However, there is no systematic reform strategy offered, other than a few 
staple government programs. In this regard, Oommen (2011) points out that India’s vision of 
inclusive growth treats growth and inclusiveness as separate. In this regard, Oommen (2011:159) 
states that “inclusiveness is not a mitigating act, but a strategy of participation in the social 
production (growth) process and settlement of claims on the product on a fair basis.”   
 Having highlighted the crucial relationship between inclusive growth and urbanization, in 
the next chapter I analyze the development of Bombay as a “colonial port city.” I focus on key 
historical processes that inform Mumbai’s contemporary unequal urban context. As highlighted 
earlier, high initial conditions of inequality slows down the pace of poverty reduction, therefore, 
our contemporary analysis of urban development needs to be informed by the historical 
processes that produce inequalities (Birdsall 2004).  
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CHAPTER 2 
AN UNEQUAL CITY: THE MAKING OF BOMBAY/MUMBAI 
~I will not claim to possess the prophetic insight to foresee what is in store for Bombay. But as it 
has adopted the happy motto of Urbs prima in Indis, it may be hoped that this will prove of good 
augury, and that among other privileges Bombay will own that of priority among the Indian cities 
for longevity in undecaying prosperity (da Cunha [1900] 2004:6). 
 
~Urban landscapes come to refract various layers of sedimentation—of past uses and 
organization—as well as to embody a range of possible meanings and actions falling outside the 
shifting levels of specification brought to bear on these landscapes by the prevailing and….often 
fragmentary apparatuses of control (Simone 2004:14). 
 
Any contemporary attempts of redevelopment of Mumbai (as discussed in the subsequent 
chapters) reflect, as well as confront, the seemingly insurmountable challenges posed by the 
existing inequalities in the city. These inequalities are not just found within the city, but are also 
seen regionally in terms of how cities emerged historically as privileged sites of concentrated 
economic activity and investment in India. Therefore, for a deeper understanding of 
contemporary urban redevelopment in Mumbai, we need to examine the long-term historical 
factors that shaped the city. The new urban experiments are not introduced tabula rasa in the 
city, but jostle with inherited institutional frameworks, patterns of socio-spatial development, and 
power geometries.  
Cities and Longue Durée Globalization  
One of the key features of the contemporary phase of globalization is the re-emergence of cities 
as central nodes in the world economy.
33
 Therefore, it is increasingly recognized that 
urbanization can no longer be understood solely on the basis of the political economy of regions 
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 The emphasis on the term “re-emergence” is to highlight the fact that if one takes into account a longer historical 
approach of understanding globalization, cities have remained key sites that articulated cross-cultural exchanges. 
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or within the boundaries of nation states and there is a need for an “analytic disarticulation of 
cities and nations” (Davis 2005:97). The world systems theory provides a key analytical frame to 
understand how processes of urbanization were connected to structural changes in the world 
economy (Braudel 1986; Wallerstein 1994; 2004). Influenced by such an approach, the “world 
city” (Friedmann ([1986] 1995) and the “global city” (Sassen 1991; 2001) have emerged as key 
concepts informing the discussion of cities and contemporary globalization. However, the 
dominant world/global city paradigm has ignored the long-term historical context within which 
cities articulated the relationship between the global and the local and therefore exaggerate the 
historical uniqueness of contemporary urban transformations.  
Scholars advocating a longue durée globalization approach have documented that cities, 
as key “nodes,” were engaged in wider circuits of production, exchange, and culture throughout 
history (Abu-Lughod 1989; Arigghi 1994; Braudel 1986; Brenner 2001; Gills and Thompson 
2006; King 1990). According to Brenner (2001:127), the longue durée historical analysis 
resuscitates “standard interpretations of contemporary urban restructuring in the broad 
geohistorical context of earlier rounds of globally induced transformations within each city.” 
Doing this enables us to understand how certain locally specific factors, processes, and 
developments have enabled cities to acquire certain world city functions in the contemporary 
context. Therefore, rather than understanding global forces as macro structural background 
conditions, the long-term historical perspective incorporates a “path dependent” analysis in 
which earlier historical events provide a causal context for subsequent development (Brenner 
2001:127-8).  
Employing such a long-term globalization perspective, this chapter tries to historicize the 
contemporary self-conscious project of globalizing Mumbai. I will do this through a path-
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dependent analysis of the development of the city that takes into account the local specificity of 
the place. For this I will use two analytical frames: Bombay/Mumbai as a “port city” and as a 
“colonial city.” The first analytical frame emphasizes the dimension of human interconnectivity 
primarily through trade and the evolution of port cities as key nodes in these trade networks 
(Rennstich 2006). Although contemporary globalization makes the world more interconnected, 
the interconnected world is also segmented in many ways. Therefore, the second frame of 
“colonial city” stresses on the unequal nature of power and highlights how contemporary 
inequalities in Mumbai were historically produced through colonial urban development which 
primarily served the interests of the colonial elite (King 1976).    
Port cities and maritime trade networks 
Rennstich’s (2006) longue durée approach understands globalization as an “evolutionary process 
in the making for an extended period of human history rather than a unique occurrence that 
started in the latter part of the twentieth century” (p.185). Each new long wave of global change 
builds upon past patterns of change and is carried forward through an “evolutionary logic” driven 
by human agency through the innovative use of resources, thereby strengthening the “global 
layers of interactions” (Rennstich 2006:184-85). In the evolution of the global system from land 
to maritime trade, port-centered world cities began to play an increasingly important role as 
“nodes” that externalized socio-economic and political networks. However, this evolutionary 
logic of change does not have a linear dynamic in terms of a constantly increasing level of global 
interaction. This historical evolution is marked by periods of “punctuation” brought about by 
political and military obstruction of trade that alters certain path-dependent tendencies resulting 
in the system becoming internally oriented until a new phase of externally-oriented evolutionary 
dynamic sets in. According to this model, it was around 900 CE that the modern era of 
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globalization began, driven by the expansion of maritime trade by Sung China.
34
 This 
externalizing tendency was punctuated at around 1850 with the introduction of a relatively 
internal-oriented industrial system. With the growth of digital technologies in recent years, there 
is a re-emergence of an externally-oriented global system, the momentum for which was set in 
the late twentieth century through a transformation in the communication technologies through 
the invention of the telephone, typewriters, and electrical telegraph (Rennstich 2006:197).  
The world city system also evolved by adapting to military and political “blockages” that 
disrupted existing trade networks, giving rise to new connections and nodes and also to new 
systems. Rennstich identifies five such blockages in the evolution of the world system. The first 
two blockages led to a change in trade from land-based Silk Road system to a maritime-based 
Spice Route system, leading to importance of port cities such as Rome and Alexandria. The next 
two blockages led to a shift from the preindustrial Silk Route to an industrial Atlantic system, 
leading to the increasing importance of cities such as Canton, Cairo, Genoa, Venice, and later 
Lisbon, Seville, Amsterdam, and London. Finally, the fifth blockage marked a transition to an 
information-based system based on digital communication, leading to the importance of cities 
such as New York, San Francisco, London, Tokyo, and Seoul (Rennstich 2006:189).
35
 Thus, 
Rennstich (2006) finds that broadly there have been three distinct network systems in the modern 
global system: the commercial maritime system, the industrial production system, and the 
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 Rennstich (2006) argues that period is crucial as it laid out the “preconditions” for the development of the modern 
era of globalization characterized by more global networks based  on innovations in communication (printing, 
oceanic travel), military technology (e.g. gunpowder) and trade (e.g. media of exchange). This expansion of global 
networks was led by Sung China through a commercial maritime system which was only later developed more fully 
by the European empires (pp. 190-91). 
35
 The first blockage appeared when Parthia blocked the Silk Roads in 25 BCE, leading to Romans taking the Sea 
route. During the second blockage, Persia blocked Byzantium in 550 CE, leading to an alternative land-based route. 
The third blockage was due to the Northern tribes in China at around 800-1100 CE during which the Sung dynasty 
expanded the earlier maritime. During the fourth blockage, the Muslim powers blocked Europe in 1400-1500 CE 
leading to Europeans finding the Cape route and crossing the Atlantic. Finally, the fifth blockage occurred around 
1850 CE when Britain was blocked by other colonial powers leading to independent communication networks by 
the UK and the US (Rennstich 2006: Table 11.2, p. 189). 
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emerging digital commercial system. Both the commercial maritime and digital system displayed 
more external network relations, whereas the industrial phase was more internally oriented. In 
terms of the path-dependent analysis of the development of the modern global system, Rennstich 
(2006) describes a “three-step” path-dependent evolution of the global system in which the 
Phoenician maritime commercial system contributed to the growth of a global maritime external 
commercial system which is now currently being transformed into an external network system 
based on digital communication. According to Rennstich (2006), the Phoenician network system 
(1100 BCE-850 BCE) centered on current regions of Lebanon and Syria, was the first truly 
transcontinental system based on maritime nodes of world cities in three different continents. 
This led to the emergence of cities such as Byblos, Tyre, and Arward with the larger Assyrian 
Empire. Later these maritime links were widened by maritime powers of Portugal, the 
Netherlands, and England. Through the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1497-99, the Portuguese 
were able to link the Asian maritime trade with the Atlantic. During the seventeenth century the 
Dutch, along with the trade with the East, were engaged in an Atlantic triangular trade between 
Europe, Africa, and the Americas, which was later contested and extended by England after 1650 
through trade in mass-consumed goods, as a result of which London emerged as the major 
financial node in the world economy. The emerging digital system marks a return to an 
externally oriented network system replacing the internally-oriented industrial system in place 
since mid-nineteenth century. It is precisely its digital nature and the possibilities it opens up that 
differentiate it from the previous external network system. This new system which is based on 
the use of digital technologies powered by the internet, enables much deeper and integration and 
a much wider impact in terms of facilitating organization and institutional changes. The United 
States due to its wider reach of digital infrastructure is a central node in this new information 
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system with other countries linked to the US. It is in this context that the current re-emergence of 
cities (“global cities”) as important nodes that articulate transnational flows of goods, capital, 
and people is to be understood.  
The colonial city and unequal urban development 
The above discussion on nodes and networks helps us in understanding the historical evolution 
of contemporary “global cities,” thereby problematizing the supposed novelty of some of the 
discussion on contemporary urbanization. However, the main drawback of such network-based 
analysis is that it does not adequately focus on the role of power and ideology in shaping global 
change. Even though Rennstich (2006) acknowledges the role of human agency in driving global 
systemic change, the agency is assumed to be power-neutral. In this context, the analytic of the 
“colonial city” is more suitable in understanding the historical role of power in shaping 
contemporary inequalities in postcolonial cities such as Bombay/Mumbai.  
According to (King 1976:7), a “colonial city” is “that urban area in the colonial society 
most typically characterized by the physical segregation of its ethnic, social, and cultural 
component groups, which resulted from the processes of colonialism.” Therefore, King 
(1976:18, emphasis added) prefers to use the term “urban development” rather than “urban 
growth” to underscore the importance of understanding urban change as a planned and directed 
process. King (1976:24) argues that colonial planning represents an attempt of colonial powers 
to experiment many of the planning theories in the colonial societies before they were adopted 
by their own governments in the metropolitan society. King further asserts that it was in the 
particular context of colonial India, between the eighteenth and twentieth century, that the 
“modern,” industrial phase of colonial urbanization was introduced.  According to King (1976), 
culture, economic-technological order and the power structure are the three basic components of 
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colonialism. Therefore, in the specific context of British colonialism, King (1976) understood the 
impact of colonialism on urban development in the colonial society as being typically Western 
(culturally British), capitalist-industrial (economic-technological order) and colonial (power 
structure). Castells (1972) used the term “dependent urbanization” to characterize the 
relationship between the colonial city and the metropolitan economy. The urbanization of the 
colonial society was dependent upon the industrialization of the metropolitan society or as 
Simone (2004:139) puts it, it was in context of an “enforced engagement with the European 
world.” This engagement disrupted traditional market structures and the colonial city, segregated 
from its hinterland, was employed in the service of the metropolitan economy. This dominance-
dependence relationship is also seen at the city level where there was a clear demarcation 
between the native and the European parts of the city, where the European quarter was dependent 
on the labor of the native quarter. This segregation between the two sectors is observed in 
architectural landscapes of postcolonial cities and the term “dual city” is used to describe this 
legacy (Abu-Lughod 1965). Even in terms of provision of services, amenities such as roads, 
recreational space, water, electricity lines, sewers, housing, shopping and hotels, were all 
concentrated in the European sector. In contrast to this, there was severe neglect and 
underinvestment in the native quarters of the colonial city (King 1976:282).  
Scholars have used the term “unintended city” to describe the invisible, nonetheless vital, 
dependence of the urban elites on the poor.
36
 Simone (2004) argues that the historical legacy of 
this dependency can be observed in postcolonial contexts characterized by the vestiges of the 
colonial state and the urban elite, whose values are culturally similar to that of the metropolitan 
past. Simone (2004:280) further argues that in the contemporary context, this transfer of 
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 The term “unintended city,” originally used by Jai Sen (1976), has been used by Ashis Nandy (1998:2) to describe 
the world of the urban poor as a city “that was never a part of the formal ‘master plan’ but always implicit in it.”  
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metropolitan values continues through various “development models,” whereby, “cultural 
categories are assumed to be universal,” giving rise to “new modes of dependence” through the 
transfer of development “models” and “techniques.”  
Colonialism not only shaped a particular nature of urban development, but also led to 
larger structural and organizational changes in the systems of production, governance, and 
knowledge production. As Simone (2001) observes in the case of Africa, the colonial project of 
urbanization involved a kind of “remaking” of precolonial cultures in a by and large rural 
continent and “cities would act instrumentally on African bodies and social formations” (p.18). 
Simone further argues that this urbanization set the framework within which Africans began to 
relate with each other within cities, as well as how they interacted with the outside world. He 
states: “the present emphases on decentralization, local management, the exigencies of poverty 
alleviation, and regionally articulated local economic development are all in significant ways a 
reformulation of instruments used to evolve urban life according to the conditions that would 
ensure a very specific engagement with nonlocal worlds” (Simone 2001:19). Much of what 
constitutes as informal economies in most of the postcolonial cities in the South are a product of 
colonial economies and the constant migration of people to cities. Cities were seen a “places of 
refuge” (Simone 2004:20) to the multitude of people displaced from rural areas as a result of the 
colonial economy.  
However, it is argued that the colonial structure remained fragmented and there were 
limits to the control it had over the urban environment. In Simone’s (2004:143) words, 
“throughout the colonial project, control was always tentative, constrained, and contested.” This 
fragmentary structure provided opportunities for ordinary urban residents to make claims on the 
cities. It is in this space of the “unintended city” that alternative practices were enacted by 
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identifying existing loop holes and underregulated spaces in a context of extreme scarcity of 
material resources and basic infrastructure. Therefore, as Simone argues the colonial city also 
provided the space for “a constant renegotiation of alternative spaces of livelihoods, relations and 
practices…a project of making something out of the city other than what was expected in 
capitalist production…allowing people to urbanize relationships derived from ruralized 
solidarity” (Simone 2001:20).37 
The Making of Bombay/Mumbai: Connections and Disconnections  
A colonial port city 
Bombay like some of the other big cities of India, such as Kolkata and Chennai, is a colonial 
city. However, unlike some of the other cities of the subcontinent such as Delhi, Agra, Lahore, 
Varanasi, Hyderabad, or Ahmedabad it has a relatively short history of urban settlement (Patel 
2003, emphasis added).
38
 Even though Thana, the region north of Bombay, is noted in some 
accounts of Marco Polo, the Portuguese who occupied several islands in the region after 1532 
did not consider Bombay of much strategic importance, unlike Goa or Calicut (Kooiman 1985).
39
  
Precolonial trade—Despite Bombay’s relatively recent urban origins, Bombay’s growth 
as a port city during the British expansion in the nineteenth century has to be understood in a 
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 In the context of Bombay, Chandavarkar (1994) has highlighted how these rural solidarities helped the textile 
workers of Bombay in their struggle for survival in the city. He also points out that these links with their rural bases 
also allowed the workers to wage militant struggles in the city. 
38
 Kolkata and Chennai are the new official names for Calcutta and Madras. The word Bombay was a corrupted 
Portuguese usage of the island’s indigenous name derived from Mumbadevi a patron goddess of the Kolis (the 
indigenous people of the region). Although Bombay has widely been understood as a “colonial port city,” some 
scholars are not comfortable using this category. Chandavarkar (2004) contends that “even though Bombay was in 
part a product of its imperial connection and owes it origin and early growth to the colonial settlement, its 
commercial and industrial development was shaped increasingly and in important ways by its place within the 
internal economy” (p.29, own italics). In this internal economy the commodity markets were linked to wider 
relations of production and exchange in the hinterland. The textile mills of Bombay depended increasingly on the 
penetration of the domestic market. Thus, the growth of Bombay does not owe solely to the colonial logic of 
development, but on the dialectics of global forces and regional/local processes, an argument made by several 
scholars with regard to other Indian cities (King 2004). 
39
 The earliest archaeological evidence suggests that the region around Bombay had precolonial trade connections 
with Persia and Rome. It is also speculated that Ptolemaeus’s Heptanesia (Seven Islands) may have been identified 
as the seven islands of Bombay. However, this period preceding the European expansion was considered to be of 
minor importance in its growth (Kooiman 1985). 
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much earlier historical context of adaptation and expansion of maritime networks of trade and 
cultural exchange in the Indian Ocean region. Recently, scholars have argued that today’s 
emerging “Asian connections” need to be understood in a much longer history going as far back 
as the thirteenth century precolonial maritime networks in the regions extending from the Red 
Sea to the South China sea (Duara 2010:965).
40
 The later European colonial trade and power 
expanded and built upon these older precolonial networks of mobile merchant communities of 
Asia constituted by the Chinese, Indian, and (Baghdadi) Jews, involved in long-distance credit 
networks.
41
 Chaudhuri (1985) argues, “India” in the precolonial period provided a vital junction 
point to three different networks of trade and civilization: “the first linking its West coast to 
Arabia and Levant; the second its North-West to Central Asia and Iran; and the third it’s South-
East to South-East Asia.”42 Washbrook (1997) argues that until the sixteenth century, Europeans 
played a marginal role in this Asian world dominated by the Ottomans, the Mughals, the Ming 
and the Ch’ing (p.426).   
European expansion--From the sixteenth century, beginning with the voyage of Vasco da 
Gama in 1497-99 and the subsequent linking of the Asian maritime trade with the Atlantic by the 
Portuguese (and its later expansion by the British through trade in mass-consumed goods), the 
European powers began to dominate these precolonial trade networks through imperialism 
(Rennstich 2006). Duara (2010:964) argues that the British Empire in the nineteenth century 
“had the effect of intensifying some of the old relationships and generating new linkages 
between cities (and hinterlands) of Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Shanghai as entrepôts and financial centers for Asian trade” (Duara 2010:964). 
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 Sen (2010) extends these Asian precolonial networks even further back in history to the first century to trading 
networks consisting of both overland and maritime routes. According to Sen (2010) by the first century the major 
ports and urban centers of Asia were linked with each other (p.992).   
41
 For more on precolonial Asian networks refer to the seminal study on the subject by K. N. Chaudhuri (1990). 
42
 Cited in Washbrook (1997:426). 
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Bombay was one of the twenty-five islands along the Konkan coast of western India (da 
Cunha [1900] 2004). Six other islands were united together with the island of Bombay through 
land reclamations to form a larger entity called Bombay. Bombay was transferred by the 
Portuguese to the British in 1661 as part of a dowry of Princess Katherine.
43
 Even by the late 
eighteenth century, Bombay was essentially a marine post with very few linkages with its 
hinterland. However, Bombay possessed several promising geographical advantages that led to 
its emergence as India’s leading port city in the nineteenth century. It possessed a safe natural 
harbor that suited the maritime interests of the British East India Company (EIC) (Koiiman 
1985). It was under the British Empire that Bombay emerged as an urban center.  
As discussed earlier, King (1976:18) has argued that colonial urbanism has to be 
understood in terms of urban development as opposed to urban growth. This fact is especially 
relevant in the case of Bombay. Even though it possessed a natural geographical advantage as a 
port, Bombay’s rise to prominence as a port city was not inevitable. Apart from harsh living 
conditions on the island itself, Bombay was also inaccessible to its hinterland as it was 
surrounded by the mountainous topography of the Western Ghats, preventing formation of land-
routes. Thus Bombay’s emergence as a port city has not only to do with its global linkages in the 
world economy, but also with its local linkages with its own hinterland. In this context, Kooiman 
(1985: 212) argues, that Bombay’s history confirmed the general trend that port cities only grew 
after their surrounding countryside was commercialized. As a result of Bombay’s inaccessibility, 
much of the trade along the western coast was restricted in the Gulf of Khambat, north of 
Bombay, in places such as Khambat, Bharuch, Daman, and Diu, and more importantly Surat, 
which was the major port along the western coast in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
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 Even at the time of the transfer, Bombay was of minor importance and was considered “notoriously unhealthy” 
and thinly populated. It seems, Charles II was more “embarrassed than pleased by this part of the dowry” and 
therefore handed it to the East India Company at an annual rent of ₤ 10 in gold (Kooiman 1985). 
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century.  Surat had been a major trading site of the Mughal Empire connected with the Persian 
Gulf, the Red Sea, and regions beyond Cape Comorin. In the seventeenth century, Surat 
possessed the largest merchant fleet in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Surat was also an important 
connection point for pilgrims going to Mecca (Kooiman 1985:21). The Mughal Emperor allowed 
certain European companies to set up their own factories. The British EIC set up a factory in 
Surat in 1612 after obtaining a license from the Mughal Emperor and since then much of its trade 
in the seventeenth century was centered in Surat. The Dutch and the French Companies too 
followed later (Kosambi 1993:211-12).      
   However, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, Surat’s importance as a port had 
declined and it was later replaced by Bombay as the leading port along the west coast. However, 
historians argue that Bombay’s rise as a port city after Surat’s decline was not a given, 
considering its inaccessibility with its hinterland. Thus, although the shift from Surat to Bombay 
occurred in 1687, it was not until the mid-eighteenth century that Bombay became commercially 
bigger than Surat (Kosambi 1993:212). Surat’s decline and Bombay’s subsequent rise have to be 
understood in the broader world-historical changes at that time.  
Das Gupta (1979) argues that the decline of Surat was affected by the declining influence 
of three empires: the Mughal Empire in India, the Safavid Empire in Iran, and the Ottoman 
Empire in West Asia. This historical juncture acted as a key “blockage” (to use Rennstich’s 
[2006] phrase) that led the decline of Surat and reconfiguration of the trading networks in the 
region. The weakening of the Saffavid and Ottoman empires disrupted Surat’s trade with West 
Asia and the decline of the Mughal Empire affected Surat’s long-distance trade with Agra, 
Lahore, and Banaras. Thus, as argued by Farooqui (2006:5), the decline was Surat was a “part of 
a general crisis in western Indian trade” leading to Surat’s declining trade with Europe (Farooqui 
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2006:5). Along with these changes, there were also local strategic reasons for the British EIC to 
consider a move from Surat to an alternative coastal site along the western coast. The company 
was becoming weary of competition from rival European mercantile companies, moreover, it 
was also looking for a more secure location especially after its wars with the Dutch in the 1650s 
and in that context Bombay’s inaccessibility proved to be a big advantage (Kosambi 1993:212).    
It was only after 1784 that Bombay began to grow due to the export of cotton to China in 
return for Chinese tea. However, it was argued that the cotton exports could not keep up with the 
increasing import of Chinese tea. This difference had to be compensated with the opium trade 
within the triangular trade between India, Britain, and China since the eighteenth century. While 
the role of cotton is well discussed in relation to Bombay’s transformation, the role of the opium 
trade for capital accumulation is fairly under-researched.
44
  
The opium trade and the emergence of the indigenous capitalist class—Opium was of 
immense importance for the Indian economy, the Indian Empire and, ultimately for the global 
economy of the nineteenth century. Because of its high profits margins, opium was one of the 
primary export products of colonial India until in the end of the nineteenth century. This trade 
was sustained by increasing consumption of Opium by China and other parts of the Southeast 
(Richards 2002). The importance of opium for the colonial economy can be gauged from the fact 
that from the early period of the EIC until the end of British Empire opium earned of the highest 
revenues along with revenues from land and salt monopoly (Richards 2002: 153). The incomes 
from opium steadily increased from about Rs 17.2 million per year in the 1830s, to Rs 50.3 
million in the 1850s, and were at the highest at about Rs 93.5 million in the 1880s (Richards 
2002:155).  
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 For more on the opium trade, see Farooqui (2006), Richards (2002), and Siddiqui (1982). 
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It is argued that it was the opium trade that led to the emergence of an indigenous 
capitalist class in India engaged in the opium enterprise around the port (Farooqui 2006). The 
opium trade not only linked Bombay to the world economy, especially China, but also to other 
regions along the west coast of India, including Rajasthan, Sind, and Malwa. The British 
government had a monopoly over the opium trade which was mainly concentrated in Bengal. 
Opium was grown in the eastern Gangetic plain, processed in Bihar and Bengal and auctioned 
and exported from Bengal. However, the control of the EIC in western India was relatively weak 
throughout the eighteenth century, partly due to the Maratha power in the region. This enabled 
the Indo-Portuguese traders to expand the trade of opium produced in western and central India. 
Through the patronage of local rulers these traders were able to thwart the monopolistic control 
of the British over the opium in the western and central India (Farooqui 2006). Thus, Farooqui 
(2006:18) argues that “modern Bombay has its genesis in the poppy fields in Bihar.”  
Realizing its inability to control the illegal opium trade in the western and central regions, 
in 1846 the government allowed private and mainly Indian enterprise (mainly Marwari and Parsi 
merchants) in opium along with the Western coast.
45
 Thus, along with the Gangetic opium, 
opium from Malwa in central India was directed to be shipped to the world market from 
Bombay. In the mid-nineteenth century, syndicates consisting of wealthy native merchants 
(especially the Parsis) operating in the Opium trade purchased Opium auctioned by the 
government and transported them through ships to Canton China (Siddiqui 1985; Richards 
2002). These entrepreneurial communities later reinvested their profits from opium trade in the 
emerging textile industry in Bombay from the mid-nineteenth century.  
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 The Parsis in Bombay were one of the first Indians to develop trade networks with China during the colonial 
period, prominent among them were people like Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy. See Siddiqui (1982) and Farooqui (2006). 
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Cotton textiles—Earlier Bombay’s economy was centered on export of cotton to China to 
settle EIC’s unfavorable balance of trade with China. However, in the middle of nineteenth 
century the indigenous entrepreneurs started manufacturing cotton textiles in Bombay. This was 
aided by road and rail development projects between 1830 and 1860 that linked Bombay to its 
hinterland. The development of spinning and weaving mills led to the migration of mill workers, 
particularly from the coastal areas of Konkan in the south. The first textile mill was established 
in 1856 and by the end of 1875, Bombay had 27 mills and by 1900 this number grew to 82. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, Bombay had established itself as an important commercial 
center in India. “It handled about two-fifths of the total value of India’s foreign trade, 70 percent 
of the value of the coastal trade and the bulk of the re-export trade to the Persian Gulf and to the 
Arab and East African ports” (Chandavarkar 1994:25). The growth of cotton mills also led to 
growth in various ancillary small-scale industries. Along with this Bombay also had emerged by 
the end of the nineteenth century as a major financial center in India (Kidambi 2007).  
All this economic activity attracted a lot of people to the city and Bombay’s population 
grew by leaps and bounds. The city’s population more than doubled from 232,032 in 1833 to 
more than half of million in 1849. Bombay’s population continued to increase in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century due to an increase in migration caused by the speculative boom triggered 
by the American Civil War in the early 1860s. In 1891, Bombay’s population was about 800,000 
out of which only a quarter were born in the city (Kidambi 2007:22).  The interwar period is 
considered to be a crucial period in the growth of the city. It is argued that the loosening of the 
colonial tie during the interwar period led to increasing fortunes of the textile industry and the 
growth of its domestic market (Patel 2003). The textile industry became the largest employer in 
the city with its employment rising from 147,000 in 1921 to 136,000 in 1931 (Kooiman 1985).  
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As argued earlier (see foot note 29 on page 62), although Bombay’s initial growth was 
due to its imperial connection, its commercial and industrial development was shaped in 
important ways through its internal economy wherein the commodity markets were linked to 
wider relations of production and exchange in the hinterland (Chandavarkar 1994:29). The 
textile mills of Bombay depended increasingly on the domestic market. The labor for these mills 
was recruited from the migrants from different regions. However, interestingly, these migrants 
maintained close ties with their villages and contributed to the rural economy through their 
remittances (ibid: 29). These continued links with their host villages played an important part in 
the sustenance of the workers in the city and in their labor struggles. Gradually, there emerged a 
unique working class culture and the area where mills existed came to be known as Girangaon, 
or the “village of mills.” The workers who came to work in the textile mills were largely rural 
migrants who migrated from the hinterland of Maharashtra, mainly the Konkan region on the 
west coast (especially Ratnagiri) and the Deccan Ghat or plateau region in central India (mainly 
Pune, Satara, Sangli, Nashik). It is also argued that all those who migrated were essentially small 
land-owners and not landless rural poor. Thus migration and the possibility of earning quick 
money further strengthened their rural power base (Chandavarkar 1994). In order to sustain 
themselves in the city and to meet the material needs like employment, credit and housing they 
had to rely on societal networks based on ties of caste, region and kinship. Thus, it was essential 
for them to maintain their rural links. Therefore, the rural migrants did not assimilate in the city 
by completely losing their rural identity. As a result of this, these rural links led to the formation 
of working class institutions in the city such as tamasha (working class theater), krida mandals 
(sports clubs), vyayam shalas  (gymnasiums), gramastha mandals (village organizations), 
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khanavalis (dining houses), path pedis (credit societies), that only catered to their cultural needs, 
also existential needs such housing, food, and finance .
46
  
Uneven urban development 
Due to the specific colonial economic, military, strategic, and political considerations, the 
involvement of the colonial state in matters of Bombay’s urban development was often artificial 
and uneven (Farooqui 2006). This unevenness has been most visible in the built environment of 
Bombay, ever since its emergence as an industrial city in the mid-nineteenth century. Reflecting 
the growing importance of Bombay as a port, the southernmost tip of the island facing the 
harbor—the Fort area—became the nucleus of European settlement in the city. Just north of the 
Fort separated by an esplanade was the native settlement. The Fort area itself was segregated 
with the native Indians concentrated in the northern sections and the European population 
concentrated in the south. The Europeans and the natives were not merely separated physically, 
but also socio-economically differentiated. The Fort symbolized the sphere of western capitalism 
where the main CBD was located, whereas the native quarter contained the indigenous bazaar 
economy reflecting caste-based residential patterns (Dossal 1991; Kidambi 2007). However, as 
the Fort area became overcrowded the colonial elite began to move to the south-western tip of 
the island which over a period of time became the upscale neighborhood of Malabar Hill which 
became an exclusive conclave of the Europeans. However, several wealthy Parsi families too 
settled in that area (Farooqui 2006).    
                                                          
46 This aspect of working class culture assumes significant importance in the context of contemporary urban 
development in Mumbai. The redevelopment of the mill-district has met with strong resistance from the former mill 
workers who still reside in the tenements in the defunct mill premises. As discussed in chapter 6, the former mill 
workers struggle is not only for housing and livelihoods, but also to preserve this unique predominantly Marathi 
working class culture in the city.  
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It is found that colonial urban planning primarily benefitted an elite minority in the city. 
There were massive investments in grand architectural projects at the expense of critical issues 
such as housing, transportation, health, and public services, concerning the majority of the city 
residents (Hazareesingh 2001). Thus, “the economy of Bombay was reasonably affluent in the 
early twentieth century: only its people remained poor” (Hazareesingh 2001:255). The 
systematic anti-poor bias of the colonial officials was especially evident at the time of the 
bubonic plague that hit the city in 1896. Having very little knowledge about the etiology of the 
disease, the colonial plague policy was driven by class-biased assumptions about the disease 
related to sanitation and hygiene leading to draconian acts that regularized forced eviction and 
demolition of overcrowded tenements of poor people in the city. The plague also provided an 
opportunity for the colonial state to pursue larger urban renewal strategies in the early twentieth 
century under the City of Bombay Improvement Trust (BIT) formed in 1898. The task of the 
Trust was to create an “orderly city” and for this it was expected “not only to carry out urgent 
sanitary improvements, but also to enhance its image as a center of imperial and commercial 
power.”  However, these technocratic visions of restructuring urban space could not achieve 
much success because of sustained local opposition involving diverse groups ranging from 
property owners to particular caste and religious groups and communities (Kidambi 2007:78-81). 
By 1909, the Trust had evicted over 50,000 people from their demolished one-room tenements, 
however, only 2,844 new “sanitary” tenements (Hazareesingh 2001:240).   
 The uneven development was also reflected in terms of access to basic services in the 
city. Despite the mid-nineteenth century population boom, there was no proportionate rise in the 
civic facilities provided by the colonial state. The city constantly grappled with “abysmal 
drainage and sewage disposal system, high morbidity and mortality rates, poor roads and 
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transport facilities, and insufficient and over-crowded housing” (Dossal 1991:30).  Figure 6, 
gives an overall picture of contemporary urban inequality in Mumbai. It compares access to 
various services between the urban poor (using slum population as proxy) and the non-poor 
population.  
Figure 6. Urban Inequality in Mumbai 
Criteria Urban poor (slum population) 
(57 per cent) 
Non-slum population  
(43 per cent) 
Access to toilet  47 per cent have access  
81 people per toilet seat  
20 per cent defecate in the open  
100 per cent 
Access to piped water  18 per cent 92 per cent 
Water Supply  
(standard is 135 lpcs) 
90 liters per capita daily (lpcs)  200 lpcs  
Health 10,147 people/bed in municipal 
hospitals (35 per cent of the urban 
poor use municipal hospitals) 
487 people/bed in private 
hospitals 
Water consumption  
(standard is 135 liters per 
person/day)  
35-60 liters per person/day  300-400 liters per 
person/day
47
  
Water costs  30 times more than the prescribed 
rate  
The rich not only pay less 
for water but there is $ 123 
million worth of pending 
water bills of state 
authorities, builders, 
shopping malls, and 
hotels.
48
 
Education 31 per cent likely to complete 
high school 
47 per cent likely to 
complete high school 
 Source: Mumbai Human Development Report (2009). 
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 MCGM supplies 800,000 liters of water every day to beverage and bottling plants in the city. 
48
 “Mumbait Thakit Paanibile 749 crores!” Lokasatta, December 14, 2009, p.2 
69 
 
Postcolonial Bombay/Mumbai 
In the post-independence period after 1947, much of the profits from the textile industry were 
reinvested in capital intensive industries such as engineering, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, 
food processing, and fertilizers (Patel 2003). This growth also fuelled a radical working class 
movement in Bombay. From 1960s, Bombay experienced major industrial restructuring which 
deeply impacted the textile industry. There was a growth of new capital-intensive industries and 
this was visible in the form of greater productive capital than employment in the organized 
sector. From 1961 to 1981 the productive capital grew from Rs. 6 billion to Rs. 700 billion (van 
Wersch 1992:18). The decline of the textile industry was further hastened by the textile strike in 
1982-83, at the end of which almost 100,000 workers were retrenched and a considerable amount 
of units were shut down. In 1976, 27 per cent of the city’s organized workforce was employed in 
the textile industry, this figure dropped to 12.5 per cent by 1991.
49
 Most workers who lost their 
jobs have joined the informal economy.  
 Industrial restructuring led to a growth in the small-scale power loom sector supported by 
the state. The spurt in the growth of capital intensive power looms resulted in a loss of market 
share of the labor intensive mills. While the overall production of cotton cloth (produced in the 
cotton mills) remained stagnant during 1970-1987, the production of blended cloth kept growing 
from the 1970s. Even during the strike, the production of synthetic, man-made fiber grew as it 
was produced in the decentralized power loom sector that remained unaffected by the strike (van 
Wersch 1992). Along with declining share of production, the technological backwardness of 
textile mills further aggravated the situation. The obsolescence of machinery used in spinning, 
weaving, and processing has been identified as one of the main causes of “sickness” in the 
industry. However, this technological backwardness is not new. The mill owners’ refusal to 
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 Bakshi (1986), cited in Patel (2004:335). 
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modernize the mills facilitated their eventual closure. Thus, the textile strike proved to be a 
blessing-in-disguise for the mill owners as they could shut down the mills and reinvest the profits 
in more lucrative sectors of the new economy.  
 Some scholars argue that what happened in Bombay cannot be called deindustrialization, 
but spatial reorganization combined with an increasing expansion of the boundaries of the city 
(Patel 2003).
50
 Due to this process of spatial reorganization, the central parts of the city ceased to 
be the dominant regions of manufacturing as production was dispersed to the suburbs and other 
satellite centers (outside Greater Mumbai, but within the Mumbai Metropolitan Region) such as 
Thane, Kalyan, and Navi Mumbai. Because of this, the central parts of the city (including the 
mill district in Mumbai) have now become the epicenter of the new economy in Mumbai based 
on service industries including finance, tourism, retailing, and entertainment.   
 By early 1990s, this shift in the Mumbai’s economy toward jobs related to producer 
services becomes more visible as seen in the following quote from Harris (1995): 
By 1994, Bombay accounted for 61 per cent jobs in India’s oil sector, 41 per cent in domestic air 
traffic. Its airport handled 75 per cent of the country’s imports and 64 per cent of exports. 
Employment in financial and business services had increased by 43 per cent between the 1970s 
and 1980s. Bombay collected 25 percent of India’s income tax revenues and 60 per cent of 
custom revenues. Its banks controlled 12 percent of national deposits and a quarter of the 
country’s outstanding credits. The number of issues listed on the Bombay’s stock exchange grew 
from 203 in 1991-2 to 694 in 1993-4, and the amount of fresh capital in old and new companies 
increased from Rs 54 billion to 213 billion between these years.
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According to the Draft Regional Plan of the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development 
Authority (MMRDA) published in 1995, the employment in manufacturing industries in Greater 
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 In this context Patel (2003:11) argues that even though much of formal sector production shifted to informal and 
small-scale sector, older capital-intensive high-value production through subsidiaries of multinational companies 
continued due to a demand from domestic consumption in Mumbai. This was largely achieved due to large 
resources of skilled labor in the city.  
51
 Cited in Patel (2003:17). 
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Mumbai has declined from 36 per cent in 1980 to 28.5 per cent in 1990, whereas employment in 
trade, finance, and service-based industries increased from 52.1 per cent to 64.3 per cent during 
the same period (MMRDA 1985). The formal inauguration of the structural adjustment policy in 
1991 (popularly referred to as liberalization) has further accelerated the process of urban 
restructuring in the city.
52
 
 In the post-liberalization years, urban planning in Mumbai is self-consciously geared 
toward “managing city space” in order to render it a “global” or “world class” status and to 
convert the city into a significant financial and service center at the cost of industrial decline in 
several areas (Banerjee-Guha 2002). Informally, this is also referred to as the “Shanghaization” 
of Mumbai, alluding to Shanghai as the preferred model of development for Mumbai 
(Mahadevia and Narayan 2005). In chapter 4, I provide a detailed analysis of the genealogy of 
the Shanghaization discourse in Mumbai. However, it is important there is a need to have a 
comparative context to the discussion on Shanghaization to understand why the urban elite in 
Mumbai seek to emulate this model of urban growth and whether it is an effective model for 
Mumbai. Therefore, in the next chapter 3, I critically analyze the Shanghai model of 
development as it emerged in China.    
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 Structural adjustment primarily implies changing importance and role of different elements and sectors of the 
economy in the process of development. It takes place either on the basis of the interplay of market forces of 
demand and supply, internally and internationally, or is brought about on the basis of conscious and deliberate 
policy measures adopted mainly on the macroeconomic front (Papola 1994). In the contemporary world economy, 
structural adjustment has acquired a narrower meaning. In the developing world, particularly since 1980s, structural 
adjustment is said to be engineered by international financial institutions as a solution to the economic crisis faced 
by the developing countries. 
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Figure 1. South and South East Asia          Figure 2. Maharashtra State, India 
Source: Google Maps (2013)                      Source: Google Maps (2013) 
 
Figure 3. Map of Mumbai   
Source: Compare Infobase Pvt. Ltd.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SHANGHAI MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
~Today, Asian cities are fertile sites, not for following an established pathway or master 
blueprint, but for a plethora of situated experiments that reinvent what urban norms can 
count as global (Ong 2011:2). 
 
Worlding Cities 
The dynamism of cities of the global South has led to a rethinking of the dominant theoretical 
accounts of cities and globalization.
53
 There is strong emerging scholarship based on the 
experiences of cities of the South that have questioned many of the assumptions of western and 
structurally deterministic understanding of urban change (King 2000; Robinson 2002; Roy 
2009b; Roy and Ong 2011; Shatkin 2007; Short and Kim 1999). Roy and Ong (2011) in 
particular go the farthest in their critique of existing “global generalizations” (both global 
capitalist and postcolonialist perspectives) that privilege singular and predetermined logics of 
global change. What is advocated, therefore, is a more “open-ended” analysis, where “worlding” 
of cities is understood as an emergent process, as “the art of being global,” in which global 
claims are understood to be always “in formation” with uncertain outcomes (Ong 2011:22-23).54 
In the process, certain global forms are recontextualized and adapted to specific contexts. 
Therefore, as a global form, the neoliberal is articulated as a situation-specific “art of being 
global” (Ong 2011:24). According to Roy (2011b), “worlding” in the global South can no longer 
be understood simply as “globalization imposed by the West on the rest.” The emerging models 
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 The wide-ranging issues covered include emerging urban modernity (Rao 2005); new contestatory politics 
(Chatterjee 2004; Sassen 2004); alternative urban theory (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000; Robinson 2002; Roy 
2009b; Roy and Ong 2011; Shatkin 2007; Simone 2001). 
54
 As against the dominant “global/world class city” approach, “worlding” of cities is understood not merely in 
terms of networks of finance and informational capital. It highlights other ways of “reaching out to the world” that 
happens either as a matter of day-to-day survival or through organized networks of social relations that are equally 
important in the world economy. For more on this see Roy (2009); Roy and Ong (2011), and Simone (2001). 
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of “homegrown neoliberalization” are based on new worlding practices such as inter-referencing 
involving “South-South coordinates and emergent South-based global referents” (Roy 2011b:10, 
emphasis added). Ong (2011:17) defines inter-referencing as “practices of citation, allusion, 
aspiration, comparison, and competition” vis-à-vis a “more successful city.” In the case of 
Mumbai, inter-referencing takes the form of “elite dreaming” where Asian cities such as 
Singapore and Shanghai are invoked as an aspiration, justifying a range of urban experiments 
related to real-estate development, clearing of slums, and suppressing local resistance (Ong 
2011:17).  
Mumbai’s Shanghai Dreams 
In recent years, Shanghai has increasingly shaped the perceptions of how China is viewed within 
as well as outside the country. It is viewed as a symbol of a “rising China." Nowhere in the world 
have people been so obsessed with Shanghai than in Mumbai, the business capital of India, 
where intellectuals, planners, as well as common residents are preoccupied with the question of 
transforming Mumbai into Shanghai. In this context, Huang (2008a) argues, “it would seem 
preposterous to even ask the question, “What is wrong with Shanghai?” Shanghai’s role in the 
economic growth in China is almost obvious, taken-for-granted, and uncontested. Scholars from 
Thomas Friedman to the World Bank economists are enamored by the “Shanghai model.” At a 
conference in 2007, the World Bank hailed Shanghai as the poster-child of its FDI-led 
globalization and based on the “Shanghai miracle” argued that urbanization was the only means 
to reduce poverty in the South (Huang 2008c). Outside China, in cities such as Mumbai, much of 
this Shanghai-fixation is based on, what Huang aptly refers to as, “numerical equivalents of 
tourist pictures of Shanghai” that include the Shanghai/Pudong skyline (Shanghai’s redeveloped 
financial district) and the city’s high-speed Maglev train (Huang 2008c). However, these 
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discourses of urban transformation in Mumbai and elsewhere take place without any detailed 
knowledge about the actual economic realities in Shanghai.  
The focus of the recent national and urban policy in India has been to technically 
restructure Mumbai’s city space in order to make it “world class” and to transform the city into 
an “international financial center” (Banerjee-Guha 2002). This is referred to as Shanghaization in 
the local press, in reference to Shanghai as the preferred developmental model (Mahadevia and 
Narayan 2005). The Shanghai rhetoric was first articulated by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. 
Manmohan Singh, in October 2004 in a state election speech when he said: 
When we talk of a resurgent Asia, people think of the great changes that have come about in 
Shanghai. I share this aspiration to transform Mumbai in the next five years in such a manner that 
people would forget about Shanghai and Mumbai will become a talking point…I have a dream 
that we can do it. I believe we can become number one through modernization, expansion, and 
development and make Mumbai the number one city in our country.
55
 
Mr. Singh reiterated the Shanghai rhetoric at yet another speech in 2006 at a conference co-
hosted by the Wall Street Journal:    
I am convinced that a historic opportunity for the revamping of Mumbai presents itself before us 
today. Mumbai can emerge as a new financial capital of Asia, and be the bridge between Asia and 
the West in the world of finance….I do believe that Mumbai can learn from Shanghai’s 
experience in reinventing itself; in rebuilding itself; in rediscovering itself. I urge every 
Mumbaikar to transform this city from being a Gateway to India to becoming a Gateway to 
Asia!
56
  
Soon after the 2004 elections, the state government unveiled a 6.5 billion USD plan to transform 
Mumbai into a “world class city” like Shanghai. The central government too offered to invest 
around 2 billion USD over a period of five years in this effort. Some of the recommendations of 
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 Siddharth Srivastava, “Mumbai struggles to catch up with Shanghai,” Asia Times, March 16, 2005. Retrieved 
March 9, 2011 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC16Df02.html). 
56
 This is an excerpt from the key note address delivered by the Prime Minister on May 18,2006 at the 16
th
 Asian 
Corporate Conference in Mumbai titled, “Driving global business: India’s new priorities, Asia’s new realities.” This 
conference was organized by the Asia Society along with The Wall Street Journal and The Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII). Retrieved March 27, 2012 (http://www.asiasociety.org/conference06/). 
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the plan included key infrastructure projects, redevelopment of “encroached” land, and 
beautification of the international airport in the city.
57
 Soon after this plan was announced, within 
two months, 90,000 homes of slum dwellers were demolished (Mahadevia and Narayan 2005). I 
will discuss these displacements in more detail in chapter 5.  
  Yasheng Huang (2008a) argues that the political elite in Shanghai viewed Shanghai as 
the symbol of a rising China reaching out to the world. Much in the same manner, the political 
elite in India too view Mumbai as an embodiment of India’s integration in the world economy as 
highlighted by the following quote from a speech of the Prime Minister at the launch of the 
Phase I of the Mumbai Metro Rail in 2006: 
I have often said that Mumbai is not an ordinary city, its contribution to the creation of wealth in 
our country, the symbol of hopes and aspirations of a resurgent India… it is an embodiment of 
the spirit of India that India is out to embrace globalization…Mumbai symbolizes India to the 
external world (emphasis added). 
58
  
It is clear from the above quotes that Mumbai’s transformation is intricately tied with sustaining 
the momentum of economic growth in India. Moreover, the “Shanghai Model” is not just a local 
urban imaginary, but (as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter) is slowly emerging as an 
urban, export-led national strategy of economic development in India. But before going into the 
specific discussion on the Shanghai model in China, I will first discuss what makes this 
association of Mumbai and Shanghai plausible by comparing these two cities. In this regard, 
Mumbai and Shanghai have some interesting points of convergences. Analyzing these 
convergences may shed further light on Shanghai’s developmental appeal for Mumbai. 
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 Siddharth Srivastava (ibid). 
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 PM lays foundation stone of phase-I of Mumbai Metro, June 21, 2006. Retrieved March 27, 2012 
(http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content4print.asp?id=342).  
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Parallels between Shanghai and Bombay/Mumbai 
Port cities  
The “Asian urban connection” stretches far back in history to the thirteenth century precolonial 
maritime trade routes extending from the Red Sea to the South China sea and constituted by 
mobile merchant communities of Asia constituted by the Chinese, Indian, and (Baghdadi) Jews 
involved in long-distance credit networks (Duara 2010: 965). Sen (2010) pushes the period of 
Asian precolonial networks even further back to the first century trading networks consisting of 
both overland and maritime routes. According to Sen (2010:992), it was by the first century that 
the major ports and urban centers of Asia were linked with each other.
59
 The Europeans 
(particularly Britain) came to dominate the long-distance Asian sea trade world only in the 
seventeenth century. Before this, until the sixteenth century, the sea trade was dominated by the 
Ottomans, the Mughals, the Ming and the Ch’ing (Washbrook 1997:426). By the nineteenth 
century European powers substantially expanded and rebuilt the earlier precolonial trade 
networks.  
British imperialism in the nineteenth century created new linkages between cities (and 
hinterlands) of Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai as entrepôts and 
financial centers for Asian trade. These linkages were deepened through the spice trade that 
linked the maritime trade of Asia with the Atlantic (Duara 2010:964). It was during this period 
that Shanghai and Bombay emerged as thriving port cities and later industrial centers. However, 
the foundations of these maritime trade networks were laid much earlier in the precolonial period 
Sung China and the Mughal period.  
Both Shanghai and Bombay historically were fishing hamlets which evolved as premier 
port cities in the mid nineteenth century. As port cities, they served the function of “gateway 
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 For more on precolonial Asian networks refer to the seminal study on the subject by K. N. Chaudhuri (1990). 
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cities” in the context of the colonial trade and both have remained, for most part, their respective 
country’s preeminent cities. The initial impetus of growth in both the cities had occurred 
primarily due to British-led colonialism, or quasi-colonial “treaty-port system” in the case of 
Shanghai (Wasserstrom 2003:56). At the end of the First Opium War, Shanghai was one of the 
five treaty ports established by the British under the Treaty of Nanjing in 1843. A section of the 
city was opened to British trade and settlement. What initially began as a British settlement came 
to be occupied over a period of time by the Americans and the French through what was referred 
to as “concessions” or exclaves, each having its own set of extraterritorial laws (Abbas 2000). 
Gradually, within the area of international settlement there emerged what Abbas (2000) calls 
“cosmopolitanism of extraterritoriality,” which was most manifest in the built space of the city 
with its “Tudor-style villas, Spanish-style townhouses, Russian-style churches, and German-style 
mansions, along with the internationalism of the buildings on the Bund” (p.774). The “Bund,” a 
water-front area within the international settlement in the north of the walled city, became a 
financial hub of East Asia at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. 
Until 1940s, it housed most of the financial institutions in China.
60
 These developments, 
however, led to extreme inequalities in the city, especially between the Western 
“Shanghailanders” and the “native residents,” the local Chinese people. Until 1930s, the 
“Shanghailanders” viewed the international settlement as an “free floating republic” where only 
foreigners were viewed as citizens with rights, while the “native residents” were considered as 
“guests”  (Wasserstrom 2003:55; 2009). In this regard, Abbas (2000) argues that Shanghai was a 
“nonviable city,” linked to the rest of the world, but delinked from the rest of China (p.776).   
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 The word “Bund,” refers to a levee or a dam and is said to have derived from a Hindi/Urdu word “Bandh,” having 
Persian roots. 
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 As discussed in the earlier chapter, Bombay’s initial development too came about due to 
the British imperial interests in the colonial division of labor. Bombay replaced Calcutta as the 
main commercial node for the British in the mid-eighteenth century due its geographic proximity 
to Europe and its excellent natural harbor. Due to a shortage of cotton caused by the American 
Civil War and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Bombay expanded economically. The first 
textile mill was established in 1856 and by the end of 1875, Bombay had 27 mills and by 1900 
this number grew to 82. By the end of the nineteenth century, Bombay had established itself as 
an important commercial center in India. It was during this initial period of expansion that much 
of the wide-scale urban development projects were introduced in the city (Dossal 1991). Just like 
Shanghai, British imperial metropolitanism manifested itself in the built-form of the city as seen 
in its numerous Victorian buildings, churches, theatres, and cricket clubs. Like Shanghai, 
Bombay too was a “dual city” that displayed simultaneously extreme wealth and poverty 
(Pacione 2006). 
The victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 ended Shanghai’s 
“bridgehead” function that characterized it since the mid-nineteenth century. From then on with 
more centralized command over local government, Shanghai was viewed as a “locomotive” for 
state-led industrialization. The role of the city changed from being a center of trade, finance, and 
distribution of foreign products to an industrial city (Wu 2003). Shanghai’s                                  
“grotesque cosmopolitanism” nurtured by its reputation as being the most “open” city in the 
world, free from the bureaucratic state, did not fit well with the Communist agenda of nation-
building. Therefore, there was a conscious effort made to erase Shanghai’s urban memory 
(Abbas 2000:775-76). Further, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, cities ceased to be viewed 
as exclusive sites of modernity. The cosmopolitan culture embodied by Shanghai was regarded 
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by the new leaders as being “bourgeois and decadent” (Abbas 2000:776). Driven by the new 
ideological zeal of nation-building, Shanghai lost its claim as China’s preeminent city as a result 
of neglect and underinvestment in the city. This led to a capital flight from Shanghai with most 
of the financial investors and institutions in Shanghai moving to the British colony of Hong 
Kong, fueling Hong Kong’s industrial development from the 1950s onwards.  
Mumbai’s too has moved in a similar historical trajectory of the colonial, the national, 
and the global phases (Chakravorty 2000; Grant and Nijman 2002; Nijman 2007). The national 
phase of Mumbai that lasted from independence in 1947 until 1980s was characterized by a 
relative insulation of Mumbai from the global economy and a weakening of foreign presence in 
the city (Nijman 2007).  However, the post-colonial context of Mumbai’s development did not 
affect its preeminent status as adversely as it did for Shanghai. Mumbai continued to remain the 
financial capital of the country and the most globally connected cities in India. However, in more 
recent times it has had to compete with cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad for investments 
in the emerging sectors of the economy led by information technology.  
Immigrant cities 
Both Shanghai and Bombay/Mumbai are also immigrant cities whose growth as industrial 
centers has attracted considerable international (particularly in Shanghai) and regional migration. 
What is interesting to note is that in both these cities immigrant merchant families played a very 
important role in their initial development. In the case of Shanghai, merchant families from 
nearby Ningbo (in Zhenjiang province) became an integral part of the coastal trading system and 
later commercial activity in Shanghai. Having the advantage of being the first treaty port in 
1849, Shanghai surpassed Guangzhou (Canton) as China’s premier trading city by 1853 (Wu and 
Yusuf 2004:27-28). The industrial development from mid- to late-nineteenth century attracted a 
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lot of foreign presence in Shanghai. During its “golden days” in the 1920s, Shanghai attracted a 
lot of migrants from other parts of Shanghai (Wu 2007:115). Rapid growth in the 1980s further 
attracted more migrants to the city to meet the increasing labor demands facilitated by a 
relaxation of migration policies. It is estimated that there are around 3 million temporary 
migrants working in Shanghai who (given their temporary status) have little access to education, 
housing, and other basic services in the city (Wu 2007:126). Similarly, Bombay’s initial growth 
through the opium trade and later textile industry was led by merchant communities who 
migrated from Surat, the earlier premier port city of Western India. Further, the development of 
spinning and weaving mills led to the migration of mill workers, particularly from the coastal 
areas of Konkan in the south of Bombay. In 1891 Bombay’s population was about 800,000 out 
of which only a quarter were born in the city (Kidambi 2007:22). Following Independence and 
the partition of India and Pakistan, Bombay’s population grew rapidly between 1941 and 1951, 
especially in the suburbs (Pacione 2006: 231). With over half of the population being of non-
Maharashtrian ethnicity, Mumbai has emerged as India’s most cosmopolitan city represented by 
immigrants from western, northern, as well as southern parts of India. 
Financial centers 
Both Shanghai and Bombay/Mumbai have emerged as key financial centers in their respective 
countries due to historical and geographical factors. In the twenty-first century Shanghai is 
competing with Hong Kong and Beijing as the preeminent Chinese city in terms of finance and 
industry. Compared to both the cities, Shanghai is more favorably disposed in terms of overall 
lower living and business expenses as well a great location with potential to emerge as a regional 
financial center due to the recent reorientation of the Chinese economy. Shanghai is situated in 
the Yangzte River Basin and along with Hangzhou and Wuxi forms one of the most important 
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urban regions in China. The Yangstze Basin is predicted to grow economically due to rural 
industrialization and rapid development of transport and communication infrastructure in the 
region (Wu and Yusuf 2004). Since 1990, Shanghai has received considerable federal 
investments and under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership the Pudong New Area district emerged at the 
new financial district of Shanghai. Between 1990 and 2000, 22 billion USD were invested in the 
development of Pudong and by 1999 it accounted for one-fifth of the metropolitan GDP of 
Shanghai (Wu and Yusuf 2004:33-34). Moreover, with the introduction of the Pudong 
international airport in 1999, Shanghai has also emerged as a regional passenger hub. Further, in 
2010 Shanghai became the busiest container port the world after it overtook Singapore. In 2010, 
the Shanghai port handled close to 30 million TEUs (20-foot equivalent units), more than that of 
Singapore’s 23.56 million TEUs.61 
 Mumbai too has made significant strides toward becoming an important financial center 
in the region and is already the financial capital of India. Located in the city are two stock 
exchanges—the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), head 
offices of the two financial regulating agencies—the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), head offices of several banks (foreign and 
national), and two major ports. Mumbai contributes one-third of the total direct taxes collected in 
India, 40 per cent of the national fiscal receipts, one in every three checks issued in the country 
are cleared in Mumbai, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port in Mumbai handles 58 per cent of the 
country’s container traffic, and the per capita income of Mumbai is 39 per cent higher than the 
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national average.
62
 The city also has the largest international airport and is thus an important 
transport junction point in India. Along with this, Mumbai is also an important center for 
entertainment and tourism. Mumbai is home to Bollywood, one of the world’s largest film 
industry (with an average of 140 film releases a year) which further contributes to the growth of 
other service industries such as the travel, tourism, and hotel trade (Patel 2004).With recent 
deindustrialization and growth in services, the city is projected to emerge as an important 
financial center for Asia and the world. However, unlike Shanghai, the external sector plays a 
relatively small role in Mumbai’s economy (Harris 1995; Grant and Nijman 2002). However, the 
liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s has expanded financial activity in the region 
through the deregulation of real estate market. The creation of the new commercial center at 
Bandra-Kurla in the northern suburbs of the city has also provided an alternative location to the 
heavily congested CBD in the South. However, despite emerging as their countries’ premier 
financial centers by creating the physical infrastructure and having offices of international 
financial institutions, it is argued that Shanghai’s and Mumbai’s claims to become regional and 
global financial centers would need to be backed by deeper reforms in their financial markets, 
which have been rather slow (Harris 1995; Wu and Yusuf 2004). 
Understanding the Shanghai Model of Development     
Fast growth 
From 1990-2000, Shanghai experienced a phenomenal increase in its GDP growth rate, the 
largest in the region. As a result of this some even consider it as a “new Chinese miracle” (Zhang 
2006). Shanghai’s growth during 1990-2002 was higher than the national average. During 1990-
2002, Shanghai’s growth rate increased by 479%, whereas that of China’s increased by 346% 
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(Segbers 2007:16). Further, Shanghai’s per capita GDP was five times higher than the national 
average (Zhang 2006). The GDP growth rate of Shanghai increased from 4 per cent in 1990 to 
around 11 per cent in 2002. The biggest leap in the growth rate was observed during the year 
1991-1992, where it doubled from almost 7 percent to almost 15 per cent, an increase of 8 
percentage points in a single year. Ever since, it has either remained steady or declined 
marginally (Zuo and Huang 2005).  
This rapid economic growth in Shanghai was also marked by drastic economic 
restructuring in Shanghai in order to reconnect it to the global economy. There was a shift from 
labor to capital intensive manufacturing and a shift from manufacturing to finance (Zuo and 
Huang 2005). Much of Shanghai’s recent GPD growth is attributed to the growing importance of 
Shanghai as the gateway of service-based industry. The service sector output in Shanghai grew 
ten-fold from 1990-2001 from 2.94 billion USD to 30.61 billion USD. In terms of GDP, its 
output increased from one-third to just over half in 2002. Within the service sector, real estate 
was the fastest growing segment. The share of the real estate industry within the tertiary sectors 
increased from 1.6 per cent in 1990 to 13.6 per cent in 2002. It is argued that this was by and 
large a result of the shift from free servicing to pricing and development of the real estate market 
(Zuo and Huang 2005:80-81).  
There is no doubt that at the aggregate level Shanghai has made rapid progress on the 
economic front. However, this rapid growth also raises a lot of questions: First, how do we 
explain Shanghai’s rapid economic in the context of a wider discussion of China’s economic 
ascendancy? Is this growth neoliberal or as Harvey (2005) explains, “neoliberalism ‘with 
Chinese characteristics’” or is the emerging picture much more complex for such neat 
definitions? Moreover, in the context of Mumbai, is Shanghai a good developmental model?  
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The “Shanghai miracle”:  neoliberalism or political maneuvering? 
David Harvey in his highly influential book A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), argues that 
the Chinese economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 represents an attempt (like 
the Chilean experiment) to construct a particular kind of market economy fusing neoliberal 
elements with authoritarian centralized control. He further equates reforms in China with 
authoritarian neoliberal tendencies of the neoconservatives in the US and the UK. Diverging 
from Harvey’s views, Giovanni Arrighi (2007) argues that the main basis for the Chinese growth 
was not neoliberal reforms, but the investments made in health, education, and a “capacity of self 
management” that emerged due to the welfare policies of late-imperial Qing China in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Therefore, unlike self-regulating neoliberal markets, the 
“invisible hand of the state” symbolized decentralized governance with minimal bureaucratic 
interference by the state.
63
 However, both these radically different accounts of China’s economic 
success are premised on a particular understanding of the state. Alternatively, Ong (2007) 
proposes the “neoliberalism as exception” thesis in the context of East Asian development which 
steers away from the state-based understanding of neoliberalization. She calls for a more situated 
analysis of neoliberal technologies as political exceptions that enable certain sovereign practices 
and subjectifying techniques that deviate from the established norms (Ong 2007:12). Therefore, 
as a political rationality, neoliberalism is not limited to advanced liberal democracies. 
Neoliberalism as exception can be deployed in various political settings: postcolonial, 
authoritarianism, or postsocialist (ibid: 14). Ong (2007) further argues that in a 
“postdevelopmental” context, the neoliberal states are no longer merely administrators of 
watertight national entities, but become regulators of diverse fragmented national spaces and 
populations connected or disconnected from global circuits of capital through various “zoning 
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technologies.” In the context of China, this is evident in the creation of special economic zones 
(SEZs) characterized by differential regulating practices.  
In the context of late industrializers in East Asia, unlike advanced liberal democracies, it 
were the relatively autonomous “Developmental States” that engaged in industrialization and 
rapid economic growth and at the same time tried to improve the material and social well-being 
of its citizens (Hill and Kim 2000; Leftwich 2002). The model followed by postsocialist China is 
closer to the East Asian model where reglobalizing strategies in Shanghai are seen as an 
opportunity to transform the role of the state and to legitimize its presence in the economic 
sphere (Wu 2003). In this context, Wu (2007) states, “[t]he spatiality of the globalizing city 
becomes an important medium and vehicle to achieve the aspiration of the state” in the context 
of a new postsocialist power structure and a rescaled state. Thus, in a rather peculiar sense the 
whole urban entrepreneurial endeavor in China is organized into a state project. Within this, it 
has become important for the Chinese state to coordinate the roles of Shanghai, Beijing and 
Hong Kong.  Moreover, it is argued that as the state retreats from overwhelming economic 
command in the postsocialist context, it is very unlikely that the “market” is going to take a more 
dominant role of coordination (Shi and Hamnett 2002).  
Huang (2008a) has argued that the very essence of the ‘Shanghai miracle” is completely 
political, rather than economic. It was politically constructed in the context of a changing 
political structure in China driven by local political forces centered in Shanghai. Two recent 
incidents illustrate the important role of national and local politics in the context of China’s 
contemporary transformation. In 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao suspended Shanghai’s 
Mayor Chen Liangyu from the Communist Party’s Central Committee and its Politburo under 
charges of corruption, criminal involvement, nepotism, and legal violation. One of Liangyu’s 
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colleagues was also accused of misappropriation of 400 million USD worth of city’s pension 
funds. This extra-ordinary action by the President assumes great significance in the context of 
the changing political structure in China. Liangyu’s dismissal came at a time when the National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) was having its plenary meeting to vote on 
the reshuffling of the Politburo, the most important decision making body in China. Also on the 
table was the macro-economic agenda to slow down the over-heated growth in infrastructure and 
property sector. Both these proposals met with resistance from members of the “Shanghai 
clique” which emerged as dominant power brokers in Chinese politics since the 1980s under the 
earlier President Jiang Zemin, who served as the Mayor of Shanghai in the 1980s.
 64
 Therefore, 
the indictment against Liangyu was perceived as a show of strength by Mr. Hu Jintao not merely 
to the provincial and lower level leaders who defied central government's efforts, but more 
specifically it was aimed against the “Shanghai clique.”65  
In another recent incident in April 2012, the Chongqing Communist Party secretary Bo 
Xilai was suspended from Politburo’s membership as well as the central committee of CPC 
under allegations of illegal business operations. Apparently, the central leadership was not 
comfortable with Chongqing party’s proclivity to the “cultural revolution.”  
At a broader level, both the above incidents indicate an ongoing political and ideological 
struggle over the future path of development in China. The sacking of Liangyu highlights a clash 
between two differing ideologies of economic growth in China: on the one hand, the real-estate 
led Shanghai model of growth which was viewed by the new leadership as being wasteful and 
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speculative and on the other hand, an emerging ideology of growth that emphasizes social and 
financial stability. In terms of the other incident, scholars have explained the sacking of Xilai as 
a fall out of the struggle between the Chongqing model of growth and the mainstream model. 
The Chongqing model has emerged as a radical critique of the current mainstream “neoliberal” 
developmental model and privileges state-owned enterprises, affordable housing for the poor, 
and support for small businesses in the region (Xu 2012). From the above two incidents it is clear 
that the current central leadership in China has to engage with diverse competing factions and 
ideologies, especially the members of the “Shanghai Clique”. Therefore, any attempt to 
understand the Shanghai model of development has to take into account the complexities of 
China’s political power structure. 
Shanghai and the political power structure in China 
Although it is assumed that the political system in China is rigidly hierarchical and authoritative, 
in reality the political power is China is found to be much more diffused, complex, and often 
competitive, leading to a fragmented political process and blurring of authority (Martin 2010:1). 
Largely, political power in China is concentrated in its three main political institutions: the Party 
(the CCP), the state government (consisting of ministries and provincial, municipal, and country 
governments), and the People’s Liberation Army. Along with these institutions, there are also 
other political actors that influence government policies such as the provincial and local officials, 
official and semi-official policy research groups and think tanks, and state and private business 
interest groups (Martin 2010). Although most political power rests with the central government, 
the constitution does grant local government some degree of autonomy to preside over the 
administration functions related to the economy, education, science, culture, public health, and 
urban and rural development. The relationship between the central government and the 
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provincial, municipal, and local governments is differentiated. The provincial leaders are 
appointed by the central government and generally care is taken to make sure that they are not 
from the same region to avoid entrenched corruption. However, the country and municipal 
leaders are from the same region and often the ministries have less control over them. As a result 
of this, there is often a problem disciplining local leaders and corruption is generally high among 
officials at the country and municipal levels.   
Historically, under the socialist regime, the political power structure in China was more 
centralized and was characterized by a vertical hierarchy that formed the basis of a command 
economy. The key actors within this set up were the central government, its agencies, and 
various “state work units” where most of the resources and planning was concentrated. The CCP 
was integrated within the government and the state units. However, in the postsocialist period 
characterized by wide-spread market-oriented reforms during 1990-2000, there was a 
reconfiguration of the central and local power relations with local states gaining more autonomy 
through fiscal and political decentralization (Wu 2007). Further, there was a decentralization of 
decision-making related to local financing, land use, and developmental policy (Zhang 2006).  
Further, post-Tiananmen Square, the new central leadership was more favorably disposed 
to Shanghai as most of the influential central leaders had earlier served as key officials in the city 
and had entrenched economic and political interests associated with the city. For example, both 
President Jiang Zemin (Communist Party secretary and President from 1989-2003) and Premier 
Zhu Rongji (1991-2003) had earlier served as mayors of Shanghai in the 1980s (Zhang 2006:42).  
However, with Jiang Zemin’s resignation as the Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission in September 2004 (his last official post), the current President Hu Jintao has 
assumed control over all the three political institutions in China: the party, the state, and the 
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military and has therefore emerged as the most powerful leader. In opposition to the Shanghai 
model of development, the new leadership that took over in 2002 has embarked on a new 
ideological campaign that focuses on building a “harmonious society” based on balanced 
development. The new approach —“scientific development” (kexue fazhanguan) or 
“comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development” — outlined by President Hu Jintao 
in 2003, seeks to correct the earlier overemphasis on GDP-focused economic growth that 
neglected social welfare. The new official rhetoric has now shifted from “economic growth” to 
“social harmony” incorporating sustainable development and social welfare (Fewsmith 2004:1). 
Following this, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao also announced measures to improve the situation of 
workers and peasants which included reemployment of laid-off workers, improving industrial 
safety, abolishing agricultural tax for farmers, educational subsidies for poor rural children and 
payment of unpaid wages of rural migrant workers.  
In order to build a consensus, the new approach seems to carefully balance earlier 
socialist and postsocialist ideologies. On the one hand, it tries to weed out local corruption and 
entrenched political interests through a set of regulations aimed at institutional reform that 
encourages voting and meritorious and competitive selection, rather than selection based on 
seniority and nepotism. On the other hand, in stressing this fact it uses a language is inherently 
neoliberal. For example, during one of the conferences on “human resources” organized jointly 
by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, a decision was made to rename 
recruitment terminology from “party administering cadres” to “party administering qualified 
personnel.” Party cadres are now viewed as “creators of value” and “outstanding management 
personnel and professional and technical workers.” Apparently, these changes were also driven 
by the pressures of a market-driven, globalized economy wherein private and international firms 
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are more interested in hiring employees regardless of the traditional cadre-management practices. 
However, despite the rhetoric, the fact that the party is still in charge of selecting skilled 
personnel and indicates the dominance of the Party and its traditional planning mentality 
(Fewsmith 2004:4).   
Despite such careful maneuvering, there is still no consensus over the new approach as 
highlighted by the recent split in the PSC between two factions: the “populists” and the “elitist.” 
The populist group favors more balanced economic development on the principles of a 
“harmonious society,” while the “elitist” group favors continued rapid economic development, 
catering to capitalist and middle-class interests (Martin 2010:5).
66
 This bears testimony to the 
entrenched nature of this ideology of growth in China. However, there is still a lot of distance 
between the official rhetoric and reality as seen in the rise in “unofficial transcripts” of various 
informal human rights movement, workers’ unrest, and peasants’ discontent (Mittleman 2006).     
Evolution of the Shanghai model 
The multiscalar contexts. The emergence of Shanghai model in China has to be 
understood in terms of its specific historical juncture by highlighting the particular global, 
national, regional, and local contexts within which Shanghai emerged a preeminent engine of 
economic growth for China. The end of the Cold War gave rise to new technologies that enabled 
increasing capital flows and a new international division of labor giving rise to a new round of 
global competition. In this new phase of economic globalization, the newly industrialized 
countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore advanced on the 
basis of their export-oriented development, leading to the “Asian Miracle.” Following the model 
of the “Asian Tigers,” China gradually began to adopt economic reforms and an open door 
                                                          
66
 Within the CCP, the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) consist of a two dozen or more of the 
most senior officials. However, it is the PSC—a smaller group of political elite—where most of the political power 
rests. 
92 
 
policy in 1979. In adopting an export-oriented development strategy, China began to concentrate 
on its coastal regions. Thus, by 1990, due to its strategic location in the Yangtze River Delta and 
historically being the largest financial region in East Asia, Shanghai was chosen as the “dragon-
head” that would link China’s economy with the rest of the world (Wu 2003:1683-84). Driven by 
the imperatives of economic globalization, China needed a “global city” that could link China’s 
growing export-oriented economy with international trade. Therefore, Shanghai began to receive 
strong support from the central state and there was a conscious effort made to “reglobalize” 
Shanghai to reclaim some of its lost international status.  
At the national level, since late 1970s, there was a sea-change in the development 
philosophy and economic landscape in China. The post-Mao leadership gave importance on 
economic reform and open-door policy. This change was reflected in 1984 with the 12
th
 National 
Party Congress launching the policy of urban industrial development. The reforms also brought 
about two significant changes in China that are important in the context of Shanghai: 
decentralization of governance from national to local level and the increasing important of 
nonstate actors such as private and foreign investors (Wu 2003). 
At the regional level, tidu lilun or the “ladder step” policy was adopted by China, which 
prioritized the development of the eastern coast and then subsequently the interior parts of China. 
There were three economic belts marked out on the basis of perceived comparative advantages of 
each region. The eastern region was to specialize in export-oriented industries and foreign trade, 
the central region on agriculture and energy sector, and the western region was to focus on 
animal husbandry and mineral extraction (Fan 1995).  The export-oriented eastern zone enjoyed 
several concessions from the central government in terms of preferential tax treatment, improved 
urban infrastructure and easy access to international markets, and professional government 
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services (Wei and Lueng 2005). Subsequently, much of China’s economic growth since the 
1980s is said to have been led by the three major regions along the eastern coast, which are 
considered as the “growth engines” of China (see Figure 4): the Pearl River Delta region 
(PRDR), led by Hong Kong/Guangzhou; the Yangtze River Delta Region (YRDR), centered in 
Shanghai; and the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan region, also known as the BTTR or the Jing-Jin-
Tang region (JJTR) (Zhang 2006).  
 
  Figure 4. China’s Three “Growth Engines” 
  Source: Zhang (2006:30) 
 
Out of these three regions, the YRDR was considered as the most important area. The 
YRDR, especially Shanghai, has been the focus of much research since the 1990s, especially 
because of its key role in articulating the high-growth led development in China. Hall (2002) 
contends that the region as a whole constitutes a paradigm (“the Yangtze paradigm”) of 
economic growth and spatial expansion.
67
 The region has also been the focus of understanding 
China’s urban transition (Friedmann 2005) through the influence of foreign direct investment, 
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inviting terms such as “exourbanization” (Sit and Yang 1997, cited in Zhang 2006). The 
dominance of these three regions within the Chinese economy can be gauged from the fact that 
although the three regions altogether constituted only 1.61 per cent of China’s territory and 10.08 
per cent of China’s population, in 2002 they contributed to 33 per cent of China’s total GDP, 75 
per cent of its foreign trade, and 72 per cent of its total exports and attracted 80 per cent of FDI 
in China. Among the three the YRDR is the largest, as well as the strongest in terms of GDP and 
FDI (Zhang 2006:28).  
Implementing the model. Shanghai’s rapid development took place because of the 
favorable role played by leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rhongzi, who dominated the 
Chinese political landscape throughout the 1990s. The transformation of Shanghai was already 
conceptualized when Jiang Zemin was the mayor of Shanghai. It was Zemin who introduced a 
top-down model of development. In 1986, “A comprehensive development program for 
Shanghai” was drafted by the municipal government to transform Shanghai into a world class 
city in a relatively short time. This new program outlined two key mechanisms to “leap frog” 
Shanghai’s development: first, the internationalization of the economy and second, eliminating 
all “backward” and “messy market places” of “unorganized, unlicensed, and unsightly” informal 
activities, carried out mainly by rural migrants and peasants. In order to implement this, an 
independent super municipal agency was created headed by the Mayor. For rapid 
implementation of the development program, all urban planning decisions were centralized in 
this agency (Huang 2008c:213-14).  
Broadly, this new development program implemented in Shanghai marked a shift in the 
regional development approach from the traditional “two-track” approach to a “single-track” 
approach. The earlier “two-track” approach was based on a differential nature of development of 
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the rural and urban areas. While, market reforms and private sector development was introduced 
in the rural areas, there was a continued emphasis of centralized planning in the urban areas. The 
new “single-track” approach based on “rural-urban planning integration” made the rural areas 
more dependent on the urban areas as it is the urban areas where economic growth began to get 
concentrated driven by massive investments in cities, primarily Shanghai. During 1991-2002, 
217 billion USD were invested in Shanghai in order to correct the long-term underinvestment in 
the city during the Communist planning era. As a result of this political benevolence, Shanghai 
was able to register rapid GDP growth and boom in construction during this time. These 
investments in the city consisted of a mix of domestic and foreign sources. Domestic sources 
included household bank deposits (60 billion USD in 2002) and land user fees. There was also a 
significant amount of foreign investments in the city during 1991-2000, amounting to 28 per cent 
of the total investments in Shanghai (Zuo and Huang 2005:74-75). Since 1992, Shanghai 
attracted over 120 billion USD in total foreign direct investment (FDI) and accounted for 23 
percent of China’s total FDI in 2006. More than 50 per cent of the FDI was in manufacturing and 
nearly 30 per cent in the real estate (Zuo and Huang 2005: 75-77). In 2004, the annual FDI in 
Shanghai was 6.5 billion USD, equal to India’s entire FDI! (Huang 2008c).  
 Based on the 1986 policy, highly expensive projects were carried out to promote the city 
as an “ultra-modern metropolis.” This is reflected in the development of the Pudong New 
District which involved the conversion of almost 350 sq km of farmland into a financial and 
commercial center in a very short period of time. The Pudong project was primarily a real-estate 
led model whereby the government acquired farm lands at very low costs from farmers and 
auctioned the land-use rights at current market prices. The money generated from these sales was 
to be reinvested in various industrial, welfare, and pension programs. However, the lucrative 
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real-estate developments accompanied by preferential politics led to growing corruption and 
crony capitalism. Since July 2006, 8 senior officials in charge of land management have been 
arrested in Shanghai.  
 The real-estate development projects such as Pudong highlight the high-handed approach 
of the central government, seemingly seen as an efficient means of “getting things done.” 
However, this emphasis on “efficiency” had severe consequences on the urban poor in the city as 
the repressive state carried out its “developmental” agenda in a non-democratic manner. Massive 
urban renewal projects were carried out to make way for new construction. These projects 
involved no public hearings and many marginalized people were evicted swiftly, and most often, 
forcefully and violently. For example, during the development of the Pudong District between 
1992 and 1997, the government demolished 22.46 million sq miles of building area and 541,400 
households were displaced (Huang 2008c:216).     
It is noted that Shanghai’s “impressive skylines and the exalted GDP performance” mask 
all the troubling realities of Shanghai’s economic growth (Huang 2008a; 2008c).  Thus, 
Shanghai not only serves as an urban-led model of development, but at a deeper level, it is also a 
model that reflects a particular developmental regime that is coastal-based, rural-exploitative, 
and thrives on regionally imbalanced development. In the following section, I will provide a 
detailed evaluation of the model and also explain why the model still appeals to planners and 
government officials, especially in Mumbai.   
Evaluating the Shanghai Model of Development 
Deep and systematic anti-rural bias of economic policies 
Huang (2008c:219) refers to Shanghai as the “consummate urban China” for having drained the 
resources of rural entrepreneurs. This top-down nature of policy aimed to increase the pace of 
97 
 
urbanization has proved detrimental to the rural hinterland. Huang (2008c) describes this urban-
bias not only as a geographical fact, but an ideology that denotes a strong hand of the state, an 
industrial policy mentality, and a bias against low-tech entrepreneurial activities. The rural areas 
of Shanghai account for a significant portion of employment (29.7%) in Shanghai. However, if 
we look at the fixed asset size of rural Shanghai, it actually declined than the rest of China 
between 2001 and 2005, a period when Shanghai’s economy was expanding massively. Thus, we 
find that even in the event of an expanding Shanghai, much of the development of the service 
industry was based in the urban areas with relatively less opportunities for rural entrepreneurs. In 
terms of wages, even though the rural wage incomes were always the highest in the country, the 
relative rural income ratio of Shanghai to the rest of the country declined throughout the 1990s. 
Thus, even though still the highest, the rural Shanghainese are comparatively poorer than 20 
years ago.  
Biased liberalization favoring foreign capitalists 
The policy of attracting foreign investment in Shanghai proved disastrous for local 
entrepreneurs. The logic of generating foreign investment was based on the rationale that it 
would lead to more jobs for the local people. However, in reality, the heavily subsidized foreign 
investors generated only 10 million jobs in Shanghai as against 100 million jobs generated by the 
rural entrepreneurs. Further, as per the new economic policy, the FDI was to be mostly invested 
in areas where the technology was not competitive, however, most of the FDIs were made in 
areas which had little to do with technology and where there already existed a better local know-
how (such as the field of herbal medicine). Moreover, the privileging of foreign investors also 
led to various malpractices in business such as the “round-trip” FDIs, where local entrepreneurs 
in order to circumvent the system would redirect their investment from a location outside China 
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so that it appeared to be “foreign.” Finally, Shanghai compared to the other first-generation 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shekou faired much 
worse in terms of maintaining a balance between attracting FDIs and nurturing local 
entrepreneurial talent (Huang 2008c).    
Rising unemployment 
The Shanghai model of development was premised on the notion that it will generate 
employment. However, it has not lived up to its ideals as the generation of employment based on 
the service sector has been negligible. The urban employment increased from 5.20 million in 
1990 to 5.73 million in 2002, compared to almost four times increase in the real output. As a 
result of this slow growth of employment, the unemployment rate in Shanghai increased almost 
four times from 1.5 per cent to 4.8 per cent in the period 1990-2002 (Zuo and Huang 2005).
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Further, the employment in the primary sector dropped from 12.3 per cent to 11 per cent, while 
that of the service sector increased from 29.3 per cent to 48 per cent. Thus, even though there 
was employment generated in the service sector its contribution was marginal to the overall 
employment situation in the city.        
Jobless growth 
The Shanghai model is a peculiar case of jobless growth. While the six pillar industries of 
information technology, automobiles, petrochemicals, steel, assembled equipments, and bio-
medicine grew rapidly (60 per cent of total industrial output by 2002), they accounted for only 
30 per cent of industrial employment. On the other hand, industries such as textiles, household 
appliances, and other light industries suffered most severe job losses, with almost 60 per cent of 
the 1 million or so lay-offs concentrated in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during 1990-98. 
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 The figures do not include the number of jobs lost in the state-owned enterprises. It is argued that if these numbers 
are included the unemployment rate would double (Zuo and Huang 2005)   
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Further, the model is also uneconomic in the sense that it is not based on the idea of fair 
competition. The rapid growth of FDI in Shanghai based on preferential policies puts the local 
industries and entrepreneurs at a disadvantage (Zuo and Huang 2005: 79). 
Anti-poor growth 
Huang (2008c) highlights, since 2000 the poorest section has lost absolute income during a 
period of the double-digit economic growth in Shanghai. Much of China’s poverty reduction 
occurred in the 1980s, before the reforms. In fact, Huang argues that poverty reduction slowed 
down dramatically since 1990s.
69
 Huang (2008b:46) states that “Shanghai is rich, but an average 
Shanghainese is not.”  Even though Shanghai’s GDP was 5.2 times higher than China’s GDP, if 
you disaggregate the GDP data based on an income approach rather than an expenditure 
approach you find that the employees did not benefit much from this growth, while most of this 
growth went to the government and state-controlled firms. In 2004, employee compensation was 
40 per cent of the net regional product, whereas corporate profits were 30 per cent and 
government taxes constituted 28.9 per cent of the net regional product (Huang 2998c:182). If we 
look at the income differences between the rural and urban areas we find that the ratio of urban 
versus rural per capita income grew from 1.8:1 in the early 1980s to 3.23:1 in 2003. The world 
average for this period was between 1.5:1 and 2:1 (Guerrero 2007). 
 The worst affected people from this model are those that are classified as “floating 
residents,” which includes low-skilled workers who do not have legitimate household 
registration. The current policy related to compensation in Shanghai excludes this category of 
tenants and thus there is no compensation given to them in the event of urban renewal. Thus such 
“illegal” structures are demolished without any compensation, cash, or resettlement (Li 2005: 
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 In this context, Huang (2008c) argues that the government revised its poverty thresholds several times so 
statistically more people were shown to come out of poverty (p. 186). 
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162). The people in the rural areas too face exploitation at the behest of the nexus between the 
state officials and private developers. The state officials in order to speed-up the urbanization 
process transfer rural land from farmers’ collectives at a relatively low price and resell it to 
private developers at market price creating resentment among the farmers (Li 2005:163).   
 The economic reforms have also affected the housing market which is becoming 
increasingly privatized. This has led to the “rolling back” of the state in public housing provision 
leading to proliferation of gated communities of commercially developed housing estates (known 
locally as xinjian zhuzai xiaoqu). These forms of spatial practices are further increasing the gap 
between the elites and the urban poor in the city such as the migrant workers, who are now seen 
by the rich, gated elite as the moral “other” (Pow 2007). 
Ecologically unsustainable  
It is argued that the high-growth led development model of China is ecologically unsustainable 
and reckless and is putting the country and the world on the brink of environmental catastrophe. 
The Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River delta, the two regions which have experienced the 
recent export-oriented growth, suffered from extensive contamination from heavy-metal and 
persistent organic pollutants. Further, changing lifestyles, increasing middle-class families, and 
the growing consumption-driven economy in China is also causing a lot of ecological concerns. 
For example, in Beijing alone, 1,000 new cars are added to the roads every day. Seven of the 10 
most polluted cities in the world were located in China (Guerrero 2007).   
Experimentation or blueprint?  
It has been argued that the Chinese model of development led by Shanghai is unique, based on 
experimentation and a “high degree of tacitness” involving local knowledge and particular 
conditions of China. Therefore, it was not based on any form of a “blue-print” of development. 
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However, if we consider the large-scale projects such as the Pudong New District, aimed at 
revitalizing cultural lifestyles, this experimental nature of the model is questionable. Especially, 
if we focus on what cultural lifestyles are being revitalized and who are the people who benefit 
from those. For example, if you take the case of Thames Town, one of the nine new towns in the 
suburbs where almost 500,000 people are being resettled, the elitist and west-centric nature of 
place-creation is apparent. Each of these nine towns is built in a distinctive style that includes an 
Italian town with canals based on Venice and a German town designed by Albert Speer, the son 
of Hitler's favorite architect. In one of the articles on Thames Town, the author states that it 
features “cobbled streets, half-timbered Tudor houses, Edwardian townhouses, and a covered 
market with a clock tower and weather vane on top. Thames Town looks like an English country 
town. And that was the whole idea, to re-create Middle England in the Middle Kingdom” (Lim 
2006). The same author also states that some critics have denounced the satellite town scheme as 
a form of self-colonization of placing fancy foreign settlements above the real needs of its own 
people. From this example it is clear that even though scholars would like to convince people of 
merits of economic growth based on Chinese particularism, the real picture on the ground tells us 
a different story. A story in which development is a code-word for building spectacles such as 
the Thames Town or the Pudong District to satiate the thirst of the elites for western ideas and 
images at the cost of most of its less fortunate people.     
Why is the Model Still Appealing? 
If we have seen so far that the Shanghai model of development is anything but comprehensive, 
just, equitable, and economically and ecologically sustainable, why is it still appealing to people 
within and outside China, especially Mumbai? There can be several explanations for this. 
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Shanghai: a symbol of high-modernity and a “resurgent Asia” 
At the level of popular imagination, Shanghai (and the model) represents a symbol of a 
“resurgent Asia,” especially China. Some argue that the Shanghai makeover was a result of both 
a means to restore its past glory (seen as reconstructing Pudong as a “21st century Bund”) and 
also a more active process of becoming a “dragon-head” connecting the economy of China with 
the rest of the world (Wu 2003). Post 1990s, Shanghai has reemerged as the symbol of Chinese 
high-modernity.
70
 Roy (2011) has argued that such “reference urbanism” is aimed at producing 
an “Asian urban capitalism that self-consciously presents itself as Asia, that deploys the motifs 
of the Asian century and that references other Asian models.” Therefore, somewhere within the 
celebratory and assertive tone of a “rising Asia,” Shanghai emerges as a model that represents a 
non-Western example of successful economic growth in the developing world. Further, it is 
perceived as an example of the East charting out its own developmental course without having to 
depend on Western models. In India, the rising power of China is acknowledged at the level of 
foreign policy with the emphasis on the “look east” policy that aims to deepen economic and 
cultural ties with China. In the above context, Shanghai symbolizes the new axis of power. 
The political dimension 
Along with this symbolic dimension, we also need to understand the role of politics in Shanghai. 
Shanghai has been a breeding ground for leaders of the CCP and a route for the local leaders to 
vest political power at the center, prime examples being President Jiang Zemin to Premier Zhu 
Rongji. Thus, what happens in Shanghai is closely monitored at the center. It is argued that it 
was the powerful political position of the city that paved the way for the development of the real 
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 Discussing the role played by transnational actors, especially the non-Chinese design professionals in the 
development of Lujiazui in Pudong district of Shanghai, Olds (1997) highlights how the Shanghainese planners and 
politicians wanted the CBD to express the goals and successes of the reform era through gleaming skyscrapers. 
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estate market in Shanghai, where Shanghai was granted much more flexibly to liberalize its real 
estate market and attract foreign investment.   
The ideology of fast-growth 
Outside China, people in India are enamored by the Shanghai model and want to replicate the 
model in Mumbai. However, if we analyze the urban planning discourses closely (as I will show 
in the next chapter) we find that one of the most crucial features that stand out is the idea of fast-
growth: of completely transforming Mumbai into a world class city in a span of 10 years. This 
ideology of fast growth is based on the idea of integrating Mumbai with the global economy. In 
this context, the Shanghai’s appeal as a “blue-print” lies in its ability to transform itself in a 
relatively short period of time.           
GDP growth rates and the tyranny of numbers  
I think a significant part of the appeal of the model lies in its spectacular aggregate economic 
performance such as GDP growth rates which serve to justify this model. There have been 
several critiques of the GDP as aggregate indicator of overall economic or social health of a 
nation. They range from ecological economists (Daly 2005) to feminists (Waring 1999) and have 
pointed out that the GDP excludes costs related to the environment, as well as ignore the role 
played by female household labor in production. Even though these aggregate economic 
indicators have become general standards of economic development, we find that historically 
these national accounting systems had been constructed for specific political purposes. For 
example, the GNP was initially developed in 1941 to measure national income affected by World 
War II and to justify spending on the war efforts (Waring 1999:56). Kuznets who vehemently 
opposed this measure wrote in 1945: “I repeat that we are not trying to measure welfare, but the 
value of production from a business point of view” (cited in Waring 1999:57).  
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More recently in 2008, the Sarkozy government commissioned a report by a committee 
headed by Joseph Stiglitz to identify the limits of GDP as an indicator of economic performance 
and social progress and to suggest alternative statistical measurements that could be more 
inclusive and comprehensive. The report reiterates the point that the GDP is an inadequate 
measure to gauge material well-being over time or sustainability based on economic, ecological, 
and social dimensions. One of the criticisms of the GDP highlighted by the report is that it only 
measures market production, but not material well-being. This can give misleading information 
on how well-off people are and therefore lead to wrong policy decisions. Further, the report 
argues that measures like GDP do not take into account crucial information such as the unequal 
participation in production or consumption or the impact of excessive productivism and 
deregulation on the society and the environment. As a result of this, measures such as the GDP 
have failed to make us aware of the limits of consumption of essential goods and the fact that the 
cost of this overconsumption is borne by the most disadvantaged groups all over the world 
(CMEPSP 2009). 
Thus, although statistics such as the GDP may not mean much from the viewpoint of 
comprehensive development, they are still hegemonic in shaping people’s perceptions regarding 
economic growth and development. Along with shaping people’s perceptions, the hegemonic 
role of these measures can be observed in monitoring growth, setting priorities in policy making, 
measuring the success of policies, and measuring economic and social welfare in general. As a 
result (as we will see in the next chapter), despite the fact that the impressive double-digit growth 
rates accompanied a lot of costs, such models are uncritically accepted. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SHANGHAIZATION OF MUMBAI:  
VISIONS OF A “WORLD CLASS” MUMBAI 
~I am convinced that a historic opportunity for the revamping of Mumbai presents itself before us 
today. Mumbai can emerge as a new financial capital of Asia, and be the bridge between Asia and 
the West in the world of finance….I do believe that Mumbai can learn from Shanghai’s 
experience in reinventing itself; in rebuilding itself; in rediscovering itself. I urge every 
Mumbaikar to transform this city from being a Gateway to India to becoming a Gateway to Asia! 
(Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India 2006).
71
 
 
There have been numerous studies that have focused on the contemporary urban restructuring in 
Mumbai (Banerjee-Guha 2002; Gandy 2008; Harris 2008; Nijman 2008; Zérah 2007). However, 
barring a few (Anjaria 2009; Harris 2008), there has been a relatively less focus on 
systematically understanding the contextual, agential, and processual aspects of contemporary 
urban transformation in Mumbai. Therefore, it is important to understand the context in which 
the urban development discourses emerges, who has the power to formulate these discourses, 
and how these discourses are mobilized to facilitate urban change. In doing this, we can get a 
clearer insight into the ideological underpinnings of these discourses in terms of whom they 
include and exclude and whose interests they serve and disserve.  
Therefore, in this chapter, I systematically analyze the material contexts, agency, and 
processes surrounding Shanghaization of Mumbai, a term that is broadly used to describe the 
imaginaries and strategies of remaking Mumbai as a “world class” city and to transform the city 
into an “international financial center.” The chapter highlights how these primarily 
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 Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's address at the 16th Asian Corporate Conference, “Driving global business: 
India's new priorities, Asia's new realities,” March 18, 2006, Mumbai.  Retrieved March 27, 2012 
(http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail931/--%09--prime-minister-dr.-manmohan-singh%27s-address-at-the-16th-
asian-corporate-conference-driving-global-business-%3A-india%27s-new-priorities,-asia%27s-new-realities). 
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entrepreneurial visions of “world classing” Mumbai were formulated by the state (national and 
local) in collaboration with sections of the local elite in the city, which include some of the city’s 
prominent business organizations, NGOs, and individuals.  In this regard, the chapter focuses not 
only on the “products”—the texts produced by these agents, but also on the “processes”—the 
negotiations within the emerging networks that materialize these visions. Some of the key 
questions that are addressed are: What are the structural factors that enable contemporary 
“worlding” of Mumbai? How do these structural factors interact with local actors in shaping the 
hegemonic discourses of “worlding?” What are the developmental visions espoused by these 
discourses? Are these visions inclusive and broad-based or do they reflect narrow power 
interests?  
An Agential Understanding of Urban Change 
The mainstream literature on urbanization primarily focuses on accumulation and ignores the 
political and local-historical contexts of “global cities.” In doing this, it gives more importance to 
the power of global actors and institutions, and underestimates local agency and contingency 
(Shatkin 2007:1). Unwittingly, cities are reified as abstract economic spaces, devoid of people 
and agency. Therefore, there is need for an “actor-centered” urban analysis where diverse local 
actors such as developers, emerging consumer classes, local and national governments, and 
corporate actors are seen as active participants in urban transformation (Shatkin 2007). In this 
regard, the “growth machine” literature in the US has highlighted that power to organize city 
space (and to imagine a city) is conflict-ridden and involves a wide variety of social actors that 
come together to form broader coalitions with the government playing the facilitating role. This 
broader coalition usually consists of local chambers of commerce, local financers, industrialists, 
business leaders, real estate and property developers, educational and religious institutions, local 
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labor organizations, political parties, social movements, and local state agencies (Harvey 1989a; 
Molotch 1976).  
Some scholars have used the term “entrepreneurial city” to highlight the processual 
aspects of entrepreneurialism in urban development (Jessop 1998a; Jessop and Sum 2000). The 
city is, therefore, no longer is just a location where entrepreneurial activities take place, but city 
by itself has become an entity that pursues entrepreneurial advantages (Fu 2003:1675). In this 
context, the city, just like the firm, has become an entity through which entrepreneurial strategies 
are implemented (Jessop and Sum 2000). Jessop and Sum (2000:2289) propose three criteria that 
differentiate an entrepreneurial city from a nonentrepreneurial city. They argue that the 
entrepreneurial city could be defined as a city that pursues entrepreneurial strategies in an 
entrepreneurial discourse or fashion through a promotion of entrepreneurial images.  
 Thus, summarizing recent studies on urbanism highlight the following features of 
emerging urbanism: interurban competition to attract investments and jobs, a shift in municipal 
governance from social development to economic development and entrepreneurialism, 
increasing importance of real-estate development in the urban economy as expressed in urban 
renewal,  “privatization of planning” involving an entrepreneurial stance to economic 
development through innovations and public-private partnerships and privatization of urban 
services (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 1989a; Leitner et al. 2007; Molotch 1976; Shatkin 
2007; Smith 2002). 
Shanghai’s Reglobalization Strategy 
As highlighted in the earlier quote of the Indian Prime Minister, the attempt to make Mumbai 
“world class” by “reinventing, rebuilding, rediscovering itself” just like Shanghai. Therefore, the 
attempt to position Mumbai as the “new financial capital of Asia” can also be seen a way to 
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reglobalize the city by strategically reintegrating the Indian economy with the world in a new 
finance-driven world economy. In this regard it wants to emulate Shanghai’s recent experience 
of reglobalization based on the “dragon’s head strategy.”  
In a famous 1992 speech, Deng Xiaoping announced that Yangtse River Delta (within 
which Shanghai is located) would serve as the “dragon’s head” and lead China’s modernization 
(Wasserstorm 2003:52). This was seen as a post-socialist entrepreneurial attempt to reglobalize 
Shanghai in order to connect China with the global economy and to restore its prominent 
international status (Wu 2003:1686). The “dragon’s head” reglobalizing strategy involved the 
construction of a new financial center in Pudong, the use of market-oriented land development to 
overcome the initial capital constraint, and government’s strategic investment in infrastructure 
development, and mega urban construction projects (Wu 2003). Shanghai, therefore, underwent 
a massive urban renewal program and in a short period of time the Pudong region was 
transformed from a rural agricultural zone into China’s leading financial district. The enormity of 
investment and urban renewal in Shanghai can be gauged from the fact that it was observed that 
at the end of the millennium there were about “23,000 building sites and some 20 percent of the 
world's cranes” in Shanghai (Wasserstorm 2003:52). This kind of massive construction in 
Shanghai is probably unmatched in the history of megacity development. From 1992 to 2007, 
Shanghai has experienced the fastest economic growth by any megacity in the world, averaging 
12 percent annually. Thus, as discussed in the previous chapter, Shanghai’s appeal to planners 
and city elite in Mumbai also rests on this dramatic manner in which the city transformed itself 
in a relatively short period of time.  
One of the strategies of converting Shanghai into a “global city” included creating a new 
space for the financial center. In order to raise the capital necessary for this, market-oriented land 
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development was encouraged. Further, the government also was involved in improving the 
infrastructure in the city to increase the competitiveness of the city. Moreover, a new 
decentralized fiscal strategy was devised which benefited Shanghai, which in the days of 
centralized planning bore much of the fiscal burden. Further, the central government also 
provided generous tax rebates and special subsidies to Shanghai. This increase in local revenue, 
along with the generous support of the central government enabled Shanghai to carry out most of 
its urban development programs in the 1990s (Wu 2003).  
Along with economic reform, there was also a concerted effort made by the municipal 
government in Shanghai to promote Shanghai as being international and cosmopolitan just like 
Shanghai in the past. Metaphors such as Paris of the Orient” were used to link Shanghai’s global, 
entrepreneurial past to the Shanghai that would link China with the world economy. The 
following excerpt from address of the municipal government at the eve of the 1999 Fortune 
Global Forum makes this point clear: 
China is a developing country and Shanghai is doing its best to solve the various problems it 
encounters in the course of progress. But suppose you have a preoccupied impression of the 
developing countries, and are full of mysterious images of early Hollywood’s films, then when 
you come to Shanghai for the first time you may be puzzled by the skyscrapers as those in 
Manhattan, surprised at the three dimensional road system in the city or amazed at the well-
dressed and happy people, as it is a modern city in the sunshine, greatly different from what 
you’ve imagined......Shanghai has modernized museums, grand theatre, and libraries; Shanghai 
possesses its own English newspaper, English broadcasting and TV programs; you can 
conveniently watch foreign TV programs; Shanghai’s internet channels you to the world; besides 
luxurious hotels and restaurants, there are also special bars and eating places of European, 
American, Thai or Mexican style (Cited in Wu 2003:1688). 
The above quote highlights the fact that in order to attract foreign investment to the city, a new 
urban image of Shanghai was being created. It is found that in most of such place promotional 
literature there were two recurring themes: first, the “city of work,” which highlights the pro-
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business environment of the city and second, the “city at play” that aims to attract global 
investors to the city by highlighting global lifestyles.
72
 
David Harvey (2005:39) argues that in a democratic political context, the neoliberal 
project had to be established through a construction of political consent across a broad spectrum 
of people. He argues that in this construction of consent, cultural values, fears, and the political 
rhetoric of “freedom” were employed to justify neoliberal ideas and to create a “common sense” 
(Gramsci 1971; Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  This neoliberal common sense was based on a 
supportive public opinion created through a circulation of these ideas in corporations, 
organizations of civil society, and various intellectuals and their think tanks with the help of the 
media. However, Harvey further argues that this process of active construction of consent has 
shown a considerable degree of variation and it is important to understand the specific conditions 
within which this consent is constructed.  
Mumbai’s “Art of being global”: The Genealogy of the Shanghaization Discourse  
For a summary of the following discussion see Table 6. 
The material contexts of Shanghaization  
The Shanghaization discourse as a “city-centric growth strategy” is articulated within a specific 
global, national, and local context (Kennedy and Zérah 2008). Certain key trends at the global 
level bear heavily on the developments in Mumbai: increasing mobility of capital; new 
international division of labor; privatization and the rescaling of the state; and deregulation and 
opening of the national economies.  
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 Table 7. Genealogy of the Shanghaization Discourse 
Material Contexts 
Global Growth of emerging economies (1970s) 
National New Economic Policy (1992) 
Political reforms (1992) 
Local/urban Decline of manufacturing and increase in 
finance and service (1980s-90s) 
 
Real estate boom (1996) 
 
Rise in middle class consumption  (post 
1990s) 
Connections and Consent (Actors/Processes) 
1993 McKinsey & Co. SICOM Report 
1995 Bombay First (think-tank of BCCI) formed 
1997 
Visits by Mayor of London and City of 
London Corporation 
September 2003 Vision Mumbai Report by McKinsey & Co. 
February 2004 
Government of Maharashtra Task Force 
Report 
October 2004 PM’s speech—Shanghai 
November 2004—March 2005 
Slum Evictions—90,000 homes of slum 
dwellers demolished 
2007 
Ministry of Finance Report on Mumbai as a 
Financial Center 
 
The growth of emerging economies was related to the economic fortunes of the advanced 
economies. After 1970s, in the context of declining industrial productivity and interest rates in 
the advanced economies in the North, countries in the South were seen as potential markets for 
the American investors. Further, facilitated by the advancement in technologies of transport and 
communication, emerging economies also became centers of production and investment due to 
the low supply of capital and higher returns to investments (Schwartzman 2004). However, 
global capital mobility requires a convergence of markets which further requires fundamental 
reforms in the political and economic systems. In India, this process of economic reforms began 
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in the 1980s, but the official policy of liberalization and privatization was announced in 1991. 
Further, in 1992, as part of the structural adjustment program to facilitate economic 
liberalization, the central government announced a policy of political devolution of authority 
through 74
th
 Amendment Act to enlarge the scope of municipal institutions. These reforms have 
transformed the institutional framework of urban governance in India and have created the 
conditions for increasing private sector involvement in policy-making and implementation.  
Along with the above mentioned structural changes, there are local socio-spatial and 
cultural factors that have shaped the emerging “world class” discourses in Mumbai. First is the 
shift from manufacturing to finance and services. This not only affected the working classes in 
the city, but also radically transformed the built-environment in the city. Harvey (1989) argues 
that space is constantly reproduced to accommodate increasingly dispersed capital. According to 
him, mobility of capital is only made possible by production of relative stable and immobile 
geographical landscapes such as the built environments, transportation infrastructure, production 
and business complexes, and communication networks. In Mumbai, the decline of manufacturing 
“freed-up” huge tracts of lands in the city for redevelopment due to the closing of the textile 
mills. Due to political lobbying by mill owners and real estate developers and directives from the 
central government, the state government amended earlier protectionist land related legislations 
such as the Development Control Rules of 1991. The state government also scrapped the Urban 
Land Ceiling Act. These changes facilitated the sale of 600 acres of mill lands and it is estimated 
that an additional 25,000 hectares of land would be “freed-up” to attract foreign investors in real 
estate development.
73
 The shift in the urban economy toward finance and services has increased 
the demand for office space in the city. This led to steep rise in the real estate prices. In fact, in 
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 Krittivas Mukherjee and Devidutta Tripathy. 2007. Maharashtra scraps land law, property prices rise. November 
29. Reuters, India. Retrieved March 9, 2011 (http://in.reuters.com/article/2007/11/29/idINIndia-30749620071129). 
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1996, some of the world’s highest real estate prices were reported in Mumbai as a result of 
increased speculation. This speculation was a result of the optimistic climate created for foreign 
investors and entrepreneurs by the economic reforms in 1991. However, along with foreign 
investors, local actors such as realtors and developers in association with local governments and 
public agencies played an important role in this speculation (Nijman 2000). The decline of 
manufacturing and rising real estate prices led to a relocation of industry outside Mumbai leading 
to the decreased competitiveness of the city vis-à-vis other cities such as Bangalore and 
Hyderabad. As a result, for the first time, the city experienced negative growth rates in the late 
1990s (D’monte 2002). This declining growth provided the immediate context within which 
visions of radically transforming the city were imagined by the city’s economic elite who had 
high stakes in a “world class” Mumbai.  
Economic reforms mostly benefitted the urban middle classes as seen in their rising 
incomes (Fernandes 2004; Nijman 2006). In Mumbai, this has led to a social polarization of 
classes in terms of “middle classes pulling away from the poor and low-income areas” (Nijman 
2006:773). Along with this, there has been a significant increase in middle-class and upper-
middle class credit-based consumption driven by financing, marketing, and advertizing industries 
(Nijman 2006). In cultural terms, rising incomes and the spread of a global consumerist culture 
has created a demand for better urban services and infrastructure and “middle-class lifestyles,” 
promoted by the leisure industry (Falzon 2004; Fernandes 2000, 2004, Nijman 2006). These 
growing aspirations of the middle classes is reflected in their readiness in redefining public space 
in the city as well as in accepting the rhetoric of a “world class” Mumbai.  
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Connections and consent (actors/processes) of Shanghaization 
The “global” or “world class” city is no longer merely a heuristic tool to understand the 
importance of certain cities in the world economy, but is increasingly used as a benchmark by 
certain “wanna-be world cities” (Short and Kim 1999). Mumbai’s “world class” aspirations 
began to take shape in the late 1990s, when a set of diverse social actors, guided by the 
modernist visions of cities in the West, began deconstructing the innumerable problems that 
plagued the city (refer to Table 6 for the following discussion). They began questioning the poor 
quality of life, ineffective governance, and the noncompetitive environment in the city. Over a 
period of time, there emerged a ”growth coalition” in Mumbai that included city’s industrial and 
political elite; professional consultants; multilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank; and urban research initiatives such as the Urban Age and the Cities 
Alliance. 
In 1993, consultancy firm McKinsey & Company published a SICOM (a Government of 
Maharashtra owned company) commissioned report for the state, which perhaps for the first time 
referred to transforming Bombay into a financial center. Citing Maharashtra’s low ranking in 
infrastructure in the 1992 World Competitiveness Report, it recommended several changes in 
land and labor legislations to improve state’s infrastructure and create opportunities for 
businesses. Thus, Bombay was to act as a source of attracting business in Maharashtra (D’monte 
2002). This was an important report as it opened up the discursive space for various private 
actors including the local chamber of commerce—the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (BCCI) and the real estate companies to weigh in on matters related to city’s 
transformation. Post-reforms, these globally mobile actors were keenly following what was 
happening to other cities in the West. London was one of the cities that attracted them due to its 
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similarities with Mumbai. Both were port cities, both had experienced recent deindustrialization, 
and both had certain strategic geographical advantages (in terms of time zones and location) that 
could propel them as leaders in the global financial market. London had successfully transitioned 
from an industrial city to a major financial center. A local business partnership called London 
First had played a key role in this transformation. Some corporate houses in Mumbai formed a 
similar initiative called Bombay First in 1995. Later, Bombay First became a key think-tank of 
the BCCI and has emerged as one of the key proponents of the “world class city” discourse in 
Mumbai (Harris 2008). For the initial funding for the think-tank, the BCCI approached various 
banks (ICICI, HDFC) and corporate houses in Mumbai such as Tata and Mahindra. From the 
beginning it was clear that Bombay First wanted to strategically position itself in the fragmented 
discursive landscape of the city through conscious image branding. This was reflected in the 
choice of its first CEO, Gerson da Cunha, a theater actor, former advertizing professional, and an 
activist and trustee of a prominent NGO in Mumbai—Action for Good Governance and 
Networking in India (AGNI). da Cunha was instrumental in giving Bombay First a formal 
structure and in the constitution of its expert committees.
74
  
However, it was Mr. B.G. Deshmukh, a former municipal commissioner of Mumbai and 
Cabinet Secretary (the highest ranking civil servant in the country) who was a key figure in the 
formation of Bombay First. After retiring from the civil service, Mr. B. G. Deshmukh joined 
Tata Sons (a key promotional wing of the Tatas, one of India’s oldest and largest business 
families) as Director of Sales. One of his colleagues, an economic adviser in the same company 
who later became a member of the economic committee of Bombay First, describes the earlier 
events leading up to the formation of Bombay First, which is worth quoting at length:  
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He (B.G.Deshmukh) saw certain information coming around about London First that used to 
appear in the Financial Times. So he used to send us some clippings of that and then he said let us 
discuss about it. He said let us think about it. So then we started working on it in the department 
of economics at Tata Sales and Services. At that time there was no concept of a Bombay First, it 
was just Mumbai’s problems and how Mumbai is going down, because of its industries, because 
the textile industry was virtually dead, and many other manufacturing activity gradually started 
moving out of the city, which led to the decline and fall of industry in Mumbai. A need was being 
felt to have some alternative approach. So then he was able to get like-minded people, including 
Jamsheed Kanga, who also was a municipal commissioner of Mumbai at one time but was then 
working with the Tata’s after his retirement in the Housing Company. So he and many others 
from the Bombay Chambers came together and we had informal discussions and we decided to 
meet with some international experts and we called a conference.
75
 
In 1997, Bombay First invited the Mayor of London and key members of the City of London 
Corporation to offer recommendations for improving city’s competitiveness. The main task that 
lay before the think-tank was to convince the government about the changes that needed to be 
done. In this regard, Bombay First began to commission studies that began gathering data on 
various aspects of Mumbai such as infrastructure, housing, and governance and simultaneously 
began to benchmark these figures against other cities in the West. Mr. Narinder Nair, who took 
over as the Chairman of Bombay First in 2002-2003, explains:   
We reorganized Bombay First when I took over as a Chairman of Bombay First. So we were 
looking at what was ailing in the city, what was wrong, the quality of life was coming down, we 
had water problems, sanitation, transport, roads, growth rate had come down to 2.4 percent, 
where as the State growth rate was 4.8 and the National growth was 5.5. So we said something is 
wrong somewhere, what is wrong? So we went to the government. We met the Chief Minister, 
the Chief Secretary, the city Commissioner and told them that the city’s quality of life is not right 
and that people are not happy. So we asked them are you aware of what is wrong? They said, ya 
(sic), things are not good, this and that, so we asked, are you aware what needs to be done? 
Nobody had a clear idea. They said Yes and No. So we said okay, we would come with a 
document, and you work with us, on how Bombay could be transformed into a world class city 
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over a ten year period. If we have the document of that sort, the then Chief Minister said that he 
would work with us.
76
 
Bombay First later commissioned McKinsey & Company to prepare a report on transforming 
Mumbai into a “world class city” in seemingly serendipitous circumstances. In 2003, Sunil 
Bhandare, an economic expert at the BCCI (who later became the CEO of Bombay First) met 
Mr. Ranjit Pandit a consultant with McKinsey in one of the BCCI meetings. Just two years prior 
to that, in a time of economic gloom, McKinsey had prepared a “feel-good” report for the NDA 
national government that highlighted that India could achieve an annual growth rate of 10 
percent by utilizing its human and financial capital more effectively. Inspired by this report, 
Bhandare approached Ranjit Pandit to prepare a similar report for Mumbai; in his words, the 
report “lifted the ambitions of growth” for Mumbai.77 Moreover, as McKinsey had also prepared 
a document for Maharashtra government 10 years earlier, it was familiar with the institutional set 
up of the region. Bombay First also wanted to use the reputation and the international brand 
image of McKinsey to strengthen their case. McKinsey prepared this report free of cost for 
Bombay First! In September 2003, McKinsey published the report, Vision Mumbai: 
Transforming Mumbai into a World-Class City (henceforth the Vision Mumbai report), and 
presented it to the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra Mr. Sushil Kumar Shinde. The Chief 
Minister, who was keen on implementing the recommendations of the report, announced in his 
acceptance speech a Special Task Force. The Vision Mumbai report, is a culmination of the 
efforts of Bombay First and gave a concrete shape to its visions of converting Mumbai into a 
“world class city” (Bombay First 2003). Following the Vision Mumbai report, the Government 
of Maharashtra (GOM) published its own Task Force report in February 2004 which was more 
or less a copy of the Vision Mumbai report (Government of Maharashtra 2004). Both these 
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reports have attracted considerable attention from a cross-section of the city including the media, 
academic community, activists, and policy makers.  
Over the years, Bombay First has been able to successfully network internationally and 
build alliances with like-minded think-tanks, professional consultants, international municipal 
agencies, and multilateral aid agencies by way of organizing workshops and conferences. In May 
2005, Bombay First organized an international conference on urban renewal, “Learnings from 
Mumbai,” that had delegates from Australia, Thailand, the US, and the UK (Harris 2008). 
Recently Bombay First and London First have jointly organized a series of conferences to deal 
with issues of security in the city after the terrorist bombings in 2008.  In January 2009, a 
conference entitled “Lessons from 9/11, 7/7 and 26/11 for safer cities” was held in London 
which included the Commissioner of London, the former Secretary of the US Department for 
Homeland Security, Chairman of the committee related to 7/7 London bombings, a member of 
the US 9/11 Commission, and the former Senior Adviser to US Department for Homeland 
Security. In November 2009, a two-day conference entitled “Megamorphosis: Resurgence of 
Mumbai” was organized in Mumbai. At this conference, papers were presented on issues related 
to economic growth, housing, education, health care, and infrastructure. All the papers presented 
at the conference were prepared by international consulting firms such as KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Delloite and by corporate think tanks such as Bombay First and 
Janagraha of Bangalore.   
This international networking of Bombay First has helped it tremendously in leveraging 
its position vis-à-vis the local and state government and to create the necessary institutional 
mechanisms that would enable them to carry out their agenda of urban planning. The two key 
channels that were established as a result of their lobbying are the Citizens’ Action Group (CAG) 
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and the Empowered Committee (EC). The CAG is supposed to be a representative advisory body 
consisting of diverse members of the civil society. However, its actual membership consists 
mostly of representatives of selective government and business friendly NGOs and 
organizations. The EC is a much more powerful decision-making body and is even more 
selective and is represented by a few prominent people from Mumbai’s corporate sector and a 
few government officials. As an urban planner in Mumbai puts it:  
What is happening in the empowered committee [is] a mutually beneficial arrangement. The 
industry representatives through Bombay First find a good forum (apart from what is on the 
agenda) to talk to senior bureaucrats, get established, generally see what is happening. And if they 
have any personal thing that needs to be settled then see how that could be settled. Senior 
bureaucrats are also happy to be in the good books of senior Industrialists. It works very well and 
actually one of the bureaucrats who were championing the whole process of this report [the 
Vision Mumbai report] has moved to Tata Realty.”78  
In fact, there is an increasing trend of mid-career bureaucrats leaving their prestigious 
administrative jobs to join the corporate sector.
79
 And most of these bureaucrats are joining 
various public-private partnership (PPP) initiatives, especially in infrastructure, which require 
close collaboration between the government and private companies. In fact the private sector is 
actively recruiting these mid-career bureaucrats in order to “facilitate” their working with the 
government. One of the corporate executives working in a consultancy firm involved in a PPP in 
infrastructure observes:  
Former bureaucrats are like our crutches in the corridors of the government and accelerate 
processes since they come with a vast knowledge of how the official machinery functions and are 
armed with a network of acquaintances in the government.
80
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Recently Bombay First has been instrumental in shaping the 50 year long concept plan of 
Mumbai. Interestingly, since the last two to three years, Singapore is emerging as the long-term 
model of development for Mumbai. In the Megamorphosis conference of 2009, one of the 
keynote speakers was Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the longest serving Prime Minister of Singapore and 
the architect behind transformation of Singapore. And in 2010, a Singapore-based consultants 
Surbana International was selected to prepare the concept plan. Explaining this entire selection 
process, Narinder Nayar says: 
When Lee Kuan Yew, took over as the Prime Minister in the 1960s, Singapore was in a bad 
shape. He said where do I want my city to be in a span of 50 years? So they prepared a concept 
plan, based on which they have worked out their ideas. So we were invited to Singapore to see 
what they have done. So based on their model, a concept plan should be prepared. Finally the idea 
was accepted by the government. We were a part of the process of preparing the plan. 
International tenders were invited. 39 companies had responded, national and international, they 
were ready to prepare the plan. 14 companies were then shortlisted. Out of the 14, nine eventually 
came to make their presentations. For 2 days, senior bureaucrats sat along with Malabar, in one of 
the government’s guest house. For two days from 9 in the morning to 7 in the evening looking at 
the various proposals Planning is a new subject for people in Bombay, so we asked Singapore 
government to send two planners to help us select. So Singapore experts came and they helped us 
and out of nine, finally four, were chosen and asked to submit detailed proposals, financial 
proposal and out of the four one has been selected.
81
 
The task of Surbana International was to formulate a plan to transform Mumbai into a world 
class metropolis by 2052. It presented its plan to the government in March 2011. Some of its key 
recommendations were: to decongest the city and improve the quality of life by building planned 
urban conglomerates in the suburbs of Mumbai, increasing the FSI (up to 15 in some areas), and 
to reclaim land from the sea.
82
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Interrogating Emerging Developmental Visions of Mumbai   
Along with material practices, discourses play a very important role in any power struggle. It is 
the everyday exchanges that opinions are formed and perceptions shaped. Rather, than viewing 
social practices as being antithetical to each other, they reinforce each other. Michael de Certeau 
has highlighted how discourses “open a field” for social practices (Certeau 1984:125). Therefore, 
language is not merely expressive, but also productive. Studies have shown that language plays 
an important role in shaping urban transformation.
83
 In the following section, I critically analyze 
recent discourses of urban transformation in Mumbai and in doing this I will try to highlight the 
ideological biases that shape their visions of “worlding” Mumbai.  
 “Vision Mumbai” (1993-2007)  
The MMRDA 1996-2011 Draft Plan, published in 1995, asserts that Mumbai can emerge as an 
“international city” based on “growth of financial and business services, and hi-tech, export-
oriented industries.” In order to do so, the plan recommends “increased investment by private 
sector in infrastructure and other developments, appropriate structural changes in the Region’s 
economy, and adoption of land use policies that respond to market potential” (MMRDA 
1995:i).
84
 This implies removal of all regulatory, political, and infrastructural barriers that hinder 
the process of attaining “international city” status. In many ways, the plan replaces the objectives 
of earlier 1973 plan that emphasized dispersal and decentralization of industry and a much wider 
vision of providing infrastructure and employment to larger sections of the city. The new plan 
emphasizes on centralization, financial investment, and a consolidation of trade, services, and 
industry as per the agglomeration logic (Banerjee-Guha 2002). 
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 The Vision Mumbai report of 2003 has the goal of “transforming Mumbai into a world 
class city with a vibrant economy and a globally comparable quality of life for its citizens.” The 
report claims that through its comprehensive vision, Mumbai can transform itself into a “world 
class city” within a 10-15 year time-frame (Bombay First 2003:vii, emphasis added). Some of its 
main recommendations are: increasing land availability by 50-70 per cent; constructing one 
million low-income housing units for slum-dwellers; creating “islands of excellence” (up-scale 
residential and commercial spaces); and redevelop the city block-by-block (2003:20-23).  
In 2005, during the budget speech India’s Finance Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram 
announced the plan of converting Mumbai into an “international finance center” and of making 
financial services the next growth engine for India. To that effect, a committee (Percy 
Committee) was appointed to recommend relevant reforms. Along with the usual financial sector 
reforms such as full capital account convertibility, abolition of securities transaction tax and 
stamp duties, and streamlining public debt, the committee also recommended construction of 
premium infrastructure in the city citing similar efforts of other financial centers such as London 
and Dubai. The committee specifically recommended the building of new roads, expressways, 
and water-borne transportation. Along with infrastructure, the committee also recommended 
creating more office space in the city by scrapping old laws that regulated land ceilings such as 
ULCRA. According to the committee, almost 40 per cent of the demand for commercial office 
space came from the financial services sector and that the city can absorb almost 10-15 million 
square feet of additional office space.
85
 However, the recommendations of the committee were 
contested by various regulatory authorities. A clear division of opinion emerged between the 
bankers and the regulating authorities such as Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) over issues related to regulation of financial instruments 
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and the issue of control resulting from full capital convertibility. For the bankers without full 
convertibility it was impossible for Mumbai to emerge as an international financial sector, while 
the regulating agencies such as the RBI was wary of malpractices resulting from deregulation 
and preferred partial regulation without relinquishing its control over the financial markets.
86
          
In 2007, the Ministry of Finance published the Report of the High Powered Expert 
Committee on Making Mumbai an International Financial Centre. The report envisions a 
creation of an International Financial Center in Mumbai as a route to faster deregulation, 
liberalization, and globalization of the Indian financial system. It envisions that Mumbai will 
play a very important role in bringing about a “financial revolution” in India (Government of 
India 2007: xiv-xv). The report argues that India should “move up in the value chain” from low-
value knowledge/business processing (BPO and KPO) to a high-end producer and exporter of 
international financial services (IFS). It argues that financial services tend to get concentrated in 
a small number of “imaginative people” such as lawyers, accountants, financial and tax experts. 
These people have extended networks with clients all over the world, but their nature of job 
demands that they have “intensive interaction”, “inter-personal information flows,” and 
“complex negotiations” (Government of India 2007:xv). An IFC is most suited for such 
economies of agglomeration.  
Fast-growth 
To instill a sense of urgency for Mumbai’s rapid transformation both the reports employ a 
strategy of fear that describes Mumbai as a city heading towards a catastrophe. The 
contemporary moment is described as a “tipping point” in the history of Mumbai that warrants 
immediate implementation of the recommendations of the reports. The Vision Mumbai report 
states that “Mumbai is currently at a critical juncture. It must implement the eight initiatives 
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outlined...and it must do it now. Otherwise it is in grave danger of collapsing completely” 
(2003:2, emphasis added).The GOM report too uses a similar language: “Mumbai hovers 
perpetually on the brink of collapse…In this moment of promise and peril…if it neglects to 
change course, it risks entering the graveyard of failed cities…Mumbai stands in urgent need of 
a game plan” (2004:2, emphasis added).87  
 The reports endorse fast growth policies that are expected to yield instant results. Thus, 
reform must come in “leaps,” “step jumps,” and “quick wins” through a “fast track” and not 
through “incremental changes.” Some of the examples of “quick wins” that the GOM Report 
argues will help build credibility for change are: beautification of Marine Drive (one of the most 
upscale localities in Mumbai), the “Mumbai Chakachak” clean-up project, and improving the 
airport ambience.
88
 
Elitist/middle class bias 
Both the reports have a distinct elitist and west-centric bias and cater to the affluent sections of 
the city that are connected to the emerging consumerist, high-wired economy. For example, 
some of the 23 “quick wins” listed by the Vision Mumbai report are: developing the downtown 
area (e.g., creating the “Rock and Roll Hall of Fame”); building world class multi-purpose 
indoor stadium, conventional center, and housing project; improving airport ambience; creating a 
world class commercial district with restaurants and cafes (2003:10&28). Further, the world 
class “standards or benchmarks” are based on “quantitative aspirations” derived from a survey of 
ten cities, mostly in the West. Thus, growth and development is seen through a modernist lens 
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that insists on “catching up” and bridging the “gaps” between current (underdeveloped) and 
world class (Western) standards.  
The elitist bias of the emerging growth visions is also seen in the hegemonic “one vision 
for the city” that clearly differentiates between “city of slums” and “city of homes” (thus slums 
are not considered as homes) and “low-value-added labor” and “high-value-talent” (thus low-
value is devoid of any talent).
89
         
This elitist bias is further revealed in the discussion of new urban infrastructure in the city 
that essentially centers on premium infrastructure. In order to create such an IFC, the Ministry of 
Finance report calls for an “enabling” environment from the state. This includes broader reforms 
in the financial system in India and improving Mumbai’s infrastructure and political and 
administrative governance. These reforms, the report argues, would help to attract a “globile” 
(globally mobile) financial workforce. In this context, the report states:  
The individuals that Mumbai must attract (and who matter most) to be globally competitive in 
providing IFS-are affluent, mobile and multi-culturally inclined in terms of their habits, tastes, 
and preferences. They demand world class facilities to live, work, and play, as well as world 
standards of infrastructure and urban governance. They have ample choice in terms of where they 
(and their families) choose to be located and how their time is allocated. Whether they choose to 
locate in Mumbai will be influenced by the attractions of Mumbai as a global city in which they 
can live, work and play in a manner similar to what they can do in other GFCs (Government of 
India 2007:xxix, emphasis added). 
In order to ensure that these “VIPs” consider Mumbai as their destination, the report further 
provides additional recommendations related to infrastructure, a cosmopolitan culture, lifestyle 
facilities, and governance (Government of India 2007: xxix-xxx). In terms of improving 
Mumbai’s infrastructure it calls for high-speed roads/urban expressways; good quality airports 
and air connections; high-quality residential, commercial, shopping, and recreational space that 
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meets “global standards for construction, finish, and maintenance.” It recommends that the 
government becomes more “expatriate friendly” by providing user-friendly visas and exhibits a 
“gentle, tolerant, open, and welcoming culture.” In terms of lifestyle, facilities concerning human 
welfare need to be “brought up to world standards and run on world class lines.” These lifestyles 
of human “welfare,” include, along with hospitals and educational facilities, “recreational 
facilities” such as sports stadium, gymnasiums, parks, clubs, hotels, bars, racecourses, casinos 
and “cultural institutions that cater to global tastes” such as libraries, art galleries, and museums. 
Finally, the report emphasizes that the quality of governance, personal security, and law 
enforcement needs to improve dramatically from “third-world to first-world standards.” This in 
its own words, Mumbai needs to become a “first-world city that can attract the brightest minds of 
the world by being an attractive place to live, work, and play” (Government of India 2007: xxxi) 
Urban entrepreneurialism and quality of life   
One of the frequent development tropes used to justify Mumbai’s transformation agenda is that 
of the “poor as an entrepreneur.” This has further gained currency in recent times through 
notable films on Mumbai, such as the “Slumdog Millionaire.” This idea of the “poor as an 
entrepreneur” is rooted in an ideology of consumption that reduces the identity of the poor to 
merely a cog in the accumulation machine, rather than a right-bearing human being. This point is 
clearly highlighted through the following example from a presentation of the Chairman of the 
Bombay First, made at an event sponsored by Cities Alliance and the World Bank in Washington 
in 2010. The Chairman begins his presentation by this quote: 
What do you call a city that’s a magnet for the corporate world, a financial rival to the top cities, 
a city built on hopes, dreams, and aspirations, a creation of human energy and ingenuity…a city 
that’s always open for business?90     
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Later in the same presentation, the Chairman lists among other people the following that “keep 
Mumbai running” (note the machine analogy in the first two): 
•   The coolie…the human baggage trolley 
• The taxi driver…who needs GPS with him around? 
• The fisherwoman…expert in the fine art of negotiation 
• The dabbawalla [lunch box-carrier]…makes sure city workers get their lunch on time (he 
also cites that this service has earned a six sigma rating from Forbes magazine -for 
99.99% efficiency) 
Further, in driving home the point that Mumbai is a land of opportunity for everyone, he says 
“even begging pays…Mumbai beggars earn more than $40 million a year.” He does not cite any 
sources from where he got this statistic. 
Recent political decentralization has enabled the growth of middle class activism in 
Mumbai in the form of neighborhood associations. These neighborhood associations have 
particularly vocal about the need for better governance at the local level that focuses on “quality 
of life” for the city-dwellers. Through an organized network of middle-and upper-middle class 
NGOs in Mumbai (such as AGNI, CitiSpace, and Loksatta) neighborhood associations have 
emerged as an important pressure group in the city. The issues taken up by these associations 
include solid waste management, beautification of space, and monitoring land use and urban 
space (Anjaria 2006; Bhowmik 2006); Zérah 2007). The people mobilized through these 
organizations mostly belong to the “new middle class” or the traditional English speaking older 
residents of the city (Zérah 2007). But how does this “middle-class activism” relate to the larger 
politics of “world classing” Mumbai?  
In the context of increasing urban entrepreneurialism, quality of life has emerged as a key 
feature for measuring the competitiveness of a city (Rogerson 1999). In order to attract 
investment and jobs, quality of life is narrowly conceptualized to suit the interests of capital. The 
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earlier discussion on the government report to convert Mumbai into an international financial 
center clearly highlights this point. However, the neoliberal discourse of quality of life is not 
merely rooted in an economic dynamic, but at a much deeper level it reflects a particular cultural 
aesthetic and sensibility associated primarily with “western” consumerist lifestyles.  
One of the “quick-wins” of “Vision Mumbai,” is to preserve open spaces in the city and 
do discourage “encroachment” through “adoption” of recreational space in the city (such as 
playgrounds and gardens) by private agencies (NAGAR Newsletter March 2004).  CitiSpace or 
Citizens’ Forum for Protection of Public Spaces (a prominent NGO in the city) was one of the 
key stake-holders consulted in preparing the “Vision Mumbai” report. It claims to have lobbied 
for inclusion of the discussion on open spaces in the report.
91
 
CitiSpace was formed in 1998 and consists of a network of 500 resident associations, 
community based organizations, NGOs, and commercial establishments.
92
 The basic philosophy 
of CitiSpace rests on protecting public spaces in the city. For this they rely on the provisions laid 
out by the land-use planning in the city which reserve public and open spaces such as beaches, 
mangroves, and land reserved for public amenities. According to the organization, over the 
years, land reserved for public space is siphoned off through “encroachment and land grab,” 
primarily through a politically driven process of slum creation and illegal construction. As a 
result, CitiSpace has taken it upon itself to preserve open spaces and stop the “illegal 
encroachment,” especially by street vendors (Anjaria 2006; Bhowmik 2006). In this context, 
CitiSpace has made use of the judiciary (effectively by-passing the municipal authorities) in 
energizing some legal orders related to regulation of space in the city. One such legal order was 
about creation of hawking zones that would restrict hawking activities to certain designated areas 
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in the city. Some scholars argue that these middle class claims over public space are reflective of 
the increasing “politics of exclusion” and an “exclusionary form of citizenship” that renders 
sections of the urban poor invisible in the city (Falzon 2004; Fernandes 2004). To this effect, 
Falzon (2004:159-60) writes: 
[T]he middle and upper classes tend to perceive the homeless, slum dwellers, beggars, “urchins,” 
and  hawkers as undesirables who “encroach” on the city’s public spaces and make it difficult for 
the former to lead what they see as a decent, healthy, and safe life. For the elites, life in the city is 
a constant siege. 
This “politics of exclusion” is rooted in modernist visions of aesthetics, order, and 
entrepreneurship that clash with the extreme poverty and squalor found in the megacities of the 
South. The following quote from one of the founding member of CitiSpace describes this clash 
of sensitivities. The respondent describes her initial reactions on returning to Mumbai after 
having spent 11 years in Singapore: 
I moved to Bombay and felt my gosh! my gosh! my gosh! I mean wherever I looked, there was 
chaos! I remember the broad footpath in front of my house, J. Tata road was huge. I remember 
sea of people were using the pavement and going towards Churchgate station. That wasn’t 
happening. Road space management wasn’t happening, garbage galore, spit galore, urine and 
feces galore. And systems, there was huge break down of systems. Traffic was cut off from my 
arterial road, instead morchas (public demonstrations) were taking place there, my footpath was 
occupied by street vendors and people were walking on the road (emphasis added).
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This middle-class politics in the city embodies a neoliberal governmentality based on an elite 
understanding of city-space, empowerment, citizenship, and human development. As seen in the 
activities of CitiSpace, the relationship between the self and space is mediated through a 
privileged notion of “quality of life” which has little regard to how the livelihoods of the urban 
poor are tied with public space in the city. Moreover, it ignores the appropriation of space by the 
encroachment of the rich. The notion of “empowerment” espoused by this middle-class politics 
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is based on a “civic governmentality,” which rests on a legalistic idea of rights that is exclusively 
based on rights of taxpayers and “law abiding citizens” (Roy 2009; Zérah 2007). In this context, 
one of CitiSpace’s key ideas of “empowerment” of citizens is to disseminate information on 
citizens’ rights through “user-friendly” booklets (NAGAR Newsletter March 2004). Finally, the 
middle class politics reduces human development to development of entrepreneurship and 
“upgrading” human capital. This rhetoric of entrepreneurship is seen in the “mainstreaming” of 
street vendors by enclosing them in municipal markets. The poverty of street vendors is 
explained through their lack of entrepreneurial skills. During an interview, a key member of 
CitiSpace expresses this idea in the following manner: 
[We are] limiting the potential of the poor to be an entrepreneur and have the capacity to build 
personal capacity, business capacity and to use street vending as a means to go places. What I am 
saying is let’s be rational....By and large, 90 percent of the population wants to upgrade...And that 
is why I want them to be absorbed into the mainstream...Can you imagine, if they hand would 
they be able to demonstrate his entrepreneurship services? Oh! it would be an explosion.
94
 
This discourse is part of a wider process that Ananya Roy (2010) refers to as “democratization of 
capital” where development related to social services is transformed into development as 
integration into the financial markets. Thus democratization of capital is about the economic 
freedom of the poor and reconceptualizing the poor as financial consumers. This is achieved 
through a kind of “neoliberal populism” that blends free-market ideology and an interest in the 
poor to recast economic vulnerability into economic opportunity (Roy 2010: 188, 220).  
 The Shanghai Model: A New “Blue-print” of Development in India  
Shanghaization is not merely a metropolitan imaginary, but is emerging as a national model of 
development in India. In 2005, India made a conscious shift in its macroeconomic policy toward 
urban centers by announcing the Rs 50,000 crore urban renewal scheme—the JNNURM 
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(Kennedy and Zerah 2007).
95
 For some, it signaled the end of the earlier reformist Nehruvian 
attempts that tried to balance growth with distribution through public-sector investment and 
regulation of the private sector (Banerjee-Guha 2002; Harris 2008).
96
 Financing of cities was 
linked to certain reforms in governance that would lead to increasing growth in an open 
economy. The federal cash transfers under the new scheme accompanied conditional reforms in 
the governance structure of the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) and state governments. Rules related 
to urban development were altered. Important land regulations that provided protection against 
land concentration (such as the Urban Land Ceiling Act) were repealed. Municipal bodies were 
directed to revamp their fiscal mechanisms and enhance their revenues.  
The main thrust of this emerging model of urban-led development is on real estate 
revitalization and development to spur economic growth, infrastructure and transport 
improvement designed primarily to encourage new private (foreign) investment and property 
development, and an export-led growth based on forcible land acquisitions and promotion of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) like China. With the introduction of the SEZ policy in 2005, as 
of 2012 there are 143 operational, 584 formally approved, and 45 in-principle approved SEZs in 
India.
97
 Studies have shown that this developmental model has engendered widespread 
displacement and regional (urban-rural) and intra-regional (urban poor and the middle/upper 
classes) inequities (Aggarwal 2006; Gopalakrishnan 2007; Huang 2008a, 2008b; Krishna and 
Nederveen Pieterse 2008; Shrivastava 2008).  The next chapter highlights such displacements 
caused by the urban projects in Mumbai that relate to infrastructure, slum redevelopment, and 
mill redevelopment, within the wider context of an emerging city-centric development in India.   
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CHAPTER 5 
TRANSFORMING MUMBAI: “THE VIOLENCE OF DEVELOPMENT” 
~We urgently need new investment in world-class public infrastructure for our cities. We have to 
invest in public transport, in roads with space for bicycles and pedestrians, in sanitation, in public 
parks, in water bodies in airports, in railway stations, and many other amenities of modern 
life….I believe we should have a vision for our cities as hubs of economic activity where citizens 
from all walks of life can live and work without difficulty.
98
 
 
~Mumbai needs investment in urban renewal. Mumbai needs a world class airport. Mumbai 
needs better public transport. Mumbai must unlock the potential of its under-utilized assets, 
especially land.
99
  
 
~We built this slum out of a swamp. We paid a slumlord to fill it with soil. That was six years 
ago. Now they come and break it down. Nobody stopped us when we built it. We got our election 
cards and our food ration cards for a price. I have three children and a husband, who is a trishaw 
puller. They can't simply throw us out and take away our lives. We are Indians. We will squat 
here. (Biswas 2005) 
 
It is found that “development-induced displacement” is a widespread and growing phenomenon. 
While there are numerous beneficiaries of development, the costs are often borne 
disproportionately by the poorest and marginalized populations (Robinson 2003:10). The World 
Bank has estimated that every year since 1990, about 10 million people worldwide have been 
displaced involuntarily by infrastructural development projects. In India alone, an estimated 25 
million have been displaced by development projects in the last 50 years. In China, the figure for 
the same period is 40 million and almost 13.6 million people have been displaced in 1990s 
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(Robinson 2003:3). People have even used the term “forced migration” to refer to cases where 
individuals or communities are “compelled, obliged, or induced to move when otherwise they 
would choose to stay put; the force involved may be direct, overt and focused, or indirect, covert, 
and diffuse” (ibid:5). Therefore, even voluntary movement may contain elements of coercion. .  
In the context of such “violence of development” Rajgopal (2001:A19) writes, “most large 
forced dislocations of people do not occur in conditions of armed conflict or genocide but in 
routine, everyday evictions to make way for development projects…Indeed this “development 
cleansing” may well constitute ethnic cleansing in disguise, as the people dislocated so often turn 
out to be from minority ethnic and racial communities.”  
The three quotes at the beginning of the chapter highlight the competing visions related to 
Mumbai’s contemporary development. The first quote is an excerpt from a speech by the Indian 
Prime Minister, Mr. Manmohan Singh, delivered on the occasion of laying the foundation stone 
for Phase I of the Mumbai Metro Rail Project. In the same speech he also stressed on the fact that 
urban centers in India must be seen as engines of growth and as spaces of “prosperity” and 
“progress.” He particularly singles out Mumbai as an embodiment of hope for a resurgent India 
and expressed that the city was in urgent need of investment to improve its infrastructure. The 
second quote from another speech highlights how “world class” infrastructure is considered as 
the antidote to Mumbai’s lagging growth and its aspiration to join to ranks of leading financial 
centers in the world. The focus on Mumbai’s urban renewal signals a shift in the overall 
development policy in India during the last decade culminating in one of the most ambitious 
programs in post-independent India—the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 
(JNNURM).  
  
134 
 
Production of Space 
In the context of contemporary urban transformation, Harvey (2005:3) makes a distinction 
between liberalism as a theory of political economy and “neoliberalization” as a process of a 
broader “creative destruction” of “prior institutional frameworks and powers, divisions of labor, 
social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive 
activities, attachment to land and habits of heart.” Transformation of urban space is integral in 
this process of neoliberization. Acknowledging this fact, there has been a “spatial turn” in the 
analysis of contemporary globalization highlighted by terms such as “space-time compression” 
(Harvey 1989), “space of flows” (Castells 1989), and “scapes” (Appadurai 1990). Brenner 
(1999:42) argues that with the increasing interconnectedness of social relations on a global scale, 
space should not be understood as a “static platform of social relations,” but as “one of the 
constitutive elements of globalization, historically produced, reconfigured, and transformed.” In 
this context, contemporary globalization can be understood as the most recent historical 
expression of a longue durée dynamic of continual process of dispersal and concentration of 
capital. On the one hand, contemporary globalization is eliminating geographical barriers to 
capitalist accumulation, leading to dispersal of capital.
100
 On the other hand, this mobility of 
capital gets re-concentrated through the production of relative stable and immobile geographical 
landscapes such as the built environments, transportation infrastructure, production and business 
complexes, and communication networks. The “agglomerative effects” of large cities based on 
their concentration of large populations and infrastructure facilitates the clustering of economic 
activities. Therefore, these large cities become attractive to investors as they centralize factors 
such as good quality infrastructure, skilled labor, specialized producer services and markets, and 
less tangible goods such as creativity and innovation (Kennedy and Zérah 2008).  
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In Brenner’s words, “social space operates at once as a presupposition, medium, and outcome of 
capitalism’s globalizing developmental dynamic…[and is] continually constructed, 
deconstructed, and reconstructed through historically specific, multi-scalar dialectic of de- and 
re-territorialization” (2009:43).   
 In order to promote this geographical re-concentration of capital, national and local 
governments have introduced new strategies of urban development and regulations. Through this 
processes of “re-regulation,” states promote globalization and create favorable investment 
environments. The competitive climate of globalization within which cities compete for foreign 
capital has led to devolution of state power to regional and urban scales, seen in large-scale 
infrastructure projects or entrepreneurial initiatives such as public-private partnerships. In the 
megacities of the South this has taken the form of reservation of business districts, creation of 
new enterprise spaces or Special Economic Zones (SEZs), or high-premium infrastructure 
(Kennedy and Zérah 2008).  
Emerging City-centered Development in India 
Mumbai’s contemporary transformation has to be understood in a broader of context of a policy 
shift in India toward city-centered growth strategies (Kennedy and Zérah 2008). The 74
th
 
Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 introduced a series of reforms related to political 
decentralization in India. The act provided the framework for democratic and participatory 
planning process at the local level. Several areas of identified for decentralized planning and 
devolution of power including economic and social development, regulation of land use and 
construction of buildings, urban planning (including town planning and slum improvement and 
upgradation) (Sengupta 2006). Liberalization reforms in the 1990s further reinforced the 
economic role of cities. Notions such as “urban productivity” and “efficiency” became the center 
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piece of urban development policy. However, the foundation for these changes was laid with the 
establishment of the National Commission on Urbanization in 1985, which probably for the first 
time recognized the role played by cities in economic development, particular large cities such as 
Mumbai. Led by the priority of economic development, the commission introduced the criterion 
of efficiency in the provision of urban services. These entrepreneurial visions were crystallized 
more clearly in the Rakesh Mohan Committee Report on infrastructure, 1996 which called for 
more market-oriented reforms. The main focus of the committee was on “commercialization of 
infrastructure” through public-private partnerships, commodification of urban services, local 
financing through municipal bonds and domestic financial markets. This report is considered as a 
key report in the history of urban development policy in India as it introduced a set of new ideas 
related to urban policy and infrastructure development influenced by international “best 
practices” (Kennedy and Zérah 2008). 
 The above urban policy reforms culminated in 2005 with the introduction of the 
JNNURM. The JNNURM continues with the “cities for growth” agenda by focusing on 
upgrading infrastructure of Indian cities to enhance their productivity. The main mission of 
JNNURM is “to encourage reforms and fast track planned development of identified 
cities….efficiency in urban infrastructure and service delivery mechanisms, community 
participation, and accountability of ULBs/Parastatal agencies towards citizens (Government of 
India N.d.). The JNNURM effectively links infrastructure financing and governance reforms by 
imposing certain conditionalities for central government funds which include mandatory reforms 
in rules and regulations of urban local bodies and state governments such as repealing land 
regulations, modernizing municipalities, enhancing revenues and fiscal responsibility (Kennedy 
and Zérah 2008). 
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It is also argued that the JNNURM strategy was also influenced by the events in Mumbai, 
especially the “Vision Mumbai” strategy (or Shanghaization of Mumbai) introduced by political 
and business elite in the city during 2003-2005. This point is acknowledged by the head of the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit—a World Bank-led initiative set up in 2005, immediately 
after the introduction of “Vision Mumbai” report:  
In a way JNNURM was also conceived as an outcome of what was going on in Mumbai. So the 
Central government also saw that after this kind of study that cities are lacking in basic 
infrastructure which is required. So that perhaps led to the central government coming up with the 
comprehensive scheme of the JNNRUM, which helped in us in taking up a few major projects in 
Mumbai.
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Transforming Mumbai: Projects and Displacements 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, Mumbai’s current transformation is taking place in a 
transformed political, economic, and institutional context characterized by: increasing 
involvement of the market and non-governmental actors in planning and implementation and a 
decentralization of political authority to local (urban) level, and deindustrialization of the city-
core. In this context, I will analyze the important projects that are currently underway in Mumbai 
that potentially intensify the existing socio-spatial inequalities in the city. There projects relate to 
infrastructure development, slum redevelopment, and mill-land redevelopment.  
Infrastructure development 
An important component of the Mumbai transformation agenda is upgrading city’s 
infrastructure. Since 2002, there are two large-scale transportation projects that are currently 
underway in Mumbai—the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) and the Mumbai Urban 
Infrastructure Project (MUIP). The World-Bank funded MUTP aims to improve the transport 
infrastructure and services in Mumbai, primarily the suburban railway system which is found to 
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be over-utilized beyond its maximum capacity.
102
The total estimated cost of the project is about 
$1000 USD out of which 45 per cent of the total cost ($477 million USD) is to be borne by the 
World Bank. The objective of the 600 million USD MUIP is to augment the MUTP by 
improving the road networks and traffic dispersal in the city. The project is funded by MMRDA 
and envisages construction or improvement of over 450 km of road network during the next five 
years.
103
    
However, the implementation of such projects is a challenging task, considering that it 
involves displacement of the urban poor, especially slum dwellers. It is estimated that since 2004 
311,000 families have been displaced or are potentially going to be displaced by various 
development projects in Mumbai (See Table 1). The resettlement of displaced people in Mumbai 
has been patchy. One of the most cited internationally-acclaimed successful “people-managed” 
resettlement story is the resettlement of 60,000 slum dwellers for the improvement of the rail 
network in 1997-98. This resettlement was mediated by non-governmental organizations such as 
SPARC and the National Slum Dwellers’ Federation (NSDF) (Patel, d’Cruz, and Burra 2002). 
However, by and large, the problem of resettling the displaced urban poor has been especially 
difficult considering that a substantially large number of slum dwellers in Mumbai do not have 
proper titles to land and in addition to this there are thousands of small, medium, and large 
businesses that exist in those areas. Further, there is also a problem of finding suitable 
resettlement sites in a densely populated city like Mumbai. Moreover, there are also certain new 
challenges in managing post-resettlement issues related to provision of utilities and services to 
the new dwellings, people’s access to transportation, and transfer of funds and title deeds. 
Women are disproportionately disadvantaged as their new homes are further away from their 
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places of work and the burden of balancing household responsibilities has made it difficult for 
them to hold on to those earning opportunities (World Bank 2007).  
Table 8. Development-induced Displacements in Mumbai
104
 
 Name of the Project Families Displaced Period 
1 Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) 20,000 2000 onwards 
2 
 
Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project 
(MUIP) 
35,000 2004 onwards 
3 Mumbai Makeover post-“Vision Mumbai” 70,000 December 2004 
4 Mithi River Development Project (Phase I) 5,000 May 2006 
5 Mahatma Gandhi Path Kranti Yojana 5,000 2007 
6 Airport Expansion Project 90,000 
Yet to be 
implemented 
7 Dharavi Redevelopment Project 60,000 
Yet to be 
implemented 
8 Mumbai Metro No data available 
Yet to be 
implemented 
9 BRIMSTOWD 20,000 2007 
10 Slum Rehabilitation Scheme 
No data available. 
However, 85,000 
resettled till date 
(not included in the 
total) 
 
 Total 311,000  
 
The recently commenced Mumbai Metro Rail Project has the objective of providing rail-
based mass transit connectivity to people within an approach distance of a half to one mile and to 
serve the areas that are not connected by existing Suburban Rail System. The total length of the 
Metro Rail is about 91 miles and the entire project is to be completed in three phases by 2021. 
The entire project cost is estimated to be about 3500 million USD. The phase I of the project 
began in 2006. For the phase II, involving a 20 mile corridor from Charkop-Bandra-Mankhurd, 
the government has proposed to construct a railcar depot (the most crucial part of the project).
105
 
For this depot, the government has proposed to acquire 140 acres of land in the Kandivali-
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Malwani area which includes 48 acres of old settlements of Laljipada, Janata colony, 
Sanjaynagar, Ektanagar, Azad compound, Gandhinagar, K.D. Compound among several others. 
This entire region houses over 20 to 25 thousand families, 200 small and medium size 
businesses, and educational institutions such as schools and Madrasas. In 2007, the state urban 
development ministry issued a circular announcing the phase II of the project. This circular did 
not mention the people who were going to be displaced as a result of the railcar depot. The 
government conveniently chose to ignore more than 150,000 people who have been living in this 
region since four decades. Laljipada, one of the main colonies with a population of about 15,000 
was developed by the poor people who moved into the region. They not only filled up the 
wetlands and made the place hospitable, but also created self-employment by establishing small 
and medium scale industries in the region. The imitation jewelry business employing 70 per cent 
of the people in the region (out of which 15,000 to 20,000 are women) was established 30-40 
years ago. Ornaments made in Laljipada are even exported overseas. Along with this, there are 
almost 8,000 people engaged in the plastic recycling industry, which recycles almost 94 tons of 
plastic every day! Almost 17,000 people, mostly women, are employed in the making of small-
scale plastic products. There are also other small businesses such as scrap dealing, bakeries, 
bottle recycling and so on (NAPM N.d.).  
 Activists opposing the depot allege that there was no survey conducted to determine how 
many people were going to be resettled. According to activist H. M. Chandrashekhar, “the real 
motive of the MMRDA [the agency responsible to implement the project] is to evict the slums in 
the region and to sell the land to rich businessmen to cover the cost of the project.”106 The area 
seems to command a high price as it is closer to the main arterial roads. The activists also oppose 
                                                          
106
 This is an excerpt from a talk delivered at the “National Strategy Meet on Metrorail Projects,” organized by the 
Ghar-Bachao, Ghar-Banao Andolan on 27-28 June, 2009.  
141 
 
the resettlement plans and demand that the depot should not be constructed over their land. They 
are well aware of the fact that earlier attempts of resettling people in high-rise apartments have 
increased costs, destroyed businesses, and disrupted stable communities. The following quote 
expresses the popular sentiment of the people affected by this project: “Did we build this land 
with our own hands only to be given away to those who want to profit from it, while our own 
lives are destroyed?” (NAPM N.d.:7).  
 Objections have also been raised regarding the disproportionate environmental and 
monetary costs involved in the Metro Rail project compared to its actual benefits. Experts from 
the Indian Institute of Technology have estimated that the 3500 million USD project would result 
in the environmental costs of over 11,000 million USD. Moreover, they argue that there are 
cheaper and less environmentally destructive alternatives available to solve Mumbai’s 
transportation problems. According to Sudhir Badami, a noted transportation expert, Mumbai’s 
current load of transport is 350,000 people per hour, an overload of almost 150-170 per cent. He 
further argues that although the Metro Rail Project designed to augment city’s public 
transportation system, it will only generate 72 per cent of the additional required capacity over a 
span of 16-20 years. Whereas, with a total cost of 1281 million USD (much lower than the Metro 
Rail) and in much less time of five years alternative transport strategies such as the Bus Rapid 
Transit System and Sky Bus can generate 65 per cent more than the additional required capacity 
of commuters.
107
 
 Another controversial infrastructure project that was recently carried out is the iconic 
Rajiv Gandhi (Bandra-Worli) Sea Link connecting the western suburbs with the island city (see 
Figure 5). The Sea Link was opened to the public on June 29, 2009 with a lot of fanfare with 
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displays of fireworks, light and laser show coupled with music and all the local newspapers 
carried particular details marveling the massive feat of construction.  For example, the bridge 
weighted 670,000 tons equivalent to 50,000 African elephants; it used 23413 miles of steel wire 
equivalent to the earth’s circumference; and that “Hercules,’ one of the largest water cranes in 
the world had to be imported from Singapore to ensure that the bridge was completed before the 
monsoons arrived.
108
  
 
Figure 5. Rajiv Gandhi (Bandra-Worli) Sea Link. In recent times, this has become 
Mumbai’s iconic landmark.  
Source: Mumbai State Road Development Corporation Ltd. 
 
Nearly 300 million USD were spent to construct the 2.9 mile long sea bridge with the aim 
of reducing peak travel time between Bandra and Worli from 35-38 minutes to 7 minutes. 
However, it was found that if one takes into account the time taken at the approach roads (due to 
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diversions, curves, and reduced speed limits) leading to the Sea Link at both the ends the total 
journey took 25 minutes, effectively saving only 10 minutes. In this context, the question raised 
is whether it was worth spending close to 300 million USD to save 10 minutes of travel time.
109
 
The more important question is whether the Sea Link was necessary in the first place and to 
whom did it cater to considering the expensive toll. Further, the discussion on the Sea Link opens 
up an entirely different discussion on the question of temporality and how value is attached to 
time, especially of motorized elite for whom the Sea Link offered a privileged view as 
highlighted by this quote: “Look out from your car window and you can see the beautiful high 
rises and the sea on either side, making you feel as if you were on a cruise”110 
For those who are at the helm of urban transform in Mumbai there seems to be a taken-
for-granted approach toward urban infrastructure that displaces politics of the poor. One of the 
most effective rhetorical tools used to justify transformation in Mumbai is that of the reason that 
privileges the notions of effectiveness and efficiency over politics and politics is seen as an 
aversion, as an impediment to growth. In the area of urban governance, idea of efficiency, 
finance, and pragmatism takes precedence over representativeness. The following quote, from an 
interview with a senior-level bureaucrat heading the key agency that deliberates on urban 
transformation in Mumbai, is instructive of the kind of change that I discussed above: 
Political issues are of course important. They are more relevant in policy work. Not in project 
based work. So there may not be much politics involved in whether you want to have a metro 
here or monorail here or a highway going in a particular area.”111 
Here the idea of politics is rendered as a deliberative process of policy making, where as 
implementation is devoid of politics and it is mostly a technicality. The above bureaucrat talks 
about the monorail as being non-problematic, but as discussed above the situation on the ground 
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is very different where there is widespread displacement which is contested by the poor. Further, 
the process of building political consensus is reduced to financial viability and efficiency. The 
same bureaucrat explains: 
Political will is also developed if the rest of the logistics in place like finance etc. In a democratic 
set up political will is important too, but if you have adequate funds at your command, it may take 
less time to get the will implemented. I mean if you have money in your pocket and if you want 
to buy something, the will is there or otherwise you may think twice. Something else may take 
priority over what you want to do.”112 
Slum redevelopment 
There exists in Mumbai a hierarchical nature of housing options available to its citizens that 
range from pavement dwellings, zopadpattis (informal squatter settlements), chawls (factory-
owned low-income rental tenements), owned or rented flats, and expensive flats or apartments 
owned by the rich and the super rich (Appadurai 2000; Risbud 2003). According to some 
sources, about 50 per cent of Mumbai’s 12 million citizens live in slums or zopadpattyas or other 
inferior form of housing (10 per cent are said to pavement dwellers). However, slum dwellers 
occupy only about 8 per cent of city space, which is around 43,000 hectares.
113
  
The answer to why there are so many people living in slums in Mumbai partly lies in the 
absence of legal housing for the poor. The supply of formal housing has been far below the need. 
The annual deficit of housing kept on increasing from the mid-50s until early 1990s (see table 9). 
Further, considering the cost of formal housing, it is affordable only to the top 6.25 per cent of 
households in Mumbai. Moreover, the private housing sector does not cater to the poor and as a 
result 53 per cent of the poor or almost 45,000 households have to rely on informal housing. 
Maharashtra Housing and Development Authority (MHADA) established in 1977 to provide 
housing to low and middle income groups in Maharashtra has constructed 33,890 units for the 
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economically weaker sections and 19,184 units under the slum clearance scheme in the state. 
However, since its inception until 1995, MHADA did not construct a single unit for the 
economically weaker sections in Mumbai. Frequently cited reasons for non-construction of 
adequate houses in Mumbai have been lack of availability of funds and space (Indian People’s 
Tribunal 2005).     
Table 9. Ratio of Average Annual Supply of Housing in Metropolitan Mumbai 
Period 
Annual Need Total Supply Deficit 
1956-66 46,000 17,572 28,428 
1973-82 60,000 19,626 40,374 
1984-91 85,000 47,417 37,583 
 Source: Indian People’s Tribunal (2005:50) 
The current slum development policy in Mumbai is a variant of its earlier Slum 
Redevelopment (SRD) announced in 1991. As early as 1980s, it was suggested to the state 
government that private participation in slum development should be encouraged. In 1991, the 
state government accepted this proposal and deviated from its earlier pattern of public sector 
involvement in slum redevelopment (Risbud 2003). Later, in 1995, a new scheme was introduced 
called Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) based on public-private partnership. On paper, this 
plan appears to be democratic based on community participation in the rehabilitation program 
and seeking private builders to implement plans. However, in reality, the private builders use 
their economic power to influence the resettlement plans. The “private” participation in this 
process is not just limited to builders, but other non-state actors such as NGOs like Society for 
the Preservation of Area Resources Centers (SPARC) have begun to play an active mediatory 
role in the settlement process. This kind of network between slum dwellers, SRA, private 
builders, and the intermediary NGOs has led to “institutional pluralism” in the housing delivery 
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system which has often lead to conflicts between different stakeholders (Sanyal and Mukhija 
2001).  
 The Vision Mumbai  report (2003) mentions that to put Mumbai on the course of 
development, the city has to free-up land by 50-70 per cent. Following this report, in 2004-2005 
the state government through its battery of officials demolished 94,000 homes at 44 sites, 
“freeing-up” 288.80 acres of land. This was described as “Operation Shanghai” in the daily 
newspapers (Mahadevia and Narayan 2005:16). This incessant drive to free-up land 
“encroached” by illegal slums has introduced new legalities, technologies, and agencies to 
dissuade development of slums. It ranges from issuing photo-cards for slum dwellers to 
controlling urban space with cameras and “flying squads.” The Citizens Action Group (CAG), 
univocally endorsed these violent demolitions (Mahadevia 2008b).  
Table 10. Slum Demolitions in Mumbai 
Year of Demolition Number of Slum Households Demolished 
1994 55,784 
1995 62,385 
1996 84,681 
1997 108,322 
1998 49,154 
2004-2005 94,000 
Total 454,326 
 Source: Singh (N.d.) 
One of the most important slum redevelopment project in Mumbai today is the 
development of 360 acres of Dharavi—Asia’s largest slum, which has also been proposed in the 
GOM Report (2004). Because of its proximity to the emerging business center at Bandra-Kurla 
Complex and its easy access to the airport, this is one of the most sought after pieces of real 
estate in Mumbai. Recently, the Dharavi redevelopment has attracted big national and 
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international real estate companies from the US, Kuwait, Hong Kong and Dubai.
114
 However, the 
project is mired in controversy and there is a strong opposition against it from certain local 
communities. 
Mill redevelopment 
With the growth of the textile industry in Bombay since the mid-nineteenth century there 
developed a unique textile mill district called Girangaon, “village of mills,” in the central parts 
of the city (Chandavarkar 1994). This area includes the mills as well the chawls or rented low-
income tenements owned by the mill-owners. However, immediately after the textile strike in 
1982-83 most mills were shut-down, retrenching more than 100,000 workers. Today there are 58 
functional mills—33 privately owned, one owned by the state government, and 25 managed by 
the central government. Due to rise in the real estate prices from late 1980s to early 1990s, the 
“vacant” Mill lands came to be viewed as the most valued land for redevelopment. The 
combined value of the 600 acres of the Mill lands in the 1990s was estimated to be around Rs 50 
billion (Paul, Shetty, and Krishnan 2005: 399). The Development Control (DC) Rules of 1991 
that deal with Mill lands were amended to enable the sale or modernization of Mill lands. As per 
the new rules some of the excess Mill lands could be redeveloped and a part of the profits 
accrued from the redevelopment was to be invested in the revival of the mill and a part was to be 
used to generate employment for the workers. Those parts of the Mills that were unviable for 
development were to be distributed in three parts: one third for low-income housing, one-third 
civic amenities, and one third for development by the mill-owner. In practice, however, the mill 
owners have managed to exploit certain loopholes in the law to redevelop or sell the Mill land 
(Lokshahi Hakk Sanghatana Report 1996). Some of the mills have been converted to up-scale 
malls such as the Phoenix Mall in Lower Parel. This transformation from Mills to Malls in very 
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poignantly described in one of the studies on the Phoenix Mill as shown by the quote following 
the photograph below:  
 
Figure 6. High Street Phoenix Mall. This mall was actually a former textile mill. The 
owners consciously chose to preserve certain parts of the mill (see the tower) to 
accentuate its historical past. This mall has been consistently listed as one of the top 
three malls in Mumbai. 
Source: Thirani (2011) 
 
When today one enters the Phoenix Mills, it has a ghost-like character — walking through the 
gates in the evening, the massive buildings that form the compound with their graceful Gothic 
architecture, their interiors wear a deserted appearance. Piles of wood, bricks, cement and mortar 
sit in dusty piles within the various departments of the old mill, stripped of their former purpose, 
their previous occupants banished, and their machinery removed to sale or scrap. At the back of 
the compound, only the winding department continues to hum with productive activity, while a 
stone’s throw away the Fire and Ice Disco thumps with dance music. The chimney of the mill 
towers above disco, awaiting the day when, in a gesture of cynical irony, the owners of the 
Bowling Company propose to repaint it to look like a bowling pin. Amidst the rubble and dust of 
the deserted premises of the spinning and weaving sections of the mill, where only a year ago 
cloth was being processed and sent to market, Marutis [a popular Indian car] and Mercedes are 
149 
 
parked, and the buzz of mobile phones is heard. Industrial activity has given way to leisure and 
entertainment, though this change appears like a forcible occupation by an invading army, who 
care little for the legal and democratic rights of the people they have displaced. Indeed if they 
even know of them, which they probably don’t (Krishnan 2000:9). 
Along with the DC Rules, Mill land sale was also subject to guidelines of Urban Land Ceiling 
and Regulation Act (ULCRA) which set limits on the development of surplus Mill land. 
However, in 2011, this legislation was scrapped in Maharashtra due to a sustained campaign 
from developers who argued that it would free up 25,000 hectares of land which could attract 
foreign investors. The scrapping of ULCRA is bound to lead to increasing speculation in the real 
estate market in Mumbai.  A recent article highlights that Mumbai has become the “world’s 
second-most expensive market for office space after London’s West End and the third-fastest 
growing such market…rentals in places like Nariman Point, a business district in south Mumbai, 
have jumped 55 percent from a year earlier to 189.51 USD per square foot a year.”115  
 The dislocations caused by the elitist visions and practices of transformation in Mumbai 
has led to widespread discontent within the poor and laboring classes and sections of them have 
organized to resist these changes. Interestingly, the new context of redevelopment has also 
emboldened support for conservative forces in the city to rekindle nativistic assertions. In the 
next chapter, I describe some of these contestations and the alternative visions of urban 
development they generate. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WHOSE CITY IS IT? MUMBAI: A CONTESTED CITY   
~In understanding Mumbai’s transformation, it is important to focus on questions such as the 
increasing privatization of health and education. However, the most important question today is—
Whose Mumbai is it? Does Mumbai belong to the workers and the middle classes who built this 
city, or does it belong to the capitalists, builders, Mafia, and the politicians who serve their 
interests?
116
 
 
~We should all be aware in our hearts and minds: Where is our share? What is our place in this 
city of Mumbai which is sustained by our efforts? What is our “right to this city” which is built 
on our labor? Is this question on everybody’s mind?117 
 
~This is a people’s movement for inclusive growth and that is all they are fighting for (Medha 
Patkar).
118
 
 
The ideological and contested nature of urbanism is becoming a key issue in the South as 
policies gravitate toward maintaining high-growth. Globally inspired restructuring projects are 
always contextually embedded within “inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, 
regulatory practices, and political struggles” (Brenner and Theodore 2002:350). Therefore, there 
is always a disjuncture between the ideology of (neoliberal) growth and its everyday functioning 
and influence as the process of incorporation of global forces is a contested one, generating 
possibilities of alternative claim-making and citizenship (Sassen 2000b).  
In the urban context, Castells’ (1983) argues that urban social movements arise as a result 
of “urban contradictions” related to production, distribution, and management of collective 
consumption of goods and services. Such urban contradictions marginalize the urban poor who 
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 Translated from Mumbai te Shanghai (Mumbai to Shanghai). N.d. Girni Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti, Mumbai, p.3.  
117
 Excerpt from Medha Patkar’s speech from the film Road to Shanghai (Via Mumbai). Retrieved on May 26, 2011 
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are often the targets of urban policies. Urban contradictions enable new or renewed forms of 
contestations, exerting considerable constraints on the state power. Therefore, the production of 
space is not a result of a unilateral impact of global economic forces on the urban environment, 
but is a contested and negotiated process in which social movements subvert or challenge the 
hegemonic processes. In the context of inclusive growth, the state has to maintain a fine balance 
between facilitating rapid growth and meeting the demands of the urban poor affected by various 
urban redevelopment projects.  
I have described Mumbai’s growth contradictions elsewhere using the term “globalizing 
marginality” (Ghadge 2010). By this I refer to the Janus-faced nature of urbanism, whereby, “on 
the one hand, the globalizing impulse of the new world economy has subjected the city to new 
strategies of urban development and regulations; while on the other hand, this very process of 
globalizing caters exclusively to certain key economic sectors and elites, marginalizing most of 
the population” (Ghadge 2010:72). Emerging urban growth strategies have engendered a new 
form of politics. These urban conflicts are not confined to the state alone. The marginalizing 
nature of urbanism in Mumbai has also led to contestations within the civil society between the 
urban poor and the middle classes. In the remaining part of this chapter, I first discuss three 
emerging contestations of the urban poor based on three poor peoples’ movements in Mumbai 
that I have studied involving the slum dwellers, street vendors, and former industrial workers 
who are impacted by various restructuring projects in the city. Later, I also engage with other 
forms of contestations in the city that may not necessarily emerge out of the neoliberal growth 
strategies, but nonetheless generate alternative claims of representation and citizenship in the city 
are in apparent contradiction of the Shanghaization strategy. 
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For the sake of clarity and comparison, I summarize in Table 10 the three forms of 
contestations (that I subsequently discuss) based on Tilly’s model of social movements that 
involves three essential elements: campaigns, repertoire, and WUNC displays (worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment).
119
 
Table 11. Poor People’s Movements in Mumbai 
Actors/Movements Campaigns Repertoire WUNC Displays 
NAPM/GBGB 
Andolan 
-Claims: housing, 
alternative 
development 
-Claimants: slum 
dwellers 
-Objects of Claims: 
builders, politicians, 
state 
-Public: urban poor, 
migrants, urban 
middle classes 
Direct action 
 
Rallies 
 
Demonstrations 
 
Coalitions building 
 
Filing court cases 
 
Right to information 
W: honest, hard-
working production 
citizens 
 
U: Revolutionary 
songs, poem, 
speeches 
 
C: Resisting 
repression, 
ostentatious sacrifice 
Girni Kamgaar 
Sangharsh Samiti 
-Claims: housing, 
space, identity 
-Claimants: former 
textile mill workers 
-Object of claims: 
government, textile 
mill owners 
-Public: working class 
people, urban poor 
Rallies 
 
Petitions 
 
Filing court cases 
 
Coalition building 
W: “builders of the 
city;” working class 
pride 
 
U: common working 
class history 
 
C: long drawn 
struggles 
Street Vendors’ 
Organizations 
-Claims: right to 
space and livelihoods, 
regularization 
-Claimants: urban 
poor, informal 
workers 
-Object of claims: 
government, middle-
class civic groups 
-Public: urban poor, 
working classes  
Petitioning 
 
Filing court cases 
 
Lobbying with  
national-level 
organizations 
 
Transnational 
linkages 
W: provide basic 
services, hard work 
 
U: preserving 
livelihoods 
 
C: clean food and 
space 
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 According to Tilly (2004), campaigns are organized, sustained, collective claims involving three parties: the 
group of claimants, objects of claims, and a public of some kind; social movement repertoire are the forms of 
political action employed by participants; and WUNC displays are public representations of the participants that 
important in conveying various political messages to the public. 
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Politics of the Urban Poor 
The rights-based struggle for housing in Mumbai  
Immediately after the publication of the Vision Mumbai report, between November 2004 and 
March 2005 (in what is referred as “Operation Shanghai” in the local newspapers), 90,000 homes 
of slum dwellers were demolished at 44 sites across the city and an estimated 450,000 slum 
dwellers were evicted,  “freeing-up” 288.8 acres of land  (IPT 2005; Mahadevia and Narayan 
2005). The nature of evictions was so brutal that it invited terms such as the “Indian Tsunami” 
and in the first 18 days itself around 39,000 homes were demolished (IPT 2005; Roy 2009a). 
One of the officers in-charge of the demolitions was even quoted as that it was time to turn 
Mumbai into the “next Shanghai” and for that to happen “we want to put the fear of the 
consequences of migration into these people. We have to restrain them from coming to Mumbai” 
(Biswas 2005). According to a survey conducted by the NGO YUVA (Youth for Voluntary 
Action and Unity), almost 9.63 billion USD were spent on carrying out these demolitions. In the 
28 slums surveyed by YUVA there were 375 police and municipal vans, 2996 police personnel 
and 87 bulldozers were utilized for the demolitions (Indian People’s Tribunal 2005:28). 
One of the residents of Ambujwadi, which was one of the first settlements that was demolished 
(see Figure 4), expresses the unprecedented brutality of these demolitions in the following 
manner:   
This demolition is almost like the end.  Everything is in complete chaos. In my presence, there 
has been demolition 5-6 times. But there is no precedence to this demolition. Earlier despite 
demolition, we managed to stay, but this time we are not even allowed to stay after demolition. If 
we request to stay, we are tortured…Not a single house is left.  (IPT 2004) 
The demolitions propelled the emergence of a housing rights movement in the city. In the 
aftermath of the demolitions, the slum dwellers came together under a coalition called 
Zopadpatti Bachao Samyukta Kruti Samiti or Joint Action Committee to Save the Slum 
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Dwellers, under the leadership of noted activist Medha Patkar of the NAPM (Weinstein and Ren 
2009; Mahadevia and Narayan 2005). The struggle later assumed a new name in the Mumbai 
context called Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao Andolan [GBGB] (Movement to Save and Build 
Homes).).
120
  
 
Figure 7. Ambujwadi Slum in Malad, Mumbai. Consisting of about 1600 homes, it was 
one of the first sites that were demolished during the 2004-2005 demolitions in 
Mumbai. However, its residents organized to reclaim the area a few months later. 
Source: Author (2009). 
It is argued that this was the first time that “hitherto ‘private’ and individual struggles of [poor] 
citizens entered the public domain” when evictees in different parts of the city joined hands in 
demanding security of tenure (Bhide 2009). At the time of the demolitions Medha Patkar was 
                                                          
120 The National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM) is an alliance of over two hundred people’s 
organizations and movements in India which began in 1992. The NAPM describes itself as “an alliance of 
progressive people’s organizations and movements, who while retaining their autonomous identities, are working 
together to bring the struggle for primacy of rights of communities over natural resources, conservation and 
governance, decentralized democratic development and towards a just, sustainable and egalitarian society in the true 
spirit of globalism.” For more information, visit their website (http://napm-india.org/). In the following sections, I 
will mention the NAPM if I am referring to the broader national level movement and NAPM/GBGB when referring 
to its Mumbai specific activities. 
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busy attending to Tsunami victims in South of India. However, the enormity of the 
displacements propelled her to move to Mumbai and join the struggle. In mid-December 2004, 
there was a large rally held at the Azad Maidan which was attended by thousands of people. 
Bolstered by this there were street demonstrations in February 2005 and following this the 
protestors also demonstrated in front of state government headquarters. Their immediate demand 
to the Congress party led state government was to put a halt to the demolitions and to live up to 
their election promise of regularizing all slum residents who could prove that they lived in the 
region before 2000. Simultaneously, they also tried to resist evictions and also reclaimed some of 
the evicted spaces and started to rebuild their houses. Pressured by the national leadership of 
Congress, the state government finally put a halt to the demolitions in February 2005.  
 
Figure 8. An NAPM rally on the eve of International Women’s Day 
Source:  Author (2009). 
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It has been argued that this new social movement in Mumbai characterized by 
NAPM/GBGB departed radically from the “populist mediation” strategies of prominent 
“government-friendly” network of organizations that include the Society for the Promotion of 
Area Resources (SPARC), the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF), and Mahila Milan, a 
network of women’s groups (Roy 2009a:161). Roy (2009) refers to this process of mediation 
between the government and various social movements and the representatives of the urban poor 
as “civic governmentality” which produces “governable spaces and governable subjects” 
(ibid:163). As a result of their proximity with the state apparatus these organizations, along with 
other NGOs, are viewed with suspicion by poor peoples’ movements such as NAPM. 
Organizations such as the SPARC avoid a confrontational positioning vis-à-vis the state and 
insisting more on collaboration. Because of this organizations such as SPARC are unable to vest 
control of urban planning and development from the state (McFarlane 2004). Sections of the 
urban poor, therefore, are becoming critical of this dialogue-based politics of SPARC that may 
have proved successful to resettling people, but have limited impact on issues of livelihood. 
More often than not the resettlement sites are away from places where these poor people work 
(Roy 2009a:172-3). This “politics of compensation” according to Roy (2009:173), “produces an 
entrepreneurial subjectivity…a subjectivity steeped in the morality of collaboration, participation 
and mediation. To protest, to confront, is to stand outside the parameters of citizenship.” 
This NAPM/GBGB rejected this strategy of “negotiated development” and framed 
Shanghaization of Mumbai primarily as an issue of right—of the urban and rural poor’s “right 
over urban space” (Patkar and Athialy 2005). This approach of politics challenges SPARC’s 
“institutionalized inclusion” through an assertive “right to the city” (Roy 2009a:176). An 
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interview with an NAPM/GBGB activist illustrates this new rights-based approach to housing in 
Mumbai:  
But today if your are living here and if this basti exists then I have the right to live here…..[A]s 
per the Human Rights Commission, everybody has the right to earn their food, clothes, and home 
anywhere in this country. We are the citizens of this country. We work in this city, earn a 
respectable living, we work hard and you get your jobs and salaries from the taxes we pay. So 
you have to grant us our rights.
121
  
 
 
Figure 9. Medha Patkar addressing a NAPM rally. 
            Source: Author (2009). 
            Translation of the posters: Top left-“Our struggle is against violence and exploitation” 
 Top center: “What is the labor of the poor? What is their right?         
See for yourself” 
           Top right: “Save Homes, Build Home” 
                                                      Middle: “Mumbai is not the property of builders. It is ours” 
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 Personal interview, June 19, 2009. 
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This rights-based approach to housing is predicated not only in terms of constitutional rights, but 
also on a sense of fairness that emerges from the contribution of the poor to the city’s elite and 
the economy. The same respondent highlights: 
Mumbai is not such a good place to live and you are dreaming of transforming it into Shanghai. 
But the ones who made Mumbai, who build it, are living lives worse than dogs. In this slum, there 
is one carpenter, there is this person who makes auto body parts, there is a driver, and they 
provide service to us. If there is no carpenter we would not have furniture, if he was not there the 
houses would not be built. If there is no driver your vehicles won’t run. Without the mechanic, 
the vehicle would not be repaired. And these people lead a life of slavery. Those who make 
Mumbai run, themselves cannot even walk well and they want to make a Shanghai out of it?
122
  
This assertive approach also often leads to a more confrontational position vis-à-vis the state and 
mistrust for the electoral process, which is viewed as a means of cooptation, although the NAPM 
does organize public hearings before elections to educate and encourage slum dwellers to vote. A 
part of this mistrust for the electoral process stems from the realization of inadequacy of electoral 
politics to bring about any structural transformation. Medha Patkar lays out NAPM’s broader 
vision of alternative politics in an interview in a recent talk show in which she states: 
What is politics? Is it only electoral politics? The sphere of electoral politics is too limited. 
Politics means changing the relations between the state and society and bringing about a desired 
transformation. It is about resolving the conflict between the state and its people.  And that is 
what we are doing. Real politics is going beyond the limited politics of votes and notes. It does 
not mean that people from the movement should not enter electoral politics, but there is a need to 
empower the politics engendered by the peoples’ movements which is a kind of alternative 
politics.
123
  
However, there were some dissident voices regarding the notion of politics that emerged when I 
interview some other activists associated with the movement. Some of these activists contested 
the 2009 Maharashtra state assembly elections as independent candidates. These activists were 
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particularly critical of the movement’s stance toward electoral politics. One such activist who 
had lost the elections was particularly vocal about the futility of movements in influencing 
government’s decisions from being outside of the establishment. According to him, unless there 
was a visible “political threat” to the entrenched political candidates nothing was going to 
change. In this regard, he was very critical of the manner in which electoral candidates were 
supported by the movement. In his interview he mentioned to me that independent candidates 
like him who have been part of the movement did not stand any chance to win when voting in 
slums is encouraged on party-lines, guided with the sole objective of keeping communal parties 
such as the BJP out of power. He vents out his frustration in the following manner: 
They ask you to vote for the same candidates who tore down your house. Then why would 
anyone listen to you? For five years you struggle for you houses and at the end of five years you 
ask people to vote for the same people…It does not matter who wins or loses. But at least don’t 
snatch away the right to vote of the person who has lost his home. Let the person vote as he/she 
pleases. If you keep voting for the same party and people, they know these people are helpless 
and no matter they will vote for us. You do not have a conscience.
124
 
This issue of elections also came up in NAPM’s 7th Biennial Convention at Kushinagar, Uttar 
Pradesh in 2008. In one of the sessions on “alternative politics” a central issue that was raised 
was “whether [NAPM’s] struggle is sufficient to create an alternative politics or an alternative 
social system” or if there was a need for any efforts. In this regard, the issue contesting for 
elections was raised. The key debate was whether contesting for elections enlarged the influence 
of the movement or did it reduce its effectiveness. On the one hand, people argued for a value-
based politics and opined that the Alliance had no role in the corrupt political process. Further, it 
was also observed that mainstream politics has proved to be incapable of solving the problems of 
the masses therefore, there was a need for people’s movements. On the other hand, some felt that 
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the political revolution was part of the social revolution and that a part of the Alliance must 
accept the challenge of electoral politics and built constituencies, while the other should continue 
their struggle for a social revolution.
125
 
On the social front, the movement is routinely involved in implementing programs 
administered under several government social service schemes such as jeevan shalas (life 
schools), anganwadis (courtyard shelters) and balwadis (play schools). It has also engaged in the 
self-provisioning of housing and livelihoods through the Ghar Bachao, Ghar Banao Andolan 
(Movement to Save and Build Homes).  
 The activists of the NAPM/GBGB have displayed several repertoires of protest such as, 
political lobbying, public interest litigations, demanding information under the right to 
information act (RTI), street rallies, demonstrations, and direct non-violent action. The activists 
of the NAPM are careful to differentiate themselves from the “new” social movements of the 
1960s (they use the term “poor peoples’ movement”) and the “NGO politics,” which they find to 
be corrupt and co-opted by the state and market forces. Some of the key discourses of the 
NAPM/GBGB revolve around the notions of “illegality,” “encroachment,” “ghettoization” 
(displacement and relocation of the urban poor outside the city through what one activist referred 
to as “manufacturing slums”), and “elite cosmopolitanism.” In its critique of the popular terms 
such as the above which are routinely used against the poor, the movement cleverly employs a 
strategy of what I like to call a “strategy of discursive inversion,” whereby activists counter these 
labels by inverting their meaning in the context of the elite subversive (illegal and encroaching) 
activities of the rich. A quote by an activist in relation to “encroachment” by the elites in the city 
will illustrate this strategy:  
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Take the case of Hiranandani (one of the city’s richest builders). He bought the land for 40 rupees 
an acre and is also obligated to provide low-income housing to people…In Mumbai Central there 
is a 60 floor building being constructed encroaching on a public road. How can that [building] be 
constructed on the roads? Why does the road always go through poor peoples’ houses?126 
 
 
Figure 10. The Atria Millennium Mall in Worli, Mumbai. It is alleged that the land 
for on which this mall is built was actually allocated for a low-income housing 
project, however the builder blatantly disregarding planning regulations built a 
high-class mall that now houses showrooms of Swarowski,  Rolls Royce, and BMW 
and also a 4-D cinema theater and entertainment plaza.  
Source: Author (2009). 
 
However, to counter the popular meaning such as “encroachment” requires hard work. First, 
activists have to excavate strategic government information through the Right to Information Act 
(RTI) on irregularities or encroachments by the government and the rich on various issues such 
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land availability, resource utilization, and illegal land deals. Second, this information then has to 
be disseminated through relatively scarce pro-poor print media or through pamphlets during 
rallies and protests. The strategic information is often used to highlight the criminal nexus 
between the builders, politicians, and bureaucrats in the land and housing market in Mumbai. 
This strategy was most successfully used in a recent campaign to make visible the irregularities 
in a housing project that was meant for war veterans. In what is now famously referred to as 
“Adarsh housing scam,” the activists of NAPM/GBGB collected information through the RTI 
and found that houses were illegally allocated to bureaucrats and politicians. This high profile 
scandal eventually cost the then Chief Minister his job as he was made to resign in 2011 in 
opposition to strong public opinion. More recently, the NAPM/GBGB has also been involved in 
a struggle against demolition and redevelopment of a slum close to the new business district in 
the central part of the city. The activists alleged that the government favored a builder who had 
used fraudulent means to show approval of slum dwellers to redevelop the slums. In June 2011, 
Medha Patkar went on an indefinite fast after the court ruled in favor of the builder. The slum 
dwellers also have filed a criminal case against the builder, which is still pending. 
 Earlier, in 2009 the NAPM/GBGB activists had uncovered another scam allegedly 
committed by one of the most prominent builders in the city, Hiranandanis, who are also part of 
the regular stake-holders that are consulted in Mumbai’s urban affairs. Activists of 
NAPM/GBGB found that the Hiranandani had committed a fraud of more than 30,000 crore 
rupees (about 5 billion USD as per the current exchange rate) in the Powai Area Development 
Scheme. One the one hand when poor people were being evicted at various parts of the city, rich 
builders such as Hiranandani were given 300 acres of land at the rate of 40 paisa acre in the 
Hiranandani Gardens scheme. The original motive was to build houses for low and middle 
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income people, but in blatant violation of rules, the builder built luxurious apartments for the rich 
which were sold at about Rs. 4 crores each (about 600,000 USD). Following this expose, the 
builder was instructed by the Mumbai High Court in 2012 ordered Hiranandanis to stop any 
future sale of apartments and to construct 3,000 apartments for low and medium income people 
at the 1985 rate. In this context, an activist noted “millions of working class people have a right 
to decent housing and it is time state government started evicting the big builders who have 
encroached upon the public and other land meant for housing of urban poor.”127 
 Although these struggles for housing the poor are closely tied to the issue of urban space, 
they resonate far beyond it. Activists on the ground recognize this fact and understand the 
housing struggle as a part of a wider process of urban transformation in India that involves 
displacement from rural areas. When asked in an interview about what is wrong with 
Shanghaization, Medha Patkar diagnoses the problem in the following manner: 
The overall objective of our policies is to change the rural areas into towns and even 
cities….With the claim of bringing them into the mainstream, turning them urban, their resources 
are being used through the development projects for the increasing desire of the urban areas, and 
not for the benefit of rural population. No one is taking care to strengthen the rural economy by 
ensuring that the rural poor get their minimum or optimum where they are. Rather, after coming 
to cities, their services are exploited to change the face of the urban locale. Later, they are 
considered to be a burden on the city and are ruthlessly shooed off. It is very peculiar that the 
people, who use the services of these poor, are unable to bear their sight on their way to work or 
shopping (Patkar and Athialy 2005). 
Even in my interview with activists, I found a similar critique of the dominant development 
paradigm. One of the activists expressed the following in an interview:   
If development is evacuating villages and make people run away from their land then how will 
we agree on such development? Does development mean deserting people from their own 
homes? If this is development, then we refuse to accept it. If our homes are dismantled, if we are 
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made homeless, then how can it be development? We consider development as that which 
understands our needs. If you want to do anything on our land then first make arrangements for 
us. However, you cannot make arrangements anywhere you please, where there are no facilities. 
You should not send us to places where there is no bus service, or school, or a place to play or no 
proper access road. Send us to a place where there are facilities give us a key of that home and 
tell us that this is your home then we would certainly leave our place. We need basic minimum 
services.
128
 
This assertive stance is also evident in manner in which security of tenure is understood by the 
poor and how it differs from a legal, state-centric definition of tenure. The state understanding of 
tenure is essentially tied to land and is defined as a series of rights related to citizenship, property 
rights, and access to services. But the poor understand tenure as a part of an overall “right to the 
city” that includes access to essential services such as food, water, shelter, work, education, 
sanitation, and health (Bhide 2009). Therefore, in the above quote the activist is not merely 
demanding a relocation, but relocation to a place that gives him access to various basic services. 
A long time housing activist in Mumbai, P. K. Das, too sees the question of housing in 
the city as part of the larger movement for democratic rights. In this sense it ceases to be merely 
an issue of physical space, in terms of an actual house or space but represents larger issues of 
political, civil, and human rights. Therefore, according to him, these are primarily struggles of 
“recognition” that have to do with human rights and dignity of the urban poor and about 
recognizing their capacity and capabilities. Therefore, housing struggles should go beyond 
opposing and stopping evictions or the “right to stay,” but should engage with larger issues of 
urban transformation in the city of challenging the market-led development policy related to 
land-use, development planning, and infrastructure planning. In this context Das is critical of the 
leadership of emerging social movements in providing specific alternatives. Das argues that:  
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The leadership is becoming like the mainstream political leaderships, which is generalizing 
everything, which is speaking generally about everything. They may be forceful, they may be 
effective, they may even be popular, but beyond this point they do not have alternatives. A 
movement cannot last for long or grow if it is only rooted in generalization. In order to provide 
alternative, it [a social movement] has to deepen its knowledge and its capabilities in areas of 
health, education, housing, science and technology and in other spheres of life. Because this is not 
happening social movements do not induce professionals.
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Right to work: From Shrampur (city of labor) to Singapore   
As discussed earlier, the formation of textile mills in Bombay led to the emergence of a unique 
working class culture in Bombay within the mill district that came to be known as Girangaon. 
However, with the decline of the textile mill industry, accelerated by the 1982-83 strike vast 
tracts of “vacant” mill lands are now the locus of contemporary urban redevelopment. Although, 
most of these mills have been closed by the mill owners, their “vacant” premises still house 
many mill worker families who were provided housing on the mill premises. These families, who 
have now joined the ranks of the new urban poor since losing work, are now struggling to find 
alternative means of livelihood and housing. But more importantly, they are waging a losing 
battle to preserve their unique working class culture in the city which no longer needs them.  
Praveen Ghag, Secretary of the GKSS, explained to me the significance of this city-
within-a-city called Girangaon in a personal interview: 
Do not think that this is an exaggeration, but there was a time when people used to know time 
when they used to hear a siren of the mill. They used to blow a siren early in the morning at 7 am 
when the mill opened and when people went to work, then again at 12 pm in the afternoon for 
lunch, and later when the workers went home from work in the evening. This is the way 
Girangoan scheduled its day. In that same Girangaon, about 250,000 people were employed in the 
mills. Apart from work, they also had a place to live in the chawls. They also had municipal 
schools like Shirodkar and Balmohan where they would send their children. They also had access 
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to health services due to government hospitals such as KEM. The point that I am trying to make 
is Girangaon was not only a place of work, but it was city in itself that catered to all your 
existential needs from work, to education, to health. It was a place where everybody from the 
poor to the rich lived. Even in terms of entertainment, there were cinema theatres like the 
Bharatmata and Plaza where one could watch a Marathi movie for two or three rupees. There was 
also the Hanuman Theater where people could watch a tamasha...
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        Figure 11. Rehearsing for the Ganesh festival in Girangaon, the mill-district of    
        Mumbai. 
        Source: Author (2009). 
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Figure 12. Masala Galli (Spice Alley) in Girangaon 
Source: Author (2009). 
Several NGOs, civic groups, and trade unions are struggling to preserve the mill lands for 
the textile workers and their families. Most prominent among them is the Girni Kamgar 
Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS) or The Textile Workers Struggle Committee. The Band (closed) Girni 
Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (BGKSS), which later became the GKSS, was formed in 1989 to 
resist the “lock-outs” of the mills by the mill-owners after the 1982-83 strike. In a span of two 
years during 1987-89, six mills were closed down by the mill-owners, displacing almost 20,000 
workers. These events led to workers coming together to organize, putting into action their 
historic organizing skills that were nurtured through years of militant trade union struggles. 
Meetings were held at the gates of closed mills to encourage workers to organize, however there 
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was not much support from the labor unions which had been demoralized after the failure of the 
1982-83 strike (Iswalkar 2009:4). The BGKSS organized a national convention of textile 
workers facing similar issues across India. Some of the demands outlined were: nationalization 
of mills, a put a stop to the modernization of mills, to avoid worker retrenchment, and an 
unemployment benefit for the unemployed workers. Letters were sent out to various ministers in 
the government. However, there was no response from them. It was then decided to disrupt the 
state legislative assembly meeting in Mumbai. In order to do that, activists stopped members of 
the assembly from going to the meeting by locking them indoors in their temporary government 
accommodation. This garnered enough attention for their grievance to be taken up for discussion 
in the assembly. This was followed with indefinite fasts by activists to protest against the DC 
Rules of 1991.
131
 A one-day “bandh” (shutdown) was observed by shop-owners in Girangaon in 
solidarity with the fasting workers. Finally, on the ninth day, a delegation of government met the 
fasting workers and gave reassurances on the question of restarting the mills. However, despite 
workers’ resistance the government decided to side with the mill-owners in allowing the sale of 
the mill-lands under DC Rules 1991.  
Praveen Ghag in his interview explains how the DC rules were a clever maneuver of the 
state and mill-owner nexus to ultimately close down the mill due to the huge profits in 
redevelopment of mills: 
After the 1982-83 strike 100,000 workers did not go back to work. And with the remaining 
workers who went to work in the mills, these mill owners were not interested in running these 
mills. The mill owners were looking for a way out to sell these mill lands in order to make a lot of 
money by redeveloping them....therefore in 1991-92 the Sharad Pawar government came out with 
the Development Control rules... This was an act developed by the government in favour of the 
mill owners. Initially it was decided that and the surplus land of the mills would be sold by the 
                                                          
131
 See the earlier discussion on the DC rules on page 150 in the context of mill redevelopment. 
169 
 
mill owner and that money was to be used for the modernization of the mill. People were told that 
this act was formulated to ensure that the mills kept running. But after formulating the act the mill 
owners sold the land, but the money earned from the sales were not reinvested in the 
modernization of the mills.
132
 
From 1991 onwards, the incidents of mill closure increased and the mill-owners used various 
tactics to close down the mills. The mill owners systematically cut the power and electricity 
connections in the mills, workers were made to sit without any work, various mill departments 
were closed down and thereby, created this belief that these mills were not going to work. At the 
same time the owners offered the workers the carrot of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS). 
Therefore the workers had no other choice but to accept it as when they had earlier approached 
the courts for non-payment of salaries, the court did not rule in their favor.
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In 2001, there were further amendments made to the DC Rules of 1991 which allowed 
the mill-owners to give even less land for low-income housing than the earlier legislation. In 
February 2005, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed in the Mumbai High Court 
challenging the legality of the 2001 amendment. On April 1, 2005 the court stayed the 
redevelopment of the mill land. However, on April 20, 2005 mill-owners filed an appeal against 
the High Court verdict in the Supreme Court after which the Supreme Court granted permission 
to seven centrally-owned and five privately-owned mills to go ahead with the redevelopment 
plans. Following this, two centrally-owned mills and two private mills were sold in June-July 
2005. The sale of one of the centrally-owned mills was challenged by another PIL in the Mumbai 
High Court in August 2005. However, the Supreme in a later judgment upheld the sale of mill-
land, clearing the way for redevelopment and sale of other mill-lands in Mumbai.  
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In 1994, a “Save Girangaon Campaign” was launched which explicitly aimed at 
preserving the working class culture of Girangaon by arresting the “mills to malls” 
transformation that was currently underway (see Figure 13). During the campaign city’s several 
noted theater and film personalities and poets lent their support to the workers. A famous poet 
Narayan Surve presented a lavni (a regional art form that includes dancing and singing) that 
sarcastically portrayed how the city was been transformed from Shrampur (city of labor) to 
Singapore (Iswalkar 2009:36). 
 
Figure 13. One of the several mills in the mill-district of Girangaon that is been 
redeveloped into new offices or residences. 
Source: Author (2009). 
 
Praveen Ghag in his interview explained to me how this “mills-to-malls” redevelopment 
is proving to be detrimental to the city. Citing the example of Phoenix Mill (see Figure 6 on 
p.147), he argues that this had proved to be a bad precedent as the malls have led to severe 
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congestion around the area as the motorized elite come to entertain themselves in these places. 
He further explains that the IT industry that came after the closure of mills cannot absorb the 
workers who had lost their jobs as seventy per cent of them were in the age-range of 40-50 and 
did not possess the skills required for these new jobs. In addition to not having a good chance at 
getting reemployed, the workers were running out of their VRS savings. In this situation the 
former textile workers got systematically marginalized in the city. Some sold their rooms and 
tenements in order to start a new business, however, many suffered losses. Therefore, they had 
no other choice but to leave the city and return to their villages or move to the suburbs where the 
cost of living was cheaper. Even those who returned to their village found themselves in a 
strange setting as because their families had moved to the city more than hundred years ago, they 
have no knowledge of farming. However, even today the workers who migrated from Western 
Maharashtra and Konkan and how were given tenements in the malls still continue to live in the 
mill premises. There about 6000 people living across 17 mills. But according to the rules they 
had no legal claim over these tenements as the mills were closed. However, they had nowhere 
else to go.
134
      
With the decreased allotment of land for worker’s housing only 25 acres were now 
available than the earlier 100 acres. However, with further pressure from the workers’ 
organizations the government decided to increase the FSI of these buildings to 4. As a result of 
this around 60-65,000 houses will be constructed. Further, the workers’ organizations have also 
managed to get the government to create an employment exchange for the mill workers that can 
help in their reemployment. This is by no means a small achievement considering how heavily 
the odds were stacked against them. However, the workers’ struggle still continues through the 
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courts to secure housing and employment for the remaining 100,000 plus workers who lost their 
jobs due to the closure of the mills.    
Ghag sums up the discussion about the effacement of the working poor and small 
businesses in the context of contemporary urban redevelopment very starkly and it is worth 
quoting here at length: 
If you observe the developments happening in Mumbai in the name of transforming it into 
Shanghai, for example, they have developed this skyscraper where once there stood a mill, 
Morarji mill, where about 5000 to 6000 workers worked. This was a secured job. They did not 
have to look elsewhere. But this kind of “development” is destroying the poor and uprooting the 
working class as they cannot sustain in this environment. He [worker] is surround by plots that 
cost about one to two crores [about 160,000-330,000 USD], but he do not have a job. This whole 
development is anti-poor. It is not just the worker, but even small shop-keepers, chaiwalas [tea-
stall owners] are finding it hard to sustain. Earlier in Lalbaug there used to be small cloth dealers 
or sweet mart vendors now they are all extinct. They are all thrown out of the mainstream 
development process. They developed this Moraji Mill land, previously small traders, street 
vendors used to be all around it, but now they are no longer there. These people were given a 
lump sum amount by the developer and were driven away. This development is being designed in 
such a way that the poor should not live in this city. Therefore, we oppose such this kind of 
development. Mumbai’s land has to be allotted to the working class community. And when 
development plans are designed, you must include these communities and they should be 
considered as the focal point of the development strategy. In this way we continue to fight the 
government through this movement. Till date no industry has allotted land for the development of 
60,000 houses to its workers after that industry has been shut down. Whatever we have achieved 
is still a small share. The workers must receive their fair share. So our struggle continues...
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Right over urban space 
Poverty and lack of gainful employment in the rural areas and smaller towns drive most of the 
people to the Indian cities. However, due to lack of opportunities for formal employment (which 
has increased in the recent years due to deindustrialization and a decline of manufacturing in the 
city) and inadequate skills to gain employment in the emerging trade and service economy, there 
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is increasing number of people doing informal work in the city. It is estimated that there are 
around 250,000 street vendors in Mumbai, the most in any city in India. They consist of low-
skilled rural migrants or migrants from smaller towns. Also among these are former industrial 
workers who have lost their jobs and are compelled to work in the informal sector. It is estimated 
that out of the 250,000 street vendors in Mumbai almost 30 percent are former mill workers. 
(Bhowmik 2006; Bhowmik and More 2003).  
For the urban poor, street vending is the most feasible means of earning a livelihood as it 
requires minor financial investment or professional skills. Much of the urban economy of street 
vending is based on the sale of household goods such as clothes, leather and plastic goods 
produced in the small-scale industries, as well as the sale of daily food items such as vegetables, 
fruits, and low-cost meals. Street vending, therefore, provides low-priced commodities to the 
urban poor, who cannot afford to shop in up-scale malls or departmental stores.  
To get more insights into the issues of street vendors, I interviewed Hariram Yadav, the 
Secretary of the Bombay Hawkers’ Union. Bombay Hawkers Union has been in existence since 
1963 and has been involved in several campaigns for preserving street vendors’ rights. Yadav 
has been with the union since 1980.  He began by explaining to me the importance of street 
vending to people in Mumbai, poor and rich alike: 
Hawkers sell cheapest goods to the public. It is cheapest. Now in Nariman Point, people who 
come from outside they serve them, now there is no hotel in that area, there is one Oberoi Hotel. 
In Oberoi Hotel, some ten-twelve years ago we had dug out this information that one type of food 
is charged about Rs.12000/-. Now here people who work in office they come on the streets to eat. 
There are clerks, peons, security guards; there is no arrangement of food available for these 
people. That is why hawkers used to work in that area. Now they have evacuated that place.
136
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However, the city-elite that consists of the government officials, upper-and middle-class 
residents, and shop-owners see street vendors as a nuisance. The municipal government looks at 
them as a problem of urban governance, obstruction of traffic, and crime. The upper- and 
middle-class residents (through their resident associations and NGOs) confront street vendors for 
their alleged encroachment of public space which according to them deprives pedestrians their 
right to walk. However, Hariram Yadav counters this by pointing to the double standards of how 
everyone turns a blind eye toward the encroachment by the elite in following words: 
When you pass V.T station, you will see it has been cleared [of street vendors], so is P.M road, if 
you go by the P.M road you will notice that they have allotted parking space. In the same place, 
previously hawkers used to sit. As a rule parking has to keep on one side and not on both sides, 
but what they have done is that parking space is kept on both the side and has blocked the roads. 
Every day so many people pass through it and no one complaint, but if they see a hawker doing is 
independent business, then they cause nuisance… One shop keeper owns his shop but does not 
own the street, but now they have instated security guard on the streets. This is dadagiri [bossing] 
of the BMC and the police; they support them. Before that hawkers used to sit there…. So slowly 
the foot paths are acquired by the shop keepers, they want to show off that they have four cars. 
That is how it is. Today car parking is a big issue and so there is lot nuisance created because of 
it. And every time shops are renovated and repaired they acquire one foot of extra space….So 
how will the roads be saved? 
There is also misconception about the so-called unhygienic practices of street vendors. The street 
vendors counter this notion by pointing out that unlike popular perception of street vending as 
being disorderly and dirty, it is actually quite regulated. For example, one of the street vendors I 
interviewed informed me this: 
A sugarcane juice vendor has been given conditions. There are 35 conditions which they are 
expected to follow. Every sugarcane juice cart owner is compelled to keep a dust bin, and they 
keep the bin and if you notice you will see that not a single piece of waste is thrown on the road. 
They instantly call the waste collector or throw the waste in the public waste bin on the streets.
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The “world class” vision of beautifying the city basically means sanitizing public space by 
getting rid of street vending. This has led to increasing regulation of public space by the 
municipal government and its refusal to legalize the activities of the street vendors, as well as 
violent evictions and confiscation of property during raids. This status of illegality renders the 
street venders vulnerable and reduces their power to negotiate entitlements from the state. Also, 
it is alleged that the illegal status benefits to keep the system of extortion by corrupt government 
officials and local goons. For example, Yadav in his interview informed me: 
Neither the corporation nor the state government is doing their job. A Commissioner is posted for 
three years. His primary motive is to please the wealthy. The whole system is corrupt. In each 
ward, every hawker has to pay a hafta (bribe) of Rs.2000 to 2500 per month. It is immaterial 
whether he [vendor] has a license or not. Both have to give a bribe. And they [municipal officials] 
are troubling the hawker due to pressure from wealthy. They do not have any official policy on 
this. This is their personal policy. For example, if a ward officer feels this hawker should not be 
seen in this area, he can invoke sections 313 and 314 under the Commissioner’s Act to confiscate 
any property on the streets.
138
 
However, this status of illegality is very aptly questioned by a member of a prominent hawkers’ 
union in the following words: 
If a candidate we vote for wins the election is considered legal, then how come my existence 
becomes illegal? The one whom I give birth becomes legal and I become illegal. How this is 
possible? If people who win elections by our votes are all legal then nobody has the right to call 
us illegal.
139
 
However, it is not only the state that the street vendors have to fight against, but also the middle-
classes in the city. One of the “world class city” visions in Mumbai involves beautifying the city 
through a sustained campaign called Mumbai Chakachak (literally, Mumbai Shining). The 
campaign is an outcome of a collaborative effort of local government agencies and a few NGOs 
such as CitiSpace and Clean-Sweep. This has essentially led to increasing regulation of public 
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space by the municipal government and its refusal to legalize the activities of the street vendors. 
Organizations such as CitiSpace whose agenda is to keep the streets clean and free of street 
vendors have long championed the cause of municipal markets to house street vendors. 
However, these recommendations have no with the existing realities in the city. Specifically 
responding to this question of municipal markets, Hariram Yadav states in during the interview: 
In Mumbai, there are very few municipal markets. There is one market in each ward for 
vegetables. There are other markets which has 250 vending slots, in some there are 150 vending 
slots, so if 50,000 people come to the market to purchase from 150 vending slots then how will 
they meet the needs of the people? The spaces allotted for the markets are acquired by the 
builders. Even the garden spaces are acquired by the builders.
140
  
However, street vendors represent one of the larger and more organized sections within the 
informal economy and have had a long history of organizing. Some of the main issues that the 
hawkers unions in Mumbai are actively involved in currently are: the implementation of the 
National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, passed in 2004; fighting corporatization and FDI in 
retail; protesting against the JNNURM; fighting the National Food Safety Bill that establishes 
standards of hygiene equivalent to five star hotels; and social security for the informal sector.
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Along with organized protest, the everyday politics of the street vendors involves negotiating 
with the government officials through bribes and gaining patronage of local goons (Anjaria 
2006). Anjaria (2006) describes how, by what is termed as “official legality,” the unlicensed 
hawkers have to deal with a host of state agencies in their daily activities. One such example is 
the pauti (receipt) system, under which the hawkers have to pay state officials “unauthorized 
occupation cum refusal charges.” Anjaria (2006) feels this is a “clever maneuver of the state to 
collect revenue from an officially illegal population” (pp. 2140-41). The informal mechanisms of 
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street vendors also serve to self-regulate and preserve urban space, contrary to most the 
perceptions of the city elites. 
In recent years, a favorable court judgment, an international declaration, and a national 
policy have provided a shot in the arm to the efforts of organizing the street vendors in India. In 
1989, the Supreme Court, in relation to a public interest litigation announced that as per the 
constitution no one can be denied the right to carry on trade or business on the street pavements, 
if it was properly regulated. Similarly, the Bellagio Declaration of 1998 was instrumental in 
articulating the demands of street vendors across the world as well as in the formation of the 
National Alliance of Street Vendors of India (NASVI) in 1998. Since its formation in 1998, 
NASVI has tried to facilitate networking among the street vendors, trade unions, and NGOs. It 
has also tried to study various problems related to street vending through survey research in 
order to justify the rights of street vendors; especially of making street vendors an integral part of 
urban policies and granting them a legal status. In 2004, the National Policy on Urban Street 
Vendors was passed which calls for recognition and legalization of “natural markets.” The policy 
also recognizes street vendors’ basic rights and the importance of the services they provide both 
socio-economically and in terms of urban planning (Bhowmik 2003 N.d.). 
Although, the Shanghaization project seems to have gained a strong foot hold in the city, 
it is one among several competing visions of urban development in the city. We have already 
seen one alternative version in the form of the struggles of the urban poor to claim their “right to 
the city.” In the following sections we will discuss a few more projects that did not necessarily 
emerge within the framework of neoliberalization of Mumbai, but nonetheless shape the 
contours of urban development in important ways. And it is will only be evident at the end of 
this section the impossibility of a single idea or ideology to define Mumbai’s space.   
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Other Competing Claims on Mumbai 
According to Gyan Prakash (2002), a city is a layered structure of power, experience, and 
memory where class, ethnicity, religion, economy, culture, and politics are weaved into the very 
texture of the city and in the spaces and rhythms of daily life.  
Bombay/Mumbai is and has always been a quintessential immigrant city and India’s 
ideal-type of cosmopolitanism. In 1891, out of Bombay’s total population of about 800,000, only 
a quarter were born in the city (Kidambi 2007:22). Following Independence and the partition of 
India and Pakistan, Bombay’s population grew rapidly between 1941 and 1951, especially in the 
suburbs (Pacione 2006: 231). With over half of the population being of non-Marathi ethnicity, 
Mumbai has emerged as India’s most cosmopolitan city represented by immigrants from 
western, northern, as well as southern parts of India. 
Mercantile groups from Gujarat (predominantly the Parsis, along with other trading and 
business castes of Hindus, Jains and Muslims) were encouraged by the East India Company to 
settle in Bombay in order to develop a trading center. The bulk of the local Marathi-speaking 
population in the city was engaged in non-commercial activities, with only a small minority of 
western educated elites working as professionals. The establishment of the cotton textile industry 
in the mid-19
th
 century transformed induced additional migration of peasants from the 
countryside, particularly from the coastal areas of Konkan in the south of Maharashtra, who 
came to work in the textile mills of Bombay. This led to the formation of a distinct working class 
mill district known as Girangaon (the village of mills). The population of Bombay grew 
exponentially since the 1940s, especially after independence, with the influx of migrants from 
what is now Pakistan. Other migrants included people from various deprived castes (such as 
Dalits) from the hinterlands of Bombay and other regions of India. The unavailability of 
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adequate housing to accommodate the rising tide of migrants in the city led to the proliferation of 
slums, which have become a characteristic feature of contemporary Mumbai. Thus, we find that 
the ethnic, class, caste, and religious divisions in Mumbai were maintained by the changing 
economic structure of the city (Kosambi 1995; Patel 2003, 2006).  
It is in within this rich history of layered cosmopolitanism that we can trace the 
contemporary ideological strands that simultaneously constituted as well as contested it. At 
various moments in Bombay’s/Mumbai’s history there emerged distinct imaginaries, some of 
which continue to exert claims over Mumbai’s space and imagination.  
Mumbai of the Marathi Manoos (person) 
On Sunday, October 19, 2008, north Indian candidates appearing for the all-India Railway 
Recruitment Board entrance exam in Mumbai were beaten up in Mumbai. Anti-north Indian 
slogans were heard outside the exam centers. The people behind these attacks were activists of 
the newly formed political outfit called Maharashtra Navnirman Sena or Maharashtra (MNS) 
roughly translated as Maharashtra Recreation Army.
142
 This party is a splinter group of the Shiv 
Sena (SS), which has been a dominant force in the local politics of Mumbai since the 1960s, 
under the leadership of Balasaheb Thackeray. In 2006, Balasaheb Thackeray’s nephew Raj, 
popularly considered as the heir apparent to the ailing patriarch broke-away from the party to 
form him own party MNS. Led by a similar persona and oratory skills as his uncle, Raj 
Thackeray and the party’s aggressive street politics, the MNS has already made its mark on the 
political landscape of the city and the state. In their first outing as a political outfit in the 2009 
state assembly elections, the party won 13 seats (out of 288) in the state, splitting the Marathi 
vote with its parent party the SS in Mumbai city. In Mumbai the party won six seats and a 23.8 
per cent of votes and emerged as the second largest party in the metropolis after the ruling 
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Congress-NCP coalition. On the other hand, its cousin SS and its ally BJP lost 30 per cent of 
their seats in Mumbai due to the MNS.
143
 Quite an achievement for a party that came into been a 
few years ago in 2006. However, in the latest municipal elections in 2012, Shiv Sena-BJP 
alliance won majority seats 107 out of total 227 seats (Shiv Sena 70, BJP 32), while MNS won 
28 seats.
144
 So together, the SS and MNS won almost 100 seats. These elections results bear 
testimony to the popularity of the MNS and SS among the local Marathi population. 
In its 2009 election manifesto, the MNS listed the following objectives among others: 
~raising the status of Maharashtra State, its people and the Marathi language to its resplendent 
glory 
~development of the Marathi language 
~to serve the interest of the Marathi Manu—a person living in the State and born to Marathi 
parents, or one, though of a different linguistic origin, born in Maharashtra, who speaks Marathi 
and loves Maharashtra. 
~To give justice to the Marathi Manus, MNS will do everything from establishing a Marathi 
Language Academy, fighting with the anti-Marathi lobby, making Marathi a compulsory subject 
in all schools, insisting for Marathi name-boards on shops and establishments to broadening the 
knowledge base in Marathi. These activities, constructive as well as street-level campaigning will 
be pursued at the same time. 
~eliminate the interference of the Non-Marathi power-mongers from outside the State in the 
State’s politics and social life thereby reinforcing the existence of Maharashtra for the Marathi 
Manus. 
The roots of the above nativist “sons of the soil” ideology lay in the 1960s with the emergence of 
a regional movement for separate statehood for Maharashtrians with the demand that Bombay be 
made the capital of that new state and that the Marathi-speaking population be given priority in 
terms of employment (Gupta 1982; Katzenstein 1979; Lele 1995).
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 This popular Samyukta 
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Maharashtra Movement (SMM) brought to the fore the contradictions between the dominant 
Marathi agricultural elite of Maharashtra and the non-Marathi elite in the industry. Although the 
movement was dominated by the left forces, there was a section of staunchly anti-communist 
within the movement, one of which was represented by an eminent journalist K.S. Thackeray, 
Balasaheb Thackeray’s father. With the formation of Maharashtra the movement lost its potency. 
The period, following the creation of the new state and the formation of Shiv Sena in 1966 was 
marked by political and economic crisis due to slow growth and rising prices (Lele 1995). It is in 
within this crisis that Shiv Sena was born and took up the cause of mobilizing the disenchanted 
Marathi middle and lower class and caste groups who shared this perception of disadvantage 
compared to the relatively well off south Indian migrants. Along with this anti-migrant program 
it also violently opposed the communists in the city by breaking the backbone of the left-led 
trade unions. However, it became more successful in the late 1960s when it began mobilizing 
underemployed and unemployed youth in the city and therefore, slums became the main 
constituencies of the SS. It began to provide financial assistance to migrants and slum dwellers 
toward their basic needs of food, leisure, and housing. In a situation where land was becoming 
scarce, the SS used its muscle power to encroach on lands and enable construction of slums 
creating this image of the dada or elder brother or protector among the slum dwellers (Patel 
2004; 2006). It continued to maintain its presence by enacting mass spectacles during various 
religious festivals. Thus, a stable Marathi audience was created by the SS through a politics of 
nativism and violence that conveniently constructed the “other” according to its waxing and 
waning influence. Initially it grew out of a movement to incorporate Bombay within the state of 
Maharashtra during the period of reorganization of states after independence. In the later period, 
it exploited the crisis of the 1960s in fueling anti-outsider sentiments among the unemployed 
182 
 
Marathi youth. As its influence began to fade in the 1970s, the Shiv Sena regenerated itself 
through right-wing Hindu supremacist politics.  
In the early 1980s, the SS began to assume a religious overtone by claiming to be a party 
of the Hindus. A turning point in this regard was in 1984, when it formed a political alliance with 
the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in a context of its losing appeal in Bombay. Lele (1995: 204) 
argues that the material basis for the “saffronization” of the Shiv Sena was provided by its 
involvement in the emerging “predatory capitalism” based on the new capital-state-crime 
nexus.
146
 With expansion of Bombay’s illicit commercial and financial links based on real estate, 
drug trafficking, and arms places such as Dubai became safe havens for this predatory 
capitalism. In a context of increasing economic opportunities for Indian Muslims in the middle-
east, the Shiv Sena conveniently used images of individual Muslim dons of crime syndicates 
operating in the middle-east led to criminalize the Muslims and spreading anti-Muslim 
sentiments. This anti-Muslim sentiment was also generated by carefully orchestrated riots in 
different part of the city in order to gain sympathy for its cause. Muslims were portrayed as being 
aggressive, conspiratorial, and criminal, while the Shiv Sena was portrayed as a “righteous 
vigilante organization” serving to protect Hindu communities (Lele 1995: 202). The support for 
the ideology of Hindutva continued to grow throughout 1980s and in Bombay for the first time 
the Shiv Sena was able to gain control of the Bombay Municipal Corporation in the 1985 
elections.  Moreover, the alliance also claimed state power in the mid-1990s and officially 
renamed Bombay as Mumbai. Today, the splinter group of the Shiv Sena, the MNS, perpetuates 
this anti-migrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence in Mumbai. This growing influence of the 
Shiv Sena and the MNS is considered by scholars as the “decosmopolitanization” or 
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“provincialization” of Mumbai as seen in the attempts to claim Mumbai as Marathi and Hindu 
(Appadurai 2000; Varma 2004).  However, its creation and sustenance as an urban movement is 
rooted in the modern economic and social fabric of the city, what Hansen (2001) refers to as 
“vernacular modernity.” 
The Mumbai mafia 
Perhaps one of the most under researched, but widely acknowledged feature of Mumbai’s 
culture, economy, and politics is Mumbai’s mafia. It influences practically every spheres of city 
life—business (film production, real estate, gold smuggling), administration, and politics (Varma 
2004). The “underworld” of extortion, smuggling, drug trafficking, and drug peddling emerged 
within the state-sponsored capitalism that regulated imports, thereby fueling the growth of black-
market smuggling. However, with liberalization of the Indian economy with the economic 
reforms in the 1990s, the underworld has diversified its portfolio to include the real estate 
market. Liberalization has led to the entry of transnational capital into the city that has spurred 
the growth of “casino capitalism” and spiraling real estate prices in the city (Nijman 2000). It is 
in this suitable speculative environment that the mafia (with the illicit supported of the nexus of 
politicians, bureaucrats, and the police) has emerged as a key figure in Mumbai’s land 
development and local politics (Weinstein 2008). The initial involvement of criminal gangs in 
the real estate was in the context of “sick” textile mills, where their help was sought to discipline 
workers who resisted the sale of mill lands. The story of mill murders such as that of the textile 
mill owner Sunit Khatau also bear testimony to the growing influence of the underworld 
(D’monte 2002).  
 In 2007, there an arrest of four hit men in Mumbai brought the builder-underworld nexus 
to the fore. Earlier the underworld used to play a support role to the builder in terms of helping 
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the builder vacate or gain control of a property. However, with the boom of the real estate has 
started attracted the underworld to engage directly into the business of construction. In a very 
bollywood like script, a developer who was involved in a Rs. 500 crore (around 84 million as per 
current exchange rate) was kidnapped at the request of a rival builder and forced to meet with a 
notorious gangster in prison, who threatened the builder to let go of the claim for the project. The 
threatened builder in return approached a politician with links with the underworld to kill the 
rival builder. However, as the shooters were waiting for the other rival builder to come out of a 
hotel they were arrested by the police.
147
 Stories like these are becoming commonplace in the 
real estate business. Interestingly, a newspaper article points out that increasing people’s 
participation in the redevelopment process is actually leading to common people, who earlier 
remained unaffected by the gang rivalries, are now getting caught up in this dirty game. For 
example, in 2008, residents of various co-operative housing societies demonstrated against the 
growing builder, politician, and bureaucrat nexus. One of the residents alleged that the when she 
refused to go with the decision of the building’s managing committee to appoint a particular 
builder, her signatures were forged and when she challenged the forgery the builder threatened to 
kill her and abduct her daughter. According to her when she went to approach the authorities for 
help, the builder would be tipped off and he would be there at the scene and no action would be 
taken against him. In another incident a lady without any notice was evicted from her apartment 
with the help of the police.
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 Many a times the builders act as front men for the mafia in various redevelopment 
projects. In 2008, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) publicized a tender for building 
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residential and commercial buildings on slums, it was found that as many as 25 proposals came 
from builders who were associated with the Dawood Ibrahim, a notorious criminal who runs 
crime syndicate and is now also known to have links with the terrorist outfits in Pakistan.
149
   
R.N. Sharma (2007:292) argues, that real increase in housing prices is due to the speculation and 
profiteering by businessmen and points out that at any point in time, over 15 per cent of the 
newly constructed units in the city remain open for speculation which earns the promoter and 
builder 100 to 500 per cent returns on their investment, which has to be shared with the 
politicians, bureaucrats, and the mafia.     
The continued nativist appeal of Shiv Sena in the urban context of Mumbai highlights the 
fact that polarization and social exclusion is as much as part of the Indian domestic political 
social structure as it is of global forces (Heller 2010). In this context, Heller (2010:440) argues 
that “while the contours of inequality in Mumbai are obviously structured by market forces, they 
are also organized through a whole range of categorical inequalities of gender, caste, community, 
and ethnicity (including a complex layering of immigrant groups from different states) that 
overlap with, but do not simply reflect class differences.” In such a situation, access to basic 
resources such as work, housing, food, water, education, and health gets organized through these 
categorical inequalities (Zérah 2008). This leads to a politics of patronage based on religion and 
ethnicity where the urban poor in order to have their demands met have to interact with the state 
as clients or members of particular groups, rather than rights-bearing citizens. Moreover, their 
interactions assume the form of exchanges, not rights (Heller 2009:138). However, as 
highlighted by the emerging poor people’s movements in Mumbai we see a radical departure 
from this form of political mobilizing. By structurally unifying the urban poor across their 
categorical identities, the poor people’s movements have managed to in an assertive rights-based 
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approach make their demands. And as we see in the earlier discussions, this approach has been 
fairly successful. Even the movements such as those of the Shiv Sena and now the MNS 
although they mobilize people on the basis of their parochial identities, class based inequalities 
form the context within which they occur. Nonetheless, one cannot deny their existence as they 
cannot be completely subsumed by class. Therefore, it becomes all the more crucial that any 
genuine attempts of economic growth must go beyond growth itself and also simultaneously 
address these categorical inequalities. Moreover, the mafia poses a severe challenge to growth 
and calls for reforms in governance as well as the land market. However, these cannot happen 
without a structural transformation in the democratic polity. This highlights the need for a more 
holistic approach toward growth and not the narrow sectorally defined approach of the 
Shanghaization strategy.   
 
 
  
187 
 
CONCLUSION 
Urban development has assumed increasing importance in contemporary globalization, 
especially in the megacities of the South which are consciously trying to reposition themselves 
globally to maximize their comparative advantages. However, we need to be attentive to the 
particular socio-historical contexts within which these cities are reimagining globalist futures.  
The recent “rise” of emerging economies in Asia (particularly India and China) has 
generated an interesting set of contradictions. At the aggregate level, sustained economic growth 
in the region has led to substantial reduction in poverty and hunger. Moreover, this growth has 
been achieved without a faithful adherence to the “blue-prints” of the Washington Consensus. 
However, the economic growth has been extremely uneven, giving rise to widespread 
inequalities. In China, this is evident in the growing disparities between the rural and urban 
areas, coastal and inland regions, and city-dwellers and migrants. In India, a time of 
unprecedented national prosperity has witnessed increasing urban poverty and the severe neglect 
of the agricultural sector, reflected in its most brutal form in the increasing rates of farmers’ 
suicides in the country.  
This study tried to unravel some of the above contradictions by focusing on the 
experience of two leading cities of Asia: Shanghai and Mumbai. Cities in Asia have grown 
rapidly in recent years and have contributed significantly to their respective national growth 
rates. In the Chinese case growth has been more dramatic as seen in the complete makeover of 
Shanghai in a relatively short period of time. Shanghai’s transformation has inspired the business 
and political elite in Mumbai to devise similar strategies of fast growth. However, they seem to 
be unaware of the realities of Shanghai’s developmental path and are enamored more by the 
modernist appeal of the city. 
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The Shanghai model as it evolved in China is deeply problematic and is one of the main 
reasons for the imbalanced development in China. Formulated in the 1980s, this model was a 
precursor to China’s anti-rural bias and suppression of small scale and labor intensive 
entrepreneurship. Further, this model also has become synonymous with forcible evictions of 
vulnerable populations, corruption by real estate developers, and rural impoverishment. Finally, 
the model is extremely expensive and subsidized at the cost of investments in other crucial 
sectors such as rural development, education, and health. Even within China, this model has 
undermined the micro-economic foundations of initial Chinese growth led by small-scale rural 
entrepreneurs and has also contributed to the growing regional and income inequalities (Huang 
2008c). 
Some scholars saw the Shanghai model of development as yet another variety of a 
neoliberal model of accumulation, while a few others understood it more as a political operation 
in the context of a changing political environment in China. Nonetheless, a non state-centric 
analysis of neoliberalism that focuses on neoliberal technologies and rationalities does lend some 
support to the neoliberal thesis in relation to China.  
The demonstration effect of Shanghai’s “fast growth” is felt even beyond China, 
especially in Mumbai. In the context of a resurgent Asia, Shanghai is an attractive non-Western 
model that appeals to the political and business elite, preoccupied with sustaining the high 
growth agenda. In the particular context of Mumbai, Shanghaization is not simply a result of 
global forces acting on the local. It is historically contingent and is articulated through a variety 
of social actors at multiple scales. Therefore, Shanghaization can be understood as particular 
kind of “worlding” based on inter-referencing that takes place at a particular time in world-
history, characterized by an ascendant urban Asian world (Roy 2011). Mumbai’s “art of being 
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global” is actively constructed by a constellation of actors involving the corporate sector, the 
national and subnational states, and the urban middle classes, for whom the idea of a “world 
class city” carries great resonance. For the national state, it serves its purpose of sustaining the 
national momentum of macroeconomic growth, for the subnational state, led by powerful 
business interests a “world class city” is a tremendous opportunity for accumulating profits 
(especially through land development), while for the enriched urban-middle classes, a “world 
class city” is about realizing a consumerist ideal. 
 As a model of development, Shanghaization is narrowly focused on economic growth 
rather than the broader welfare implications of growth. Its fast growth strategy is based on real 
estate revitalization and development to spur economic growth, infrastructure, and transport 
improvement designed primarily to encourage new private (foreign) investment and property 
development. It is basically an entrepreneurially-driven, accumulation model which engenders an 
elitist reimagining of the city that caters to the educated urban middle-classes who are well 
positioned to reap the benefits of an interconnected world. In Roy’s (2011:10) words 
Shanghaization of Mumbai represents: 
[T]he production of an Asian urban capitalism that self-consciously presents itself as Asian, that 
deploys the motifs of the Asian century and that references other Asian models. In their crudest 
form, these worlding practices legitimize national projects of primitive accumulation, often 
deepening socio-spatial inequality and injustice. 
Therefore, the development visions espoused by Shanghaization are not only incapable of 
addressing issues of structural urban poverty and inequality in Mumbai, but on the contrary, 
potentially deepen already existing inequalities.  
Recent critical urban scholarship complicates our understanding of an emerging urban 
world by acknowledging contestation and uncertainty related to urban change. The contemporary 
elite worlding of Mumbai represented by Shanghaization is inherently unstable because this 
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violent form of urban development leaves the majority of the urban poor out of its vision. But the 
tenacity of resistance shown by various poor peoples’ movements in Mumbai has shown that any 
technical, top-down attempt of restructuring city space in Mumbai is bound to be met with stiff 
opposition. Through these movements, the urban poor make themselves visible by claiming their 
“right to the city.” Harvey (2004:23) defines the “right to the city” not only as individual access 
to urban resources, but also as “a collective power to reshape urbanization”—a right to change 
the city. As seen in the case of the three urban poor movements analyzed in this study, the urban 
poor in Mumbai go beyond mere access to urban resources: land, housing, and work. They also 
lay claims on the future on the city by elaborating their indispensable role in the historical 
development of the city. They claim their “right to the city” by inverting the whole logic of 
“illegality” and “encroachment” by unmasking the illegal and encroached urbanism of the elite, 
thereby calling for a “just” and “equal” city.  Moreover, this emerging urban politics in Mumbai 
transforms the discourse of citizenship from formal national state membership to its substantive 
aspects related to civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights (Holston and Appadurai 
1999). This has tremendous potential to enlarge the scope of urban development which is 
currently equated with rapid economic growth as an end-in-itself toward a more redistributive 
and inclusive growth that serves as means for broad-based development. Thus, transforming 
Mumbai into Shanghai does is not merely an economic project, but is an inherently contested 
political project that raises a fundamental question: Whose City is It?  
From Inclusive Growth to Inclusive Development 
A critique of rapid economic growth should not undermine the role of economic growth in 
development. Sustained economic growth is crucial for poverty reduction; however, for growth 
to be sustainable in the long run it should be broad-based involving all economic sectors. 
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Further, it should also be inclusive to allow contribution of large sections of the country’s labor 
force (World Bank 2009b). Therefore, inclusive growth is concerned not only with the pace of 
growth, but also with the pattern of growth.  
“Inclusiveness” as a concept encompasses equity, equality of opportunity, and protection 
in market and employment transitions (The Commission on Growth and Development 2008). 
Equity refers to creation of equal outcomes, while equality of opportunity refers to equal starting 
points. Markets are not capable of ensuring equity; therefore the government has to play an 
important role in creating equality by providing universal access to public services like health 
and education and in promoting job opportunities. In this regard, there is a need for pragmatic, 
gradual, and experimental policies that are sensitive to particular historical and social contexts. 
Growth is not an end in itself, but a means to end (broad-based development). The 
emerging consensus in development theory is that any inclusive, broad-based development has to 
have in place social institutions that are developmental (that sustain high rates of growth and are 
redistributive), socially inclusive, and democratic, respecting human development of all citizens 
(Mkandawire 2004). Rather than thinking in terms of trade-offs between equity and efficiency 
and between social and economic development, we need a supply-side “productivist approach” 
to social development that not only focuses on social capital, but which also enhances 
productivity and output, rather than relying on the conventional demand-side consumption 
approach (Nederveen Pieterse 2001). In adopting such a developmental approach there is a need 
to focus on “development as imminent change” that happens from within and which incorporates 
the needs and aspirations of most of the citizens rather than catering to a select few (Nederveen 
Pieterse 2001:126).  
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Futures 
The alarming growth of inequalities and its discontent has forced the Chinese and the Indian 
governments to address the issue of inclusive growth. In 2003, President Hu Jintao rhetorically 
moved away from the Shanghai model of development and adopted the goal of “harmonious 
society” based on a new approach of “scientific development” (kexue fazhanguan) or 
“comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development.” This new approach seeks to correct 
the earlier overemphasis on GDP-focused and reign in run-away unequal growth that neglects 
social welfare. The new official rhetoric has now shifted from “economic growth” to “social 
harmony” incorporating sustainable development and social welfare (Fewsmith 2004:1). 
Similarly, India’s Planning Commission has made inclusive growth as their goal in the eleventh 
(2007-2012) and twelfth (2012-2017) five year plans focusing on poverty reduction, bridging 
gender and regional divides, and sustainable economic growth (Government of India 2006). In 
2006, India also launched the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act or NREGA, the 
world’s largest social welfare scheme aimed at completely eliminating poverty. 
However, the agenda of inclusive growth is ridden with several challenges. In China, as 
discussed in chapter 3, the current administration has to balance competing political factions, 
including a dominant section of the “Shanghai Clique” which has vested interest in preserving 
the Shanghai model of fast growth. In India, despite all the talk of inclusive growth, there is no 
agreed upon definition of the term. Even welfare programs such as NREGA has failed to live up 
to its objectives and studies have found the program mired in widespread corruption, caste-based 
discrimination, and lack of political coordination between the center, state, and local bolides in 
running the program (Jeelani 2010). 
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 To conclude, it remains to be seen if the lofty goals of inclusion turn out to be an empty 
rhetoric, or whether they are transformed into genuine action to address issues of structural 
inequality and poverty in these two cities. Regardless, one thing is very clear, rather than chasing 
and celebrating double-digit growth rates, cities in the South need to rethink their developmental 
agenda. In the case of Mumbai, the most urgent task at hand is to provide basic amenities of 
sanitation, housing, and transportation for the majority of its citizens and to promote the small-
scale informal sector where most of its citizens toil. Simply importing “blue-prints” such as the 
Shanghai model will not only be inappropriate to the local needs of the particular society (such 
as Mumbai), but it also means adopting models which have not worked well in the first place.             
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